TITLE: The Americans Are Also Guilty

AUTHOR: Meron Benvenisti

PUB: Ha'aretz

DATE: March 1, 2001

Sources close to the U.S. secretary of state's entourage say that Colin Powell turned down offers from State Department experts to brief him before his visit to Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Apparently Powell wanted to formulate his own opinion of the situation, free of the stroking by the veterans of the "process" and to rid himself of the burden of mountains of documents that have piled up over the decade long "peace process" that has now collapsed. The declaration by the Bush Administration, that it is no longer committed to the "understandings" reached by President Clinton, has rendered them null and void, and is an indication not only of the White House's rejection of the content of those understandings, but also of the way the previous administration and its "peace team" managed the process. Irrespective of the political considerations arising from any change in office or from differing concepts, it's possible to regard the disengagement from the tradition of "the process" as a public failure for those involved in the process - from the president down to the last of Dennis Ross' aides. Indeed, it's time that the autopsy report on the peace process include the third element - the Americans - and not just deal with the Israeli and Palestinian contribution to the dismal results. There's no doubt that the main guilty parties are Yasser Arafat and Ehud Barak. Mountains of words have already accumulated in the search to find who was more to blame, who was late for the train and who was guilty of arrogance. But what about the American role in the failure? Apparently, you can't blame a mediator who invested all his energy - to the point of neglecting other issues - in settling the age-old conflict in the Holy Land, thereby endangering his own reputation as leader of the free world. If it was a failure, at least it was a noble one. But in the mediator's eagerness (which did not lack the hallmarks of personal ambition) to reach "an end to the conflict," he became a party to the process; not because he adopted the position of one side or the other, but because of his hubris in dictating "a framework of principles," and forcing Israelis and Palestinians to answer yes or no, on threat of being branded "peace refuseniks," and bringing down the wrath of the leader of the free world. And while parading as the final adjudicator on the issue, the threat of enforcement was absent, when, for someone wishing to impose a Pax Americana, it would in fact have been appropriate. Instead of speaking directly, the mediator allowed the process to become a competition over who would win the approval of the referee. True, the Americans were dragged into the catastrophic Camp David talks, and later, desperate, were tempted to formulate the "framework of principles" that produced more questions than answers. But the experts should have understood the price: there is a direct connection between the failure at Camp David and the outbreak of the violence in the territories; and the framework of principles also had a direct impact on Barak's failure at the polls. The fact that it was Barak who made the Americans convene Camp David and then publicize the Clinton Plan, is irrelevant; his positive response to that plan sealed his fate. If the Americans had not been so eager to present the "framework" Barak would not have been forced to accept it and perhaps the results of the election would have been totally different. When the catastrophe became clear, the Israelis returned to direct negotiations - without Americans - at Taba, where there was some progress. After all, the breakthroughs in the peace process between Israel and Egypt, and Israel and Jordan - and between Israel and the Palestinians - took place through direct talks, and always to the surprise of the experts. But Taba was too late. Everyone knows that the feverish activity undertaken by America was influenced by Clinton's ambition to carve a name for himself in history as a peacemaker. It is ironic that the new administration, scornful of that ambition, ignores the fact that the current team, together with the father of the new president, initiated the Madrid process 10 years ago for the very same reason. "The crusade to oust the Iraqi dictator" and promote a "new world order," in which name the Americans engaged in a Gulf War, ended with Saddam Hussein still in office and the Pax Americana fizzling out. Bush senior and his associates couldn't take the mockery and disappointment and needed to prove the war yielded some fruits. What could be more convincing than a declaration that they had managed to settle the best-known of all regional conflicts, the Israeli-Arab dispute. There was no connection between the Gulf War and the Madrid Conference, but Bush senior needed to prove that he was not only a victorious military commander but a peacemaker as well: so, he appeared at Madrid and left immediately, to face an election that he lost. Now the circle's been closed. Once it became clear that the diversion created at Madrid collapsed, the heroes of the Gulf War decided to return to the theatre of war they had neglected. Maybe people have forgotten the original failure. Now, they relate to the Middle east as "a single issue" and are advancing, 10 years too late, on the Iraqi dictator. But perhaps some good will come of it after all. The Israelis and Palestinians will finally have to speak directly, without the lacy umbrella of pretentious and patronizing American involvement. After all, they don't have a choice. END top