TITLE: A Security Solution

AUTHOR: Lesley McCulloch, The World Today

PUB: Journal of the Royal Institute for International Affairs

DATE: March 18, 2001

There were high hopes for the first civilian President of Indonesia. But now allegations about the misuse or mismanagement of some six million dollars have cast a cloud over Abdurrahman Wahid and allowed his opponents to gather strength. Should they overwhelm him, many fear that dark forces would slow reform and implement security solutions in restive provinces like Aceh. The first democratically elected Indonesian President is in trouble. Since coming to office, hopes that he would transform Indonesia into a democratic and corruption-free state have not been realised. He has yet to deliver promised economic reforms, a tolerant government respectful of human rights and end corruption. In addition, his reputation for wild and contradictory statements has served neither him nor his troubled nation well. Even before the two cases that resulted in a parliament censure motion - by 393 to 4 votes - against the President, he was in difficulties. Incidents in which President Abdurrahman Wahid allegedly 'mishandled' or 'mismanaged' around $6 million are really only a useful vehicle for those who want to see his term come to an untimely end. A parliamentary commission found that the President could be suspected of 'playing a role' in the fraudulent withdrawal by his masseur of money from the pension fund of Bulog, the state logistics agency. His account of the handling of a donation of $2 million from the Sultan of Brunei - ostensibly for aid to the war-torn province of Aceh - was 'deliberately inconsistent'. The credibility and legitimacy of the President has fallen and with it that of the government. The reform movement has faltered. The fight against corruption, collusion and nepotism, which provided much of the President's popular support, also appears hesitant. The transparency and accountability of the government remains at an unacceptably low level. MILITARY INFLUENCE Despite the battered image of the Indonesian military in the wake of the East Timor crisis, it remains the most solid political power amid unabated bickering among civilian counterparts. It is still able to impose security solutions on rebellious provinces. The process of reforming the security forces continues - but progress towards real reform has been slow. One example of change was the landmark decree by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) which separated the police (Polri) from the military. The police have been placed under civilian control, and there is now a clear division of labour. The constitution has been amended to distinguish between external defence, which is now the responsibility of the Indonesian military (TNI), and internal security, law enforcement and the maintenance of public order, now in the hands of Polri. It can request assistance from the military when the security situation demands. The prolonged bloodshed in Maluku and North Maluku and violence in the rebellious provinces of Aceh and West Papua (Irian Jaya) has been used by the military to justify maintaining its present territorial command structure. This structure, which runs parallel to the civilian administration, gives the armed forces access to power and influence all the way down to village level. Plans to reform the territorial structure have caused tension in the military elite. The present system serves their interests well. These include a fully functioning business complex which reaches from the national to the local level. Rumours that the President as supreme commander is unable to control the military were all but confirmed when he failed to protect pro-reform Lt. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah. Many generals turned against Agus when he revealed irregularities, including losses of around $15 million, in the foundation belonging to the Army Strategic Reserves Command (Kostrad) - of which he was commander. A number of generals were implicated. Despite the fact that the Minister of Defence Mahfud is a civilian, most of the strategic posts in the military headquarters - which has more power than the Ministry - remain in the hands of army generals. RICH BUT VIOLENT Set against this backdrop of increasing instability, the situation in Indonesia's northernmost province of Aceh may, at first glance, appear to be of little consequence. On the contrary - it is of great significance. In the northern tip of Sumatra with a population of around four million, Aceh is extremely rich in oil and gas. It is commonly overlooked in the internationalcoverage of the nation's numerous problems. If asked about violence and human rights abuses perpetrated by the Indonesian armed forces, most casual observers immediately think of East Timor. But the atrocities in this corner of the world's fourth most populous nation far exceed anything else in Indonesia in terms of continuous levels of violence and brutality. The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) has been fighting a limited war for independence against the central government since 1976. The conflict has escalated over the past two years and support for GAM appears to have grown in direct relation to increasing human rights violations. The government has stated - with renewed vigour - its determination to ensure the vast archipelago does not break up. Stern words have been accompanied by strong action. DOMINO EFFECT Fear of 'disintegrasi' is the justification for the Indonesian government's security approach to Aceh and West Papua which are both seeking independence. But there is little likelihood of a domino effect from an independent Aceh. The disintegrasi argument has been used by the government to mask the real reasons why the tiny province is so important to the state. Aceh's resource base is at the centre of its reluctance to relinquish the territory. The area has a wealth of oil and gas, timber and minerals, and is a fertile agricultural region. It is responsible for eleven per cent of Indonesia's exports, but underdevelopment is acute. There are few health care facilities, infant and maternal mortality rates are high, and infrastructure is less than adequate. For nine years until August 1998, Aceh was a Military Operational Area (DOM - Daerah Operasi Militer) as the government tried to silence the pro-independence movement. The military and police acted with impunity. Reports of killings, disappearances, torture, rape and other abuses of human rights are common. At least six thousand have died in the past decade. Countless more have disappeared and the discovery of mass graves is not uncommon. The Indonesian Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) reported that 'the year 2000 has been the bloodiest in Aceh since before the military occupation which began in 1989'. In the past year almost a thousand have died, most of them civilians, and several hundred have been tortured or disappeared. TIME TO PAUSE Last June, in recognition of the escalating level of violence, an agreement commonly referred to as the 'humanitarian pause' was put into effect. The initial three month 'pause' was extended to this January. The main objective was the 'delivery of humanitarian assistance to the population of Aceh affected by the conflict situation'. There are some forty thousand internally displaced people in Aceh, and several thousand have fled further afield. While GAM may be responsible for some of these atrocities, it is the security forces that are the perpetrators of the majority of the violations. A 'humanitarian pause monitoring team' was convened to 'assess the implementation of the humanitarian action'. The chief government representative on the team told me in November that 'we [the team] are here in Aceh to monitor the failure of the pause, not the success'. During the period of the agreement - a little more than six months - five hundred people lost their lives. In November last year, as in the previous year, the student-led Information Centre for a Referendum in Aceh (SIRA) planned a rally in Banda Aceh calling for a referendum. The rally of 1999 which the organisers claim attracted one million people passed without incident. But the rally in November, which eventually took place several days later than originally planned, produced a massive military crackdown. The main roads to the provincial capital were blocked to prevent people attending. The Acehnese, determined to show support for the referendum, arrived by sea and by backroads. Many lost their lives en route, were injured, raped, tortured - those who could not make the journey went to pray at local mosques. This military operation served only one purpose: to unite the people of Aceh against the 'common enemy', the central government in Jakarta. Previously the issues of independence and support for GAM were quite separate, now it seems they are one. PRESIDENT'S PROJECT Recognising that the security forces had inflamed the situation, and that the issue may spill-over into the already fragile domestic political arena, the embattled President made a trip to Banda Aceh on December 19. He took with him a package of measures which he hoped would appease the situation. Only close allies and the political elite turned out at the Grand Mosque to hear him offer 'special autonomy' and an aid package of $10.5 million. An earlier plan to implement Syariah law was dropped in response to protest from the Acehnese. The President has offered a more conciliatory approach than many in his government would prefer. The Vice President, Megawati Sukarnoputri, many prominent politicians including the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the military and police have always favoured a security solution. The problems in Aceh have highlighted the President's increasingly tenuous hold on power. His isolated position in domestic politics has been mirrored in his policies towards Aceh. The 'pause', has always been the President's project. Despite a worsening security situation and increasing calls for independence, the government and GAM agreed to further talks to try to find a political solution. WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY Swiss-brokered talks between GAM and Indonesian government representatives in early January resulted in a one-month Provision of Understanding. The loose agreement has only two provisions, an indication that common ground remains elusive. It establishes a 'moratorium on violence' during which both parties will 'work to substantially revise the security situation'. A subsequent ten day pact came into effect on February 11. This is designed to reduce violence, and to open channels of communication between commanders on both sides to try to jointly promote law and order. Further talks in Switzerland will attempt to reach a more lasting agreement and include substantive elements relating to security, democratic consultation, humanitarian law and human rights, and socio-economic development. The prospects for a meaningful pact are not good - almost one hundred have died in the violence this year. The government is offering 'special autonomy' - the details of which may not be finalised for several months - but the Acehnese represented by GAM insist on independence. The leader of the GAM delegation, and Aceh's health minister-in-waiting, Dr Zaini Abdullah said shortly after the talks, 'For the people of Aceh it is quite simple - and also for GAM. We will have independence from Indonesia. It is only a matter of when, and how many will be killed in the process.'In theory at least, the agreement gives a window of opportunity for a negotiated settlement. Dr Zaini said 'the future of any such settlement is dependent on the situation in the field. The violence must stop, and those responsible for violations of human rights must be brought to trial'. But violence continues. The National Police Chief, General Bimantoro, told a government commission at the end of January - two weeks into the agreement - that Aceh was in a state of rebellion and the security situation could not be resolved by the police, but needed a military operation. In response to the security force demands that GAM surrender its weapons Dr Zaini said 'GAM will disarm when the non-organic military [drafted in from around the archipelago] leave Aceh - not before'. In a more positive move, the military and police have requested that Komnas HAM investigate alleged human rights abuses. The situation in Aceh remains as unpredictable as the leadership drama playing out in Jakarta. A constant theme throughout Wahid's presidency has been his jostling with the military. He has - with the support of many in the international community and some in his own government - struggled to push the process of democratisation which has included substantial reform of the military and police. For those resisting reform, the latest scandal presents a unique opportunity. Vice President Megawati has close relations with the military, and has had many overt and covert meetings with the more conservative factions. DARK FORCES The situation in Indonesia is extremely fluid, and difficult to predict. The official memorandum regarding the two scandals gives the President an opportunity to improve his performance and make amends with those he has alienated, and upon whose support he is now dependent. Four scenarios are possible. The first is that the President takes the censure motion as a serious warning. He may change his leadership style - be more consultative - and will remain until his term ends in 2004. The second possibility is that the President pays little attention to the censure, it is repeated, and finally a special session of Parliament is held which could lead to his impeachment. The third is that he is ousted from power by the weight of student protests, or the resignation of his cabinet, or his party decides to abandon him and calls for him to be replaced. There is a fourth, but highly unlikely possibility, that the international community withdraws its support for the beleaguered government. Without doubt Vice President Megawati is now waiting on the side-lines to assume the Presidency, and has been taking the advice of close friends to be patient and say nothing. The waiting game seems likely to pay off. It is no longer a matter of whether Megawati will take over, but when. The timing of the President's downfall is crucial and will determine the durability of the new administration. It is in no one's interest to further damage political and economic stability. The 'dark forces' of former President Suharto's New Order and of his Golkar party are waiting on the sidelines. Megawati must not be seen to have been manipulated by those who want to regain some of their lost power and influence. EXPLORING PEACE It is possible that Megawati will become President in the coming months - perhaps at the annual August parliamentary session. This may benefit the economy, as she has shown herself more willing to rely on the advice of experts, whereas Wahid has often insisted in playing an active role in issues of which he has little knowledge. Megawati is sympathetic to conservatives who argue that pushing reforms 'too far, too fast' is not advisable. Her meetings with top military brass have worried the more progressive political and military elite. Such a leadership change would almost inevitably produce a security approach to separatist tensions in Aceh. The military believes it is time to abandon attempts at a political solution, and to allow it and the police to disarm GAM and 'enforce peace'. The president-in-waiting has herself grown impatient with the deteriorating security situation in Aceh - and elsewhere around the archipelago. The Acehnese, all too aware of the implications of the President's possible fall from power, have said they are ready, and willing, to die for their cause. END top