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1. INTRODUCTION

As part of a National Lottery Charities Board (NLCB/UK) grant to FEWER members in the Caucasus (EAWARN, Peace Mission to the Caucasus, in a joint effort with Non-Violence International), a series of strategic roundtables will be held on post-conflict reconstruction in Chechnya. The first roundtable was held in Pyatigorsk on 15-16 December 2000. Participants included leaders of Chechen communities in and around Chechnya, experts, representatives from the governments of Chechnya and neighbouring republics, representatives from Federal ministries, as well as international organisations. This Post-Conflict Reconstruction Plan has been prepared as a guide for donors and implementing agencies working in Chechnya. Groups that participated in its elaboration recommend that the agencies working in the region participate in regular information sharing and co-ordination meetings for the enhancement of the cumulative impact of reconstruction related activities.

Three critical response issues are raised in this document:

The need to initiate a co-ordinated reconstruction process in Chechnya. The need to start a political settlement process led by the people of Chechnya themselves. The need to strengthen law enforcement, and protect the rights of the civilian population. The Post-Conflict Reconstruction Plan is a dynamic document. Two more roundtables are envisaged before it emerges as final. These roundtables will involve further engagement with Federal government representatives, and international organisations that were not part of the Pyatigorsk meeting. Surveys of local NGO activities in Chechnya will also be undertaken. This document includes the following elements: (a) the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Plan; (b) the situation analysis upon which it is based; and (c) an analysis of past and on-going projects relevant to the Plan.

2. THE CHECHNYA POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION PLAN

The Post-Conflict Reconstruction Plan covers the following issues: (a) peace objectives; (b) risk indicators and challenges; (c) response directions and concrete activities; and (d) strategic principles for work in the region.

A. The long-term Peace Objectives established for the region are:

1. Strengthening the rule of law and the protection of human rights;

2. Meeting the basic needs of the population;

3. Ensuring personal security for the Chechen people;

4. Economic development (particularly access to employment and education); and

5. Harmonious relations between Chechens and their neighbours.

B. The Risk Indicators and Challenges identified are:

1. Low morale and order among federal troops

2. Alienation of the civilian population

3. Profiteering from the war

4. Widespread human rights abuses

5. Inability to consolidate power on the part of the Chechen Republic Administration

6. Internationalisation of the Chechen conflict

7. External financial support for Chechen separatists

Details on risk factors are provided below in the analytical section.

C. The Response Directions and Specific Activities identified are:

1. Initiate and co-ordinate reconstruction efforts

The long-term and complex process of reconstruction presents great challenges and it is important that peacemakers at all levels are involved. In particular, there must be co-ordination of the efforts of the Russian Presidential administration, the Russian government and legislature, the Chechen Republic administration and local authorities, and the Representative of the President in the Southern Federal District.

Reconstruction of the Chechen economy and society will be decisive in bringing stability to Chechnya and the North Caucasus. After the immediate need of humanitarian support for the Chechen population and for IDPs outside Chechnya, the priorities for the Federal centre must be funding for the reconstruction of Grozny, housing, the agricultural sector and the petroleum industries. Reconstruction must also be linked to the return of IDPs, as the revival of the Republic's economy will be dependent on their return.

In addition to supporting the return of IDPs, social reconstruction must also involve instituting job-creation schemes, and health and education programmes. The commercial sector will be key to the reconstruction process, and the Russian corporate sector and Chechen entrepreneurs must be encouraged to invest in major industries and other social services. The establishment of co-ordinating bodies to facilitate investment and humanitarian support would be helpful in achieving these objectives.

2. Initiate a political settlement process

A political settlement of the problems in Chechnya is essential, and positive public commitments to ending the conflict and to the process of reconstruction will be vital if a lasting settlement is to be achieved. Critical for the settlement process are two issues: (a) negotiations with armed separatist groups to end the violence; and (b) the definition of Chechnya's legal status within the Russian federation. This last issue cannot be a subject of negotiations with separatists - decisions on the country's status must be taken by the Chechen people themselves. Another key component of a lasting settlement will be the development of strong and representative national institutions and the conciliation of competing group interests. Democratic elections, and the legitimate authoritative power they will provide for the Republic, must be the focus of any settlement process in order to ensure a long-term resolution of this protracted conflict.

3. Media and transparency of reconstruction and settlement efforts

When the role of the media is considered, it is essential that positive and constructive policies be adopted with regard to radio and TV broadcasting in and outside of Chechnya. Broadcasts should not only represent Chechen society externally, but should be oriented to the needs of the Chechen people. Awareness-raising can be used to help consolidate and encourage peace-oriented sentiments within Chechen society, and to help dismantle anti-Chechen feeling within Russian society. Transparency regarding settlement efforts and negotiations will be key in consolidating public support for any final settlement. Media projects can play an instrumental role in supporting transparency of reconstruction and settlement efforts.

4. Ensure autonomy of Chechnya

A high degree of autonomy in the internal governance of the Chechen Republic will help to ensure its status as an autonomous region of the Russian Federation. This status would be underpinned by legal pluralism, with co-existing centralised and local legal norms, membership of international organisations and unions and other options within the framework of modern federalism. In the immediate term, power in Chechnya should be consolidated in a single structure, reporting directly to the highest Federal authorities. During this current period of special governance under the Chechen Republic administration, the formation of power structures must be developed and finalised, with an emphasis placed on the building of trust and co-operation between military and civilian structures and the strengthening of elected local self-governing bodies.

In addition, tensions in inter-ethnic relations must be avoided by the enforcement of the Law on Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples. There is a need for an official statement guaranteeing the self-determination of the Chechen people and a high level of governmental autonomy for the Chechen state within the Federation. Such a public statement would serve to assure the Chechen people that their social order and the cultural and religious traditions is preserved.

5. Meet basic needs and protect Chechen IDPs and refugees

The Security Council and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation should define and follow priorities for the Caucasus, taking steps to protect IDPs and refugees in the CIS countries. Those in need, either IDPs or Chechens remaining within the Republic, should be supported by targeted financial and humanitarian aid, pensions and benefits to victims of war, and return and re-integration programmes. Law and order must be upheld and the indiscriminate and unrestrained use of firepower must be stopped. Special rules and codes of conduct for soldiers and combatants in relation to the civilian population must be established and adhered to.

6. Strengthen law enforcement and the protection of rights in Chechnya

The rule of law and strong authorities are needed to achieve stability in Chechnya. Equally important are traditional institutions, people's diplomacy and the establishment of a commission on blood vengeance conciliation. The war must be made unprofitable for warring parties through the reconstruction of the Chechen economy and through the provision of effective socio-economic solutions to problems of unemployment and poverty. The judicial system must be urgently restored in order to deal with criminality within a legitimate framework, and the population must be issued with passports or ID to allow for freedom of movement; both initiatives would help bring an end to the practice of hostage-taking and provide for the protection of human rights and freedoms in Chechnya.

D. Strategic Principles include:

1. An integrated approach to reconstruction in Chechnya, involving the Russian Federal and Chechen local government, local communities, NGOs and international organisations.

2. The political settlement and negotiations with separatists should focus on the cessation of violence. The status of Chechnya within the Russian Federation should be determined by the Chechen people themselves.

3. Transparency and accountability in the reconstruction and political settlement process is critical.

3. SITUATION ANALYSIS: CHECHNYA TODAY

OVERVIEW

Despite official claims that key enemy forces have been routed (13,000 rebels killed, 20 well-known field commanders killed and 20 arrested), federal troops have not won the second Chechen campaign. About 50-70 servicemen are killed each month in the course of the guerrilla war. The Kremlin's primary objective, to destroy the strongholds of the armed separatists, has not been attained. Moreover, ineffective use of the armed forces has multiplied the number of victims among the civilian and refugee populations and has led to increased support for the resistance movement. The Chechens have become hostages of the war and victims of coercion by both sides. Widespread abuse of human rights and freedoms in the republic seems to be the principal area of concern for Chechnya today.

The criminalised Chechen war has proved lucrative for both sides, with trade in people, weaponry, petroleum products and drugs. Arms, drugs and alcohol pose a far greater threat to the Russian troops and to the peaceful population in general than the rebels. Russian soldiers, particularly those on contract, who have survived life-threatening risks in the course of battle, are unable to re-integrate into civilian life and are turning to force to resolve their problems. The victims of the violence are mostly civilians.

The Chechen Republic (CR) Administration, headed by Akhmed-Hadjy Kadyrov, has degenerated into a state of permanent controversy (between Kadyrov and his first deputy Gantamirov), lowering the administration's authority with the general population. Coupled with poor federal financing of social and economic programmes, this state of affairs presents a serious obstacle to stabilisation. There is no military solution to the Chechen conflict and intra-Chechen dialogue and political settlement are now at the forefront of the agenda.

KEY INDICATORS

Internal Factors

On 15 April 2000, Russian military and political leaders officially declared the fighting stage of the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya to be over. The General Staff held that Ministry of Defence forces had defeated the key rebel formations armed with heavy weapons, and destroyed their control system and infrastructure. According to official figures up to 13,000 rebels, including 20 well-known field commanders, were killed. Another 20 field commanders were arrested and detained. The Russian troops have lost about 3,000 soldiers (these figures seem questionable to many NGOs and to the media). Human rights organisations estimate citizen losses at approximately 9,000. (V. Ibragimov, representative of Ichkeria, quotes different data: 14,000 killed by federal forces and 1500 by the Chechen resistance). In the course of the operation the federal forces seized strategically important settlements and took control of the Chechen part of the Russian-Georgian state border.

Low morale and order among federal troops

After the battle stage of the operation was over the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and the Federal Security Service (FSB) were charged with the task of suppressing the smaller guerrilla groups. The defeat of major rebel units and seizure of the whole Chechen territory perimeter does not represent an outright victory for the federal forces. For the last six months the conflict has developed into an unrelenting guerrilla war. The Russian military estimates the number of rebels in Chechnya at between 2,000 and 2,500 (Maskahdov believes that there are 15,000). Russian troops are attacked daily, subjected to acts of terrorism, and bear monthly losses in the region of 50-70. Rebel numbers are not decreasing, and their main leaders, Maskhadov, Basaev, Khattab, Gelaev, and Baraev, move freely throughout Chechnya co-ordinating guerrilla activities. As a result, the principal goal of the counter-terrorist operation remains unattained.

Large army units, unable to engage effectively with the dispersed and mobile guerrilla groups, emphasise defence, thereby minimising their battle involvement. This shift marks the beginning of an entrenched struggle with the guerrillas. The federal troops are still suffering heavy losses due to 'kamikaze' actions in particular. Grozny city, war-torn, with ruined industry and houses and deep craters, provides an effective spring-board for subversive activity. The military say that there are at any one time at least one hundred rebels in the city, hiding during the daytime and attacking roadblocks and burning and mining other targets at night.

Today there is growing evidence that a guerrilla war is being conducted within Chechnya, and it is commonly acknowledged that this type of war will continue until its root causes have been effectively addressed. Official claims by Russian forces that the situation is under control do not reflect reality. In fact, the federal forces are incapable of protecting either themselves or the civilian population. Together with the rivalry among Chechen leaders, this general state of affairs fuels the ongoing guerrilla war.

Experience demonstrates that armies that remain outside barracks in the field combating active guerrilla operations become demoralized very quickly, and begin to engage in looting and vandalism. Today, the Russian command is confronted with the problem of how to prevent the degradation of troops. Soldiers tried by the ordeals of war, have found themselves with time on their hands. The result is that the 100,000-strong army is getting out of control. The growth of alcohol-related crime and of anti-social behaviour is widespread. Weaponry, drugs and alcohol seem to pose a greater threat to the army and civilians than the rebels. Servicemen who have suffered during the war have difficulties re-integrating into civilian life. They cannot stop reaching for their guns to resolve problems; their victims are mainly civilian.

Alienation of the civilian population

The Ministry of Defence, plunged into a protracted guerrilla war, has neither the means nor the forces necessary to go on, and has started to express its dissatisfaction with MVD and FSB activities. General V. Manilov, deputy chief of the Russian General Headquarters, admitted publicly that the inefficiency of these agencies has enabled rebels to move freely through the republic, to set up bases and store weapons. The military has been led to believe that the elimination of mobile guerrilla groups and counter-terrorist actions is to be conducted by the special police forces. In fact, neither Ministry of Interior Affairs troops, nor OMON (the special police forces) or SOBR (special rapid response units) dispatched to Chechnya from other parts of Russia are capable of solving these problems.

On the contrary, all sorts of 'special' or 'cleaning' operations lead to an escalation in the number of civilian casualties, intensify refugee flows and strengthen support for the guerrillas on the ground, even among groups initially antagonistic towards the guerrillas. Battle operations lead to victims among the civilian population rejecting the positive effects of social and economic assistance programmes and obstructing the process of stabilization. The violence and illegal activities of the Russian forces towards Chechen civilians aggravates the tendency to treat the combat activities of the federal forces as actions directed "against the people", supporting the widely held perception of rebel resistance in terms of a national liberation movement. Chechen resistance may in the near future become dominated by a wave of new recruits brought up in an atmosphere conducive to extremities of belief, as there is a new brutality in battle. One should realise that the Russian military forces in Chechnya are nationally homogeneous, and that they are fighting in a territory with a mono-ethnic population. This creates pre-conditions for tension in relations between the two sides.

Profiteering from the war

The Chechen war is profitable for both sides, hampering the process of stabilisation, as certain high-ranking officers have developed vested interests in the conflict. The conflict allows them influence over the state leaders, and provides them with considerable budgetary finance. To maintain the current situation, the generals are attempting to convince themselves, and to convince society, that the 'Chechen issue' will be resolved as soon as the guerrilla leaders are arrested or killed. As a matter of fact, it is far more profitable for them to maintain the situation as it is. The Chechen war has never ceased to be a criminalised war. Everything can be dealt in, human life included. The conflict is a paying business for certain political, financial and military circles in Russia, their representatives maintaining 'business contacts' in Chechnya. Mafia structures conduct business in the sale of people, arms, drugs and oil. This business is linked with the clans of certain regional 'barons', who siphon off a proportion of the money made from the sale of international humanitarian aid (to say nothing of federal resources).

Widespread human rights abuses

There is widespread human rights abuse in Chechnya, where Russian law is dysfunctional. Up to now, there has been no legal framework in place, facilitating anti-guerrilla activities. Some servicemen from the OMON and SOBR contract-based sub-units coerce, deliberately kill, and rob the civilian population. Very often such robberies are absolutely barefaced, confined not only to small items such as money or jewellery, but to the organized removal of bulk goods. This would not be possible without the compliance of certain unit commanders. An extortion system is enacted by ragged and underfed marauding federal soldiers. Kidnapping and human trafficking are also exercised by 'legal armed formations'. Over 10,000 people have passed through a 'filtration' system and been ransomed by relatives.

Despite the apparent prevalence of human and legal rights abuse committed by soldiers, according to official statistics, of over 467 criminal cases brought against the military only 14 concern crimes against the civilian population. The situation looks even worse in view of the lack of appropriate legislation. The fact that legal protection has been unavailable for the whole period of the war shows that the people in Chechnya are deprived of any mechanisms protecting their basic legal rights. P. Krasheninnikov's independent commission states that marauding and bribing by the military are common practice. A commission member E. Panfilova said that 62 contract-based servicemen were dismissed for having forged documents. Sometimes 'cleaning' operations are held without the consent of the federal centre.

The number of disappearances is constantly growing. Detained at the road-blocks, persons disappear without trace. The official figures approach 500. The independent commission states that the names of many detained local people cannot be found anywhere. They are not listed by the MVD, the Prosecutor's office or the FSB. Another problem for many Chechen inhabitants is the lack of Russian passports. Without papers, people are not free to move and are afraid of being arrested during a 'cleaning' operation. According to the commission's assessment, the humanitarian situation in the post-war Chechen republic has significantly worsened.

The problem of the human rights abuses was brought before Parliament for the first time on 21 September 2000. The hearings were devoted to 'cleaning' operations without motive, particularly searches for drugs or ammunition. All the reporters, including the Russian federal presidential representative to the Commission of Human Rights Observation, V. Kalamanov, confirmed that human rights abuses are still being committed on a massive scale ("Nezavisimaya Gazeta"[NG], 22.09.2000). The CR deputy, A. Aslakhanov, accused the army and public order protection bodies of cruelty, dishonesty and immorality in regard to the Chechen people, maintaining that the war will continue until the army begins to respect the rights of Chechen civilians, as they will fight and die to defend their honour, for "it is impossible to suffer arbitrariness and lawlessness any longer" ("NG", 22.09.2000). Most of the participants in the Duma hearings, state officials, analysts and experts, agreed that the situation regarding the protection of the peaceful Chechen population from both rebels and federal forces has become critical.

The problem of refugees is also intensifying. The manufacturing and municipal infrastructure, partly reconstructed and functioning after the first war, has been destroyed..9 Those who had left Chechnya before 1999 will not be able to return as their homes have been demolished once again. In addition, the number of refugees is increased by the hundreds of thousands of forced migrants. With winter approaching, 150,000 refugees in Ingushetia will be on the verge of catastrophe. The separatists and some sympathetic Ingush leaders have used the Chechen refugees as an instrument with which to pressurise the federal authorities into opening negotiations with Maskhadov. Some IDPs are ready to return, so long as their security and minimum social assistance are guaranteed.

Under these circumstances the rebels are stepping up their reign of terror over the local population, shooting members of administration, and organising 'show-executions' of those who have denounced the guerrillas. A wave of murders has swept over many Chechen settlements. In the period from March to July 2000, nine local administrators, twelve Chechen militiamen, four members of the Prosecutor's office and four settlement mosque imams were killed. Another two men were executed by rebels in Dargo and Belgatoy at the end of August. They were publicly beheaded, and their heads put on stakes for the purpose of striking fear into the population. On September 16 five local people aged between 15 and 70 were murdered in Starye Atagy. The next day another inhabitant of the same settlement, 34-year-old Magomed Chikuev, was assassinated. Six other people had earlier been killed there and the locals suspect federal forces. Rebels ostentatiously shot Vedensky ROVD (district militia sub-unit) deputy chief lieutenant-colonel Shamil Azaev, and the staff chief lieutenant-colonel Said Bisultanov.

Press sources have reported a number of acts of violence. On 11 October separatists undertook an act of terrorism against the Chechen militiamen, by bombing the Oktyabrsky ROVD building in Grosny, killing 12 and injuring 17 others (all of them Chechen, including women and children). On 23 October the Elder Council chairman of the Goity Urus-Martan district, 70-year-old Magomed Saidaliev, fell victim to the terrorists for his irreconcilable attitude to Wahhabism. On 31 October in Alkhan-Kala the district militia inspector of Groznensky rural ROVD, Isa Emursaev, was assassinated. On 9 November the head of the Alkhan-Kala local administration and two female assistants were killed. On 16 November, Dadalov, the head of the Mesker-Yurt administration, and his deputy were also killed. By means of terror, the rebels are attempting to frighten those co-operating with the federal troops and with A. Kadyrov's administration.

Sometimes the federal operations also turn against the locals, making the peaceful Chechen population a hostage of war. Ivan Babichev, commandant of Chechnya, admitted that occasionally 'cleanings' are coercive of civilians. The head of the acting Chechen administration, A. Kadyrov, says that the practice of mass 'cleaning' operations can lead to eruptions of indignation, and on those occasions he "will consider people to be right" and "take their part". ("NG", 19.09.2000).

Inability to consolidate power on the part of the Chechen Republic Administration

A. Kadyrov's appointment as Head of the Provisional Chechen administration has had no substantial influence on the arrangement of forces in the CR. The appointment was accepted differently by various parties. Not only separatists but also the pro-Russian part of Chechen society reacted negatively to the Kremlin's choice, convinced that a worthier and more competent person could be found amongst the Chechen establishment to provide a consolidating figure for Chechen society. However, the Kremlin's stake in Kadyrov is logical. The army has influence over Kadyrov. He is protected and fully controlled by military and special services structures. The foreign policy factor was also.10 taken into account. The Russian federal leaders wanted to show world opinion that Chechnya would be headed by its 'spiritual leader', Naskhadov's former brother-in-arms who had experienced disappointment in separatism. Kadyrov's nomination would serve as an example of conciliation for ex-Dudaev and Maskhadov supporters, who didn't participate in actual conflict. It was thought that Imam Khadyrov's appointment would help unify those Chechens wanting compromise. Kadyrov began to enlist Dudaev's former subsidiaries to the acting administrative bodies. In the case of Kadyrov's failure, the federal centre could lay the blame on the Chechen political elite's inability to establish and maintain a leader of their own.

The latest developments in Chechnya have shown that the new administration will not be able to change the situation. Not only because many parts of the population are strongly against Kadyrov, but for much more serious reasons, including the illegal activities of the federal forces and the lack of sound financing for economic and social reconstruction. Against this background the dispute between A. Kadyrov and his first deputy B. Gantamirov (responsible for the CR force structures) gained new impetus. The dispute had cause in the legal quagmire that characterises the power-sharing system of Chechen administrative bodies. Kadyrov says he himself is unaware of his own offices/mandates, those of the Russian federal president proxy in the South district or those of the commandant of the CR.

Local analysts believe that the attempt to harness together two irreconcilable enemies -Kadyrov and Gantamirov - is not an oversight but a conscious decision by the Kremlin. To their mind the Russian generals did their best to show that the Chechens are unable to rule the republic. These suspicions were confirmed by General Vladimir Shamanov, who was quick to stress that the situation in Chechnya is "a skirmish among the local clan leaders", and that the solution is for the republic to be ruled by a Russian. A number of local experts feel that all these plots are woven in the Kremlin. There are numerous indications of this: at the beginning of the operation in Chechnya Gantamirov was in opposition to the chairman of the then acting State Council Malik Saydullaev, later on to Nikolay Koshman, and now to Kadyrov. Kadyrov's appointment provoked a split in Koshman's administration in such a way that some people were forced to resign. Another version views the plots as devised by the federal forces command to persuade Russian federal political leaders of their necessity. This argument is supported by the fact that it was only the generals who played the role of peacemaker between Gantamirov and Kadyrov.

The instability caused by deadlock among the CRleadership seems to justify the war dragging on. It is difficult to say what the Kremlin's next steps will be regarding the administrative split in the CR. The Russian authorities have no common position. The latest statements issued by V. Kazantsev and some media publications indicate that the federal centre will soon not only have to choose between Kadyrov and Gantamirov, but probably have to change the whole system of administrative rule of the CR. G. Troshev recently made criticisms of Kadyrov and his work: "Recently his actions have become inconsequential... Administrative plots interest him more than real work... His activities have shown an unpleasant tendency to use our hands to solve internal Chechen problems" ("NG", 24.10.2000). Such criticism confirms that Kadyrov is a provisional figure. It is likely that some new Chechen names will be heard. The CR may soon be headed by someone,.11 possibly from the military, who enjoys the absolute confidence of the Kremlin and who is provided with extraordinary powers.

External Factors

Internationalisation of the Chechen conflict

The situation in Chechnya has been negatively influenced by external factors. The Chechen conflict is becoming increasingly internationalised, with new players attracted into its geopolitical orbit. Some argue that Chechnya has become a spring-board where world and regional powers clash in the attempt to use the break-up of the USSR and Russia's weakness for a re-division of spheres of influence and of Caucasian energy resources. There is also a strong perception in Russia that a large-scale information war is being waged against the country. Through certain western media institutions and member states of the Islamic Conference Organization, Chechen separatists are inculcating the myth of a nation-wide armed Chechen struggle against Russian federal forces. Regardless of cost, they are attempting to inflict maximum losses on the federal troops in order to demonstrate their military potential.

External financial support for Chechen separatists

The main aim of many separatists is now to make the federal centre open negotiations with Maskhadov and avoid a protracted guerilla war. Some analysts feel that groups in western and muslim countries are counteracting Russia's positive efforts to stabilise the situation, not only in Chechnya but in the whole Caucasus region, particularly because of evidence that extremist groups in the North Caucasus receive regular financial support. The dominant element of the Chechen resistance movement consists of the group of contract fighters and leaders such as Khattab, who receive the bulk of funding from abroad and are gradually becoming more influential than the Chechen field commanders. Experts and some observers fear now that the Chechen rebels' foreign partners have invested too much effort and money in the conflict to give up now without solid results. Stakes are also too high in this game for those western policy-makers who moved against Russia's actions in Chechnya. All these factors, coupled with the growth of assistance from radical Islamic organisations, lead to the continuing and fierce guerrilla war in Chechnya and present the threat of the conflict spilling over into other regions of the North Caucasus.

SCENARIOS OF POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS

1. Most Probable: On-going protracted war

The most probable scenario is an on-going, protracted war, sooner or later followed by a set-back for the federal forces and negotiations with the separatists. It is evident that events in the second Chechen conflict are following the worst possible route. Further development of the conflict using the same methods and means employed in the past, by which the civilian population suffered the most, will only aggravate the situation. At the start of the counter-terrorist operation the majority of Chechen people supported the federal forces, but unmotivated and unrestricted coercive actions led to the growth of hostility towards the Russian army. Under these circumstances the anti-terrorism struggle may become a war against the Chechen people. The conflict can only be ended when large-scale military actions are halted, the army is separated from police functions, attitudes towards the Chechen people change, human rights and freedoms in the CR are protected, and, principally, after the reconstruction of the Chechen economy and social sphere begins..12

2. Less Probable: Increased rebel activity

A possible but less probable scenario sees rebel activity increasing, with the seizure of Gudermes, Grozny and other important Chechen settlements. Large-scale terrorist and diversionary acts in neighbouring regions of Russia could not be discounted from such a scenario. All this will be aimed at making the Russian leaders open negotiations with the guerrilla commanders. In this instance inter-ethnic relations in Russia will deteriorate and xenophobic and 'chechenphobic' campaigns will gather momentum.

3. Least Probable: Spill over to neighbouring republics

The conflict may escalate with its geographic scope broadening, and spilling over to other regions of the North Caucasus; Daghestan and Ingushetia in the immediate term. The army is unable to remain in a passive defence position for long, so sooner or later it will have to counter-attack and pursue the enemy across contiguous territories. This scenario is fraught with the possibility of a large-scale Caucasian war and the disintegration of Russia's southern regions.

4. CURRENT AND PAST PROJECTS IN RELATION TO THE POST-CONFLICT

RECONSTRUCTION PLAN

This section provides a brief analysis of how the projects implemented in the region correspond to the Response Directions identified in the Plan. Basic conclusions can be drawn from lists of projects undertaken in the area outlined in the United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal1 and documents from the European Commission.2 The UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for the Northern Caucasus (Russian Federation) spent a total of $40,402,789 on 76 projects in the region in 1999. Of these, 21 projects (3.75% of funds) involved social or economic reconstruction, addressing Response Direction 1. Only one project (0.62% of funds) addressed Response Direction 6, Strengthen Law Enforcement and the Protection of Rights in Chechnya. The vast majority, 60 projects (95.63% of funds) provide humanitarian aid for civilians, IDPs or refugees, thus addressing Response Direction 5, Meet Basic Needs and Protect Chechen IDPs and Refugees. Additional Humanitarian Assistance for the Northern Caucasus (Russian Federation) from 1999 to 2000 outside the framework of the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal is valued at $21,242,395. Of the 51 projects listed, three projects with 2.46% of the total funds spent, addressed Response Direction 1, Initiate and Co-ordinate Reconstruction Efforts. The remainder addressed Response Direction 5, Meet Basic Needs and Protect Chechen IDPs and Refugees, accounting for 97.54% of the total funds spent.

The European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) data reflects a similar distribution of funds and project activities. ECHO funding in the Northern Caucasus (Russian Federation) and in Georgia in 1999-2000 totalled 17,405,000 Euros. Two of the 29 projects, with 2.73% of the total funds, addressed Response Direction 1, Initiate and Co-ordinate Reconstruction Efforts. 26 of the 29 projects, with 97.,27% of the total funds, addressed Response Direction 5, Meet Basic Needs and Protect Chechen IDPs and Refugees. Only one of the projects addressed Response Direction 6, Strengthen Law Enforcement and the Protection of Rights in Chechnya, and this project had "pending" status with funding representing 1.14% of funding for planned projects.3

It seems clear from the data provided by the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for the Northern Caucasus and ECHO, that funding in the Northern Caucasus is predominantly focussed on projects which work to meet the basic needs of civilians, refugees and IDPs through the provision of humanitarian aid. Projects such as these, which address Response Direction 5, Meet Basic Needs and Protect Chechen IDPs and Refugees, are supported with over 95% of the funding listed in the data analysed. Very few of these humanitarian projects address issues of social or economic reconstruction, Response Direction 1, and on average this area receives under 3% of total funding. Of the 156 projects in all the data analysed only two (one of which had yet to be implemented) addressed issues of security and law and order and Response Direction 6, Strengthen Law Enforcement and the Protection of Rights in Chechnya; receiving on average less than 1% of total funding.

Response Directions 2 (Initiate a Political Settlement Process), 3 (Media and Transparency of Reconstruction and Settlement Efforts), and 4 (Ensure the Autonomy of Chechnya) were not addressed by any of the projects analysed. While the urgent priority of ensuring that people's basic needs are met cannot be denied, the predominant focus of donors and implementing agencies on immediate humanitarian needs is allowing little attention to the long-term resolution of the conflict through reconstruction, law and order enforcement and support of a political settlement. It is clear that there are problems associated with initiatives in more 'political' areas, and this is an issue that needs to be addressed in itself. However, the funding of economic reconstruction, and activities such as capacity-building, post-war trauma healing and other social reconstruction projects needs to increase, if a lasting settlement of the Chechen conflict is to be properly supported.

The above analysis is very basic, and there is a need for further, more detailed analysis of a wider range of sources, particularly local NGO projects and funding from bilateral donors. Such analysis would prove useful to those designing and implementing future projects in this region, alerting donors and NGOs to areas that require more attention, areas where there may have been duplication or to areas which could benefit from follow up activities.

Footnotes

1 United Nations (2000), United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for the Northern Caucasus (Russian Federation), 1 January - 31 December 2001. November 2000.

2 The analysis consisted of a very basic assessment of the focus of each project from the limited detail provided by the lists produced by the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for the Northern Caucasus and by the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office. Where one project addressed more than one Response Direction, the funds for the project were divided by the number of Response Directions, thus providing an approximate reflection of the differing funds allocated to projects addressing each Response Direction.

3 European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), Central and Eastern European countries; NIS countries (ECHO 2) ECHO funding in the Northern Caucasus (Russian Federation) and in Georgia since the beginning of the crisis (1999-2000).

 

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