East Timor
East Timor Action Network Applauds Lawsuit Against Indonesian General, ETAN ~ March 29
General Lumintang Trained by the U.S., by Allan Nairn ~ March 29
To Rebuild, East Timor Needs the Help of American Catholics, By Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo, Dili
UNHCR Warns Against Early Stop of Humanitarian Aid, UNHCR ~ March 30, 2000
NGOs Urge Strongest Resolution on Timor to Human Rights Commission ~ March 24, 2000
Deadline For Refugees Gives Rise To Starvation Fear, By Sonny Inbaraj ~ March 24
Ramos-Horta Issues Statement On Refugees, Prosecutions, Military Ties ~ March 23, 2000
Noose Is Tightening on Generals Invoved in Timor Violence, Tapol ~ March 17, 2000
Wiranto Could Go On Trial in Three Months, Suara Pembaruan ~ March 17, 2000
Elections Possible Next Year, Says UN, Sydney Morning Herald, by Mark Dodd ~ March 16, 2000
East Timor And Australia's Oily Politics, Mike Head, World Socialist Web Site ~ March 14, 2000
TAPOL Hails President Wahid For Supporting a Judicial Probe Into the 1965/66 Massacre ~ March 14, 2000
U.N. Seizes Weapons Smuggled From Indonesia, Japan Economic Newswire ~ March 14, 2000
Wahid Orders Disarming of Militias, Lusa ~ March 14, 2000
Court Told of Militia Leader's Gun-Dealing, by Karen Polglaze, AAP ~ March 14, 2000
Indonesia To Summon Generals, Steps Up Timor Probe, Reuters ~ March 14, 2000
Militia Elusive But UN Says Their Time Nearly Up, by Mark Dodd, Sydney Morning Herald ~ March 10, 2000
East Timor Operation Facing a Military Crisis in Australia, By Sonny Inbaraj ~ March 10, 2000
Saying It By Numbers: Mummy, Where Are You? by Mark Dodd, Sydney Morning Herald ~ March 9, 2000
Peace Keepers Capture Militia Member, UNTAET Briefing ~ March 9, 2000
Militias Pose Serious Threat to East Timor Refugees, Daniel Coney, Associated Press ~ March 9, 2000
Militia Disinformation Campaign Targets West Timor Refugees, Lusa, March 8, 2000
TNI Signature On Border Raids, Mark Dodd, Sydney Morning Herald ~ March 7, 2000
The Portuguese Connection, by Eric Wright ~ March 7, 2000
Troops on Alert as Shootings Delay Return to Normal Life, Sydney Morning Herald ~ March 7, 2000
Jobless and Hungry But Full of Hope, By Kanis Dursin ~ March 6, 2000
Timorese Search for Truth About 'Disappeared', South China Morning Post, by Joanna Jolly ~ March 3, 2000
East Timor Must Avoid Becoming Another Cambodia, TIME Asia online/Asia Buzz, by Terry McCarthy ~ March 3, 2000
Reunion of Divided East Timor Families to Resume This Week, Agence France-Presse ~ March 3, 2000
Interfet's Exit Has Militia On Warpath, The Australian, by Michael Ware ~ February 29, 2000
East Timor Ire At Coffee Tax, Australian Financial Review, by Wilson da Silva ~ February 29, 2000
Former Militia Members Targeted Amid the Devastation, AAP, by John Martinkus ~ February 29, 2000
West Timor People Urging Govt to Review Timor Gap Treaty, Antara, March 1, 2000
East Timorese Refugees in Indonesia, Refugees International ~ 25/02/00
Unresolved Problems, Liem Soei Liong, TOPAL ~ 25/02/00
ETAN Opposes Continued Training in Violation of Ongoing Ban on Military Ties With Indonesia, East Timor Action Network ~ 25/02/00
East Timorese Trapped in West Timor, By TOPAL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign ~ February 2000
Military Training Resumes Quietly, Washington Post ~ February 21, 2000
Legislators Hail Gus Dur's Move to Suspend Wiranto, Jakarta Post ~ February 15, 2000
Indonesian Team Standing by to Explore Rights Abuses, Agence France-Presse ~ February 15, 2000
Retired General Criticizes Plan to Pardon Wiranto, Indonesian Observer ~ February 15, 2000
Australia Hands East Timor Peace Mission to Portugal, Australian Broadcasting Corporation ~ February 15, 2000
Leader of Notorious Militia Gang Faces Execution, South China Morning Post ~ February 15, 2000
Workers Strike at Floating Hotels Housing UN Staff, Agence France Presse ~ February 14, 2000
Timor’s Horta sees Internet Future for Timor, Reuters by Chris Johnson ~ February 14, 2000
Journalists Harassed in West Timor, Committee to Protect Journalists ~ February 14, 2000
Statement on the International Human Rights Tribunal for East Timor, Free East Timor! Japan Coalition, Amnesty International Japan Section, East Timor People's Peace Relief Project ~ February 14, 2000
Submission to UN Commission of Inquiry into Crimes Committed by Indonesian Military, Timor Aid ~ February 14, 2000
Western Intelligence Hampering Portugal's Timor Effort, Minister Says, RDP Antena 1 Radio ~ February 11, 2000
Soares Sanctioned Murder: Militia Chief, Sydney Morning Herald by LINDSAY MURDOCH ~ February 11, 2000
Exiled Timorese Militia Sells Arms to Ambon Fighters, South China Morning Post by JOANNA JOLLY ~ February 10, 2000
Conclusive Proof TNI Planned Reign of Terror, The Independent by Richard Lloyd Parry, Feb. 7, 2000
Wiranto Responsible for Timor Atrocities, say Gusmao, Ramos-Horta, AFP ~ February 7, 2000
A Note on the Conduct of International NGOs and UN Institutions in Post-referendum Timor Lorosa’e HAK ~ February 7, 2000
Will Wahid Tackle Indonesia’s Terror Machine? The Age by SCOTT BURCHILL ~ February 4, 2000
Making Up For the Timidity of the Past, By Anil Netto ~ Malaysia, Feb. 10, 2000
All the Help A New Nation Can Get, By Prangtip Daorueng ~ February 6, 2000
Full Text of Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor ~ February 2, 2000
Brereton on Defence Intelligence Leaks and Australian Lies, Laurie Brereton MP, Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs ~ November 25, 1999
Indonesia's Wahid Close To Confronting Wiranto, by Nayan Chanda, John McBeth and Dan Murphy ~ January 28, 2000
Coroner: Indonesian Military Shot Dutch Journalist In East Timor, Associated Press ~ January 28, 2000
Timor Rights Investigators Implicate Wiranto In Report, Associated Press ~ January 28, 2000
New Information Reveals Moves Behind Timor Vote, ABC, PM News ~ January 28, 2000
The Investigative Commission on Human Rights Violation Says 200 People, Including Scores of High-Ranking Military Officials, Involved in the East Timor Atrocities, Indonesian Observer ~ January 28, 2000
Timor's Losers Gather to Decide Whether to Go Home or Not, AFP ~ January 28, 2000
UN Police Expect to Find 60 Bodies in Timor Grave, Reuters ~ January 27, 2000
Pressure for International Tribunal Grows, by Sonny Inbaraj, IPS ~ January 27, 2000
United National Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET): Briefing 26 Jan 2000
Indonesia’s Draft Law on Human Rights Court Will Protect Generals From Justice, Tapol, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign ~ January 24, 2000
Soeharto Forces ‘Building Timor-style Militias’ in West Papua, by Andrew Kilvert, Sydney Morning Herald ~ January 21, 2000
Lombok Violence Spurred on by Suharto’s Supporters: Wahid, Australian Broadcasting Commission ~ Jamuary 21, 2000
East Timor’s First Tetun Paper Hits The Streets!, Lalenok, Editor-in-chief: Virgilio da Silva Guterres ~ January 24, 2000
Language, Currency a Sore Point For New Nation, IPS by Sonny Inbaraj ~ January 24, 2000
Fear Rules Journey Home For E Timorese, The Age by Tom Fawthrop ~ January 24, 2000
Indonesia Campaigns Against UN Court for E. Timor, Reuters by Jonathan Wright ~ January 24, 2000
Jakarta Setting Stage For Army Prosecutions, International Herald Tribune by Michael Richardson ~ January 24, 2000
Government-Sanctioned Commission on Human Rights Violations (KPP HAM) Likely to Verify the Alleged Involvement of the Indonesian Military (TNI) in the Post-Ballot Violence, Jakata Post ~ January 24, 2000
Indonesian Lieutenant-Colonel, Mannurung, Allowing Militia Attacks, AAP NEWSFEED by John Martinkus ~ January 24, 2000
Horta Accuses Indonesian Military of State Terrorism Campaign!, Sydney Morning Herald by John Martinkus ~ January 24, 2000
Timorese Leader Accuses Indonesian Army of Destabilization Campaign, Portuguese Radio on January 20, 2000
UK Minister Defends Arms Sales to Indonesia, The Guardian, by John Aglionby ~ January 20, 2000
Marzuki to Meet UN Officials about East Timor Tribunal, Jakarta Post ~ January 20, 2000
Border Clashes Continue In East Timor Enclave, Associated Press ~ January 20, 2000
Quarter of Refugee Children in West Timor Malnourished, UNCIEF ~ January 20, 2000
Bring the East Timorese Home, A Fact Sheet (East Timor Action Network)
East Timorese To Return or Resettle - In Days? Refugees Daily ~ January 20, 2000
UNHCR Suspends Returns in Tense Areas, Refugees Daily ~ January 19, 2000
Militia Members Returning? UNHCR Press Briefing Note ~ January 14, 2000
Returning Militants Attacked, Refugees Daily ~ January 14, 2000
Deal To Help East Timorese Return, Refugees Daily ~ January 13, 2000
More East Timorese Returning - UN, Refugees Daily ~ January 12, 2000
Mass Information Campaign Working, UNHCR Press Briefing Note ~ January 11, 2000
Press For East Timorese Returns, Refugees Daily ~ January 5, 2000
Militias Impeding East Timorese Returnees, Refugees Daily ~ January 4, 2000
A Grassroots International Report ~ Refugees: The Other Side of the Crisis in East Timor by Martha Thompson
East Timorese Return Slowly, Refugees Daily ~ December 31, 1999
East Timorese Asked to Choose Nationality, Refugees Daily ~ December 28, 1999
Reporters Sans Frontières Calls on Indonesia to Charge Military Over Killing of Journalists, November 30, 1999
The Call for Referendum in Aceh, November 17, 1999
Notes on the Indonesian Military and the New Government by John Roosa, November 3, 1999
The International Federation for East Timor's Letter to the Members of the U.N. Security Council October 21, 1999
PRESS CONFERENCE ON EAST TIMOR BY XANANA GUSMAO AND JOSE RAMOS HORTA 28 September 1999
JOURNALIST ALLAN NAIRN TO RETURN TO THE U.S. THURSDAY September 28, 1999
EAST TIMORESE LEADERS IN WASHINGTON, DC, WEDNESDAY & THURSDAY September 27, 1999
Testimony of the International Federation for East Timor to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights September 24, 1999
IFET Says Timor Violence Predictable; Calls for Prosecution of All of Those Responsible September 23, 1999
Refugees could be forcibly relocated, warn rights groups September 22, 1999
DETAINED AMERICAN JOURNALIST ALLAN NAIRN FACES IMPRISONMENT September 16, 1999
Media Release - Death List; Refugees Slaughtered; Bombers leaving West Timor September 16, 1999
Timor Starving to Death September 11, 1999
The Total Annihilation of East Timorese Society, Culture and Property Is Taking Place September 10, 1999
Advance Copy of Article on US Complicity in Timor to Appear in the Nation on September 27, 1999
International Observers Evacuated from East Timor as Violence Escalates September 7, 1999
EAST TIMOR VOTES OVERWHELMINGLY FOR INDEPENDENCE; Paramilitaries Still Rampage Uncontrolled September 6, 1999
Militia Attack the Foundation for Legal and Human Rights (Yayasan HAK) Office September 6, 1999
Situation in Dili deteriorates by the hour. Shooting throughout the night. Reports of many killings of men, women and children (September 6, 1999)
As Mass Killing in East Timor Ensues, American Observers Remain in Dili September 5, 1999
DILI PRESS CONFERENCE ON LINKS AMONG THE EAST TIMOR MILITIAS, TNI/ABRI (THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES), AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT September 5, 1999
International Red Cross Office has been Completely Bestroyed by Militia Groups September 4, 1999
East Timor's Bloodiest Traditions by Aniceto Guterres Lopes (Op-Ed in the New York Times May 5, 1999)
Report from Yayasan HAK received from Fortilos
The Militia Started Their Action Again, and Victims Fell in Dili
GETTING AWAY WITH MURDER (an article from the Nation)
Indonesian Government Recruits Members of Pro-Intergration Militia Into Civilian Defense Force
Militia Attack Village and Terrorize Family of Leading Human Right Activist
THE REFUGEE PROBLEM IN EAST TIMOR
Foreign Minister Ali Alatas has Refused to Allow Reconciliation Meeting in Australia
The Death Toll Continues to Rise
LICENSE TO KILL IN EAST TIMOR (an article from the Nation.
JOINT STATEMENTHUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS IN EAST TIMOR
Press conference by José Ramos-Horta, April 23 1999 at UN Correspondents
Association, New York, NY (Near verbatim transcript by Charlie Scheiner and John M. Miller, East Timor Action Network/U.S)
UPDATE ON PARAMILITARY VIOLENCE April 22, 1999
Yayasan HAK: The True Story of A East Timor Victim
Militia attacks against East Timorese planned for Jakarta Too
PROVOKATOR DARI DILI MASUK JAKARTA
Pro-integration militia's brutal attacks in Dili, East Timor, on Saturday, April 17, 1999
Update situation in East Timor
East Timor Network Condemns Killings, Calls for U.S., UN Action
Xanana Statement on East Timor
News re the situation in Liquisa on 7 April 1999.
Yayasan HAK: INTERIM REPORT LIQUISA MASSACRE, 05 - 07 APRIL 1999
US Congress Pressures Albright on East Timor massacre
Violence and Terror Will Ruin a Peaceful Resolution to the East Timorese
Problem: Indonesian Groups Statement on East Timor Massacre
Yayasan Hak Report on East Timor Pro-integration Militias
FALINTIL RESUMES THEIR MISSION IN DEFENCE OF THE PEOPLE OF EAST TIMOR - APRIL 5, 1999
East Timor Action Network Applauds Lawsuit Against Indonesian General
ETAN ~ March 29
The East Timor Action Network (ETAN) applauds the filing of a lawsuit against Indonesian General Johny Lumintang for his role in devastating human rights abuses in East Timor. Lumintang, who was the Vice Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Army, was served notice of the lawsuit late this afternoon at Dulles International Airport.
"All available avenues must be used to bring justice for East Timor," said John M. Miller of ETAN. "Lawsuits like this one can help insure that those responsible for last year's devastation of East Timor are called to account, while putting future rights abusers on notice."
The suit was filed on behalf of a mother whose son was killed, a man who was beaten and shot in the foot which had to be amputated, and a man whose father was injured and brother killed. The plaintiffs also had their property destroyed or were forced from their homes in the aftermath of the August 30, 1999 vote on East Timor's independence. The lawsuit was filed by the New York-based Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), San Francisco-based Center for Justice and Accountability (CJA), and DC-based James Klimaski.
"The suit here is especially necessary because the U.N. has put an international tribunal on hold, and Indonesia's Attorney General has stated that he plans to focus his efforts on a mere handful of the best known incidents and a small number of Indonesian military commanders."
Legal papers filed in U.S. District Court on Tuesday cite a telegram signed by Lumintang and sent to the regional military head Major General Adam Damiri and other commanders just hours before the agreement to conduct the plebiscite was signed at the United Nations on May 5. The telegram ordered the commanders to plan a crackdown should the East Timorese vote in favor of independence. This was to include "a plan to move to the rear/evacuate if the second option independence is chosen." Soon after the vote, such a plan was put into action and hundreds of thousands were forced from their homes.
The suit also cites a June 1999 army manual, also signed by Lumintang, which states that Kopassus intelligence operatives were to be trained in propaganda, kidnapping, terror, agitation, sabotage, infiltration, undercover operations, wiretapping, photographic intelligence and psychological operations. Kopassus operatives were involved in the kidnapping of East Timorese independence activists prior to and after the independence vote.
In 1994, CCR successfully sued Major-General Sintong Panjaitan for his role in a 1991 massacre in Dili, East Timor in which more than 270 Timorese were gunned down. U.S. District Court Judge Patti Saris ordered the general to pay $4 million in compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive damages to Helen Todd, the mother of Kamal Bamadhaj, the only non-East Timorese killed that day.
The Lumintang lawsuit, like the Panjaitan case, is based in part on the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789 which allows anyone, citizen or not, to sue for acts committed outside the United States "in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." The 1992 Torture Victim Protection Act restates the 1789 law and applies it to torture victims. Lawsuits can only go forward if the defendant is served legal papers while in the U.S. The plaintiffs wish to remain anonymous at this time because East Timor remains subject to Indonesian military and militia attacks.
A U.N. Commission of Inquiry in a report issued earlier this year concluded that the Indonesian military was involved in systematic human right violations before and after the vote. An Indonesian government investigation reached similar conclusions saying it found evidence "that a planned, systematic and massive scorched-earth campaign was launched" and that among the perpetrators were "those who held responsibility for national security policy, including but not limited to, high-level military officials who actively or passively were involved in these crimes."
END
General Lumintang Trained by the U.S.
by Allan Nairn ~ March 29
Months after helping to design and implement a campaign of violence against East Timor, Indonesian General Johny Lumintang is in the United States. Lumintang, who last summer issued a secret Red Beret (Kopassus) terror manual, is a US trainee who has long been favored by Washington policy makers. In 1989 Lumintang was brought to the United States for an International Defense Management course under the Pentagon's IMET (International Military Education and Training) program (Lumintang was IMET student #23294). In following years Lumintang assumed command of two military campaigns -- occupied East Timor and West Papua [Irian Jaya] -- based on the systematic
torture, killing, and abduction of civilians.
Under Lumintang's command in West Papua (1996), Kopassus massacred civilians after descending from a helicopter illegally painted with international Red Cross markings.
In May of 1998 Lumintang shared command of "security" in Jakarta during anti-Chinese riots that -- according to diplomats and human rights groups -- the army itself helped to organize.
On June 30, 1999 Lumintang personally authorized and signed a secret Kopassus covert action manual ("Buku Petunjuk Pembinaan Sandhi Yudha") that calls for preparing Kopassus forces in the "tactic and technique" of "terror," "kidnapping," "sabotage," "undercover," "infiltration," "wiretapping," and similar measures.
The handbook is, according to senior Indonesian armed forces officials, still in use in Indonesia and is at this moment being applied in the Kopassus terror campaigns in West Papua and Aceh, and in undercover provocateur operations in Ambon and Kalimantan.
The terror handbook has come to light because of its use in occupied East Timor during the 1999 armed forces/militia campaign of arson, murder, rape, abduction, and assassination ( A copy of the book was found in an abandoned army base by Yayasan Hak, an East Timorese human rights and legal aid group).
Lumintang has long been a close protege of US military intelligence, and has been promoted by the Pentagon and State Department as a leading Indonesian "moderate."
Kopassus itself has received extensive training under the Pentagon's JCET (Joint Combined Exchange and Training) program in tactics including demolitions,surveillance, "advanced sniper technique," air, sea, and ground assault and "psychological operations." The JCET training was suspended in 1998 after a public and Congressional outcry, but the Pentagon is pushing to renew it on the grounds that under leaders like Lumintang, the armed forces are reforming themselves and deserve new US weapons and know-how.
In fact, it is popular pressure that has forced Jakarta's army into slow retreat, and as the Lumintang case illustrates, armed forces repression is systematic. The use of terror against civilians is written deep into TNI (Indonesian Armed Forces) doctrine and is assumed by senior commanders as their basic tactic and technique.
If it is true in some sense that Lumintang really is a "moderate" in TNI, then that only illustrates the extent to which this is a truly terrorist organization. As Vice Chief of Staff for the Army -- and also as a former on-the-ground East Timor commander -- Lumintang played a leading role in the shaping of Timor militia policy. On the day that the UN agreement for the Timor referendum was finalized (May 5, 1999), Lumintang sent a telegraphed order to commanders for the Timor zone directing them to prepare a "security plan" including "repressive/coercive measures," as well as a military-planned "exodus" if the Timorese voted for independence. As an army personnel chief he also helped send his former aide -- Gen. Kiki Syhanakrie -- to Timor to assume command of the final stage of the scorched earth operation.
When I was a prisoner in Gen. Kiki's Dili headquarters (his command had been re-named The Committee for the Restoration of Peace and Stability), I could see the Aitarak militias on-base, going out to stage their raids. They were directed by Kopassus officers, some uniformed, some plainclothes, as well as by intelligence and operations officers from the Army, Navy, Air Force and Police.
Gen. Lumintang was one of the senior officers who gave them their marching orders. Those officers -- and their foreign accomplices -- should be prosecuted for their crimes. The civil suit by victims of the Timor terror cannot put Lumintang in prison. But it can help the US public begin to catch up with a discussion already underway in today's Indonesia and in newly liberated East Timor. The question is whether senior public officials should be allowed to sponsor murder.
Award-winning journalist and human rights activist Allan Nairn was the last foreign reporter in Dili, East Timor, prior to the arrival of the international peace-keeping force. On September 14, as the Indonesian destruction of Dili was culminating, Indonesian military forces arrested him on the streets of Dili. He was held in detention for six days and threatened with charges that could have landed him in jail for 10 years. The Indonesian government finally deported him to Singapore. On a previous trip to East Timor while on assignment for The New Yorker magazine, Nairn had his skull fractured by Indonesian troops while covering the November 12, 1991 Santa Cruz massacre. He is currently writing a book on U.S.-Indonesia military relations.
END
To rebuild, East Timor needs the help of American Catholics
By Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo, Dili, East Timor
I have visited the United States several times, and have enjoyed the hospitality and solidarity of American Catholics, who have shown great sympathy for my Church and people. Now, more than ever before, we urgently need direct American help.
It may seem distant now, but violence in East Timor was seen by television viewers throughout the world last August and September. During that time, so much of my native land, a mountainous island territory about the size of Connecticut, was cruelly destroyed. Many hundreds of people, including priests, nuns, seminarians and other church workers, were murdered without pity, others were maimed. An untold number remain missing. Most of the country was devastated: my own home and chapel were burned, as were the diocesan offices in the capital.
Nonetheless, in light of the terrible suffering that struck East Timor and the painful losses that still afflict it, a bishop and the Church have no special status. And, without doubt, it was the people at large who suffered the most, with as many as 90 percent displaced. Tens of thousands lost their homes and livelihoods and what little property they had. When my home was attacked, dozens taking refuge there were killed or injured without mercy. Hundreds of thousands were forcibly driven across the border with West Timor, the Indonesian side of the island, where about 100,000 East Timorese remain in squalid refugee camps where people have been terrorized. In East Timor itself, many families remain separated. Parents search for children, children search for parents, seemingly without end.
Why did this happen, and who is responsible? The rampage of last September in particular was orchestrated by Indonesian army elements and militias under their control to reverse the result of the August 30 United Nations-sponsored election, in which nearly 80 percent of registered voters rejected Indonesian rule. It was hardly surprising that people voted as they did: at least one third of our population of 700,000 had perished from the combined effects of Indonesia's 24-year occupation. Neither was it surprising, in view of this history, that Indonesian forces brazenly tried to overturn the will of the people. Despite months of warnings and reports of mounting violence, only after East Timor was aflame before the eyes of the world did the international community bring decisive pressure to bear on the Indonesian military.
This might not have happened were it not for strong efforts by the Holy See, the U.S. Catholic Bishops and others of good will. Even so, soon after the entry of international peace keepers in late September, many say East Timor disappeared from public view, at
least as far as television is concerned. Indeed, to people from far away, it may have seemed as if the crisis had come to an end.
Indonesian forces finally withdrew from East Timor in late October. But nearly six months later, reconstruction of our martyred land is barely visible. Even now, supplies to rebuild have not yet arrived in many if not most places: I hope the United States can help, both in terms of material support and in using its influence with the United Nations.
Though the United Nations is present in East Timor in large numbers, they have made comparatively few jobs available for East Timorese people, even though most are without work: a special effort must be made to include them.
To rebuild in peace, families must be united. But for this to happen, all those in refugee camps in West Timor and elsewhere who want to return to East Timor must be allowed to do so. At the same time, militia members now in West Timor cannot be permitted to resume their violent activities under any circumstances. Elements of the Indonesian army should be convinced to stop supporting the militias and allow people to freely return to East Timor. Further pressure on the Indonesian army from Washington is needed.
As of now, however, all is not yet secure. There have been numerous border attacks in recent weeks by militias who could not continue to operate without the support of the Indonesian army. Some of those who returned to East Timor during this time were found to be carrying firearms and grenades, which were confiscated by United Nations troops. But the fact that they had such weapons was a sign that some elements of the Indonesian military intend to continue to promote violence in East Timor. Indonesia badly needs the good will of Washington if it is to receive the billions of dollars in international bank loans that it needs. Therefore, the United States influence should be used to prevent a new outbreak of violence in East Timor.
Will the United States use this influence? Without the influence and solidarity efforts of American Catholics, it is unlikely that Indonesian troops would have withdrawn from East Timor at all. To rebuild, and to do so, in peace, the help of our American brothers and sisters in Christ is needed.
Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo, apostolic adminstrator of Dili, East Timor, is the only Catholic bishop ever awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. East Timor was invaded by Indonesia in 1975 in a move never recognized by the Vatican or United Nations. More than 200,000 East Timorese were killed or died from famine or disease during Indonesia's often brutal rule. Bishop Belo was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996 for being an unflinching defender of his martyred people. In his first major international statement since last August's vote for independence, he writes exclusively for The Florida Catholic©.
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UNHCR Warns Against Early Stop of Humanitarian Aid
UNHCR ~ March 30, 2000
The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) today warned against Indonesia's plans to cut off relief aid to East Timorese refugees in West Timor after March 31.
The Indonesian government has given East Timorese until the end of this month to decide whether they want to go back to East Timor or remain in Indonesia, threatening to stop providing aid to East Timorese refugees living in some 200 encampments in West Timor.
"We appreciate Indonesia's efforts to date to help East Timorese refugees, but we are concerned that an early discontinuation of assistance will have a negative impact on the well-being of the refugees and on the repatriation programme, postponing a solution to the crisis," said Francois Fouinat - UNHCR's Geneva-based official in charge of Asia.
A memorandum of understanding signed between the Indonesian government and UNHCR on 14 October 1999, gave Indonesia overall responsibility for the safety and care of East Timorese refugees.
Since the announcement of the deadline earlier this moth, UNHCR has called on the authorities to be flexible and allow for voluntary repatriation to continue.
During a recent trip to Indonesia, UNHCR Assistant High Commissioner Soren Jessen-Petersen told Jakarta UNHCR would continue to support government plans to help those wishing to return to East Timor or those who want to settle in Indonesia, but he urged Indonesia to give the people more time to decide.
Since 8 October 1999, more than 156,000 refugees have returned to East Timor under a UNHCR voluntary repatriation programme supported by the International Organisation for Migration. The World Food Programme and non-governmental organisations also joined UNHCR in providing emergency and relief assistance to the refugees. Up to 95,000 East Timorese remain in West Timor. UNHCR estimates that a significant number may still decide to return to East Timor.
END
NGOs Urge Strongest Resolution on Timor to Human Rights Commission
Prime Minister Antonio Guterres
Portugal
March 23, 2000
Your Excellency,
the Prime Minister of the Portuguese Republic, Antonio Guterres,
We are writing to urge you to use your government's current role as President of the European Union to achieve the strongest possible outcome in favor of justice and freedom for East Timor from the upcoming meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva.
Indonesian President Wahid's promise to allow the safe return of the East Timorese in West Timor camps and to end military support for the militias will materialize only if compelling international measures are immediately adopted. These people taken hostage now face the danger that on March 31 Indonesia will deny them access to humanitarian assistance and will initiate their relocation within Indonesia. Given the prevalence of disease and malnutrition in the West Timor camps, this represents the danger of large-scale loss of life, in addition to the hundreds of people who have already succumbed in these camps.
We urge you to bring forth this most fundamental matter in Geneva, and to ensure that the outcome of the meeting will be forceful enough to resolve this matter urgently and once and for all. All East Timorese in West Timor and elsewhere in Indonesia must receive immediate humanitarian assistance and be given the chance to freely choose to return to Timor Lorosae. We ask you to ensure that all camps are quickly placed under direct UNHCR authority.An increase in UNHCR and IOM personnel is required. This increase is only short term but must be large to be effective. The Indonesian military must be compelled to stop providing weapons to the militia who harass and coerce their hostages in West Timor, and to block militia access to the camps. Indonesia must place militia leaders under arrest pending human rights trials.
The integrity of the Timor Lorosae territory is not yet secure. Several recent incursions have occurred of heavily armed and trained men from West Timor into Timor Lorosae, including killings and shooting at UN aircraft.
Participation or collaboration by Indonesian military in cross-border attacks must be vehemently protested and stopped. We urge you to support Jose Ramos-Horta's recent calls for a European Union freeze of weapons sales to Indonesia. Additionally, the UN must be prepared to resolve the problem of securing the border if incursions continue. UNTAET officials have stated the impossibility of securing the border under current conditions.
We now come to the subject of accountability. Here we distinguish two different periods. First, the period covered by the mandates of the UN Commission of Inquiry and the Indonesian Human Rights Commission, that is, following President Habibie's January 1999 announcement that he would consider a popular consultation in East Timor. Second, the period from the 1975 Indonesian invasion until January 1999. Concerning the first period, both commissions have produced strong reports of their initial findings.
Those people who in these reports are alleged responsible for systematic breaches of international humanitarian law (a category which may include genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes) must be brought to trial and receive appropriate sentences.
The investigation of the crimes in the first period starting 1975, during which an estimated one-third of the East Timorese population perished, including the gathering of evidence of systematic breaches of international humanitarian law, must be initiated by the UN. Crimes during this extensive period were of the gravest nature and cannot be forgotten to focus solely on the 1999 period.
These are necessary conditions to set the ground for democracy in Timor Lorosae as well as Indonesia, and to allow the possibility for normal relations between the two neighboring countries and between the pro-integration and pro-independence Timorese. Unless justice is served, we may expect that revenge will take its place for years to come, making peace and prosperity unlikely to succeed in Timor Lorosae. And unless justice is served, the entire population of Timor Lorosae will be denied the only possible relief available for the unimaginable trauma they have been collectively subjected to during 25 years of the worst kinds of abuses known to humankind.
The inquiry team of the Indonesian Human Rights Commission has produced a strong report of their initial findings concerning the crimes against humanity committed in East Timor that followed the 1999 UN referendum, and has our admiration and praise. The findings of both the Indonesian team and the UN Commission of Inquiry on East Timor deserve to be presented in a fair court, where appropriate sentences will be issued for those found guilty and where witnesses will feel safe to testify.
The establishment of an international tribunal for these crimes was proposed in September by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, and suggested by three UN Special Rapporteurs in their December report. The UN Commission of Inquiry on East Timor (established by the UN Secretary general upon request of the UN Commission on Human Rights) also concluded in its January report that an international tribunal should be established.
The only conceivable possibility for avoiding an international tribunal would be if Indonesia succeeds in conducting fair trials within the country very soon. Given the evidence that the crimes committed in East Timor were commanded from the highest levels of the Indonesian military and government, that some of the accused remain in powerful positions today, and further, given the lack of independence and the corruption prevalent in the Indonesian judicial system, we have serious reservations that fair trials can be conducted in Indonesia.
Despite our reservations, the recently introduced new Indonesian Draft Law represents a very positive development -- in particular the establishment of Ad Hoc human rights courts to try past crimes -- that may allow for some hope to emerge for the possibility of fair Indonesian trials. The democratizing steps represented by the Draft Law and by the Indonesian Human Rights Commission conducting such valuable work taken seriously by the Indonesian government came about in response to international pressure for an international tribunal.
Mr. Prime Minister, we respectfully ask that Portugal take the lead in pushing the UN to prepare itself for an international tribunal for the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in East Timor since the Indonesian invasion in 1975. Trying the crimes committed in 1999 alone is not sufficient. Concerning 1999, the UN should be urged to implement the recommendations of its own Commission of Inquiry and, as a first step, establish an international investigation and prosecution body. Preparations for an international tribunal must continue. Delegation to Indonesian trials can only occur if Indonesia does succeed in establishing truly fair trials itself, while the responsibility for ensuring that justice for East Timor is served remains with the UN.
The UN investigation of crimes -- including the gathering of testimonies and physical evidence -- must proceed and be extended back to the entire period following the 1975 Indonesian invasion.
The UN Secretary General should be asked to make public what criteria will be used to evaluate the Indonesian trials; in particular, what is meant by meeting "international standards," and the UN should offer technical assistance to these trials. Indonesian compliance with these international standards must be absolute and must be continually monitored by the UN. In particular, the pardoning of sentences such as the pre-announced pardon by President Wahid of General Wiranto, is unacceptable. President Wahid must be required to affirm the Indonesian government's commitment to implementing sentences issued on any person.
The failure by Indonesia to absolutely comply with any one of these international standards should lead to promptly resuming an international trial under UN auspices.
With our Best Regards,
Australians for a Free East Timor (AFET) - Australia
Christians in Solidarity with East Timor (CSET) - Australia
Comissao para os Direitos do Povo Maubere (CDPM) - Portugal
East Timor Action Network / United States (ETAN/US) - U.S.
East Timor Human Rights Centre (ETHRC) - Australia/East Timor
East Timor International Support Centre (ETISC) - Australia
East Timor Ireland Solidarity Campaign (ETISC) - Ireland
Gesellschaft fuer Bedrohten Voelker, e.V. (GFBV) - Germany
International Platform of Jurists for East Timor (IPJET)
Norwegian Cooperation Council for East Timor and Indonesia (NOCETI) - Norway
Swedish East Timor Committee (SETC) - Sweden
TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign - Great Britain
VVV East Timor (VVVET) - The Netherlands
Cc: His Excellency, the President of the Portuguese Republic, Jorge Sampaio
For more information please contact John at East Timor Action Network
END
DEADLINE FOR REFUGEES GIVES RISE TO STARVATION FEAR
By Sonny Inbaraj
DARWIN, Australia, Mar. 24 (IPS) -- There is fear that tens of thousands of East Timorese refugees still languishing in West Timor could face starvation as the deadline fast approaches before Indonesia cuts off all aid to the camps.
Indonesian authorities in West Timor have said that after March 31, feeding and caring for the refugees will be the responsibility of the international community. In the meantime Jakarta wants the refugees to decide whether to return to East Timor or opt for permanent resettlement in Indonesia.
On Wednesday Indonesia's human rights minister Hasballah Saad warned about a looming humanitarian disaster for the East Timorese refugees if the government halted food distributions next week.
"Indonesia gave warning that as of April 1, it will stop the food distributions," said Saad who toured refugee camps in and around Kupang, West Timor last weekend. "Very soon the food distribution will stop. If it does it will be a very big problem."
East Timor's Nobel Peace Laureate Jose Ramos-Horta called the situation of East Timorese refugees in Indonesia "a criminal matter," and urged the international community to help return them home fast.
"International aid workers must be sent in to the camps, to shine the light of international attention on what our people are facing on a daily basis," he said.
Up till now the camps in West Timor -- which are government-run camps, not U.N. refugee camps - have been receiving medical aid, some water supplies and rice in partnership with major aid programs from U.N. agencies and international organizations.
About 260,000 people were either deported to West Timor or fled there to escape the militia violence in East Timor which erupted after the announcement, on Sept. 4, of the UN-sponsored Aug 30 referendum. The outcome of the poll favored East Timor's separation from Indonesia by an overwhelming 78.5 per cent, against 21.5 per cent opting to remain with Indonesia but with broad autonomy.
More than 140,000 East Timorese have returned from the camps in West Timor, but with intimidation by militias still rife, more than 100,000 remain, including the families of militias and former employees of the Indonesian military and civil service who would prefer to remain permanently under Jakarta's rule.
"There is still intimidation going on (in West Timor). On Monday we had a convoy and there was a militia who stoned the convoy smashing the windscreen of one of the aid vehicles," said UNHCR's public information officer Fernando del Mundo who returned recently from West Timor.
"The militias are still active in two camps," he told IPS.
In recent cases, UNHCR staff members themselves have been the target of militia violence. UNHCR has been denied unrestrained access to refugee camps in West Timor, and their efforts to extract refugees from the camps and return them to East Timor are often done under extremely risky circumstances.
In late February a convoy of trucks, transporting 1,000 refugees and UNHCR officials was attacked by militias. As a result, one truck was damaged, and only 179 refugees were eventually repatriated.
"The basic problem is, these people (militia) are allowed to do whatever they are doing. They are allowed to harass. They are allowed to intimidate. That is the issue," Jessen-Peterson, U.N. Assistant High Commissioner for Refugees, said recently.
Similarly, while the International Red Cross has been able to conduct humanitarian operations in East and West Timor, they too have been largely unable to gain access to refugee camps in West Timor, rife with malnutrition and disease.
Sari Kendar, a Unicef representative in the West Timor border town of Atambua said the world body was paying special attention to deadly malaria. She said Unicef had not expected malaria to strike.
"The number of medical doctors is inadequate and the increasing incidences of malaria were unmonitored," she said.
UNHCR, according to del Mundo, expects that of the reported over 100,000 people in West Timor about 50,000 want to go back to East Timor. "These people still haven't gone back to East Timor because they're still ambivalent about conditions back home besides fearing the militias," said del Mundo.
Humanitarian workers are troubled by reports that militias, in particular the Union of Timor Warriors (UNTAS), a pro-integration umbrella group, are placing advertisements in newspapers to scare refugees from returning to East Timor.
One recent advertisement suggested that those who return to East Timor will be doused in gasoline and burned alive. Others threaten torture and shooting. Although UNHCR has attempted to refute these advertisements, many refugees in West Timor do not believe the counter-ads.
A Jakarta Post article on March 19 quoted Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare and Poverty Eradication Basri Hasanuddin as saying some 10,000 East Timorese repatriated by international agencies have returned to neighboring West Timor over the past month.
The Indonesian minister told the paper East Timorese were streaming back to refugee camps in Indonesia because of uncertainties at home, including food shortages.
But del Mundo, who was at the East Timor-Indonesia border last weekend, said there was no evidence of such large numbers of people coming back into West Timor. "We are seeking clarification from the Indonesian government on when this happened and over what period of time."
On the contrary, del Mundo said the number of refugees returning from West Timor has been rising in the last several weeks. "On Monday 450 people crossed the border overland, yesterday some 800 people returned, 500 of whom left Kupang aboard a ship."
The Portugal-based East Timor Observatory, however, said there is still strong concern that not enough refugees are returning home fast enough with the Indonesian deadline just a week away.
"The average repatriation rate was 2,100 per day between Oct. 8 and the end of November. However, the rate fell sharply in December to 400 per day," said the Observatory in a briefing paper circulated to aid agencies.
"The most likely explanation for the drop, according to aid workers, is that most of the early returnees had been living in places to which international agencies had access (through civil and religious organizations), while the others had to get out of the 'refugee camps' that were controlled by militias opposed to the repatriation process," said the monitoring group.
END
Ramos-Horta Issues Statement On Refugees, Prosecutions, Military Ties
March 23, 2000
Calling the situation of East Timorese refugees in Indonesia "a criminal matter," East Timorese Nobel Laureate Jose Ramos-Horta urged their speedy return. He said that all but the commanders responsible for ongoing military and militia terror are welcome to return. These leaders must be called to account, and the international community "must take strong measures at all levels to put the Indonesian military in check."
In a statement issued today, Ramos-Horta also praised Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid's efforts at reconciliation with East Timor and urged the international community to support democracy in Indonesia. "By suspending all military ties with that brutal military, the ... world will not only help stop the terror in West Timor, they will also strengthen the civilian government... [and] bring closer the day when the people of Indonesia can finally live in peace, free from military repression."
Ramos-Horta called on the international community to push forward with its own tribunal, while supporting Indonesia's efforts to investigate and prosecute some of those responsible "for the nightmare of destruction East Timor has witnessed since 1975." He said, "such a tribunal would guarantee justice is served against the masterminds of genocide in the Indonesian military high command if Indonesia cannot meet standard international norms of due process." He urged the international community to clarify the standards that Indonesia must satisfy for credible prosecutions.
Ramos-Horta, vice president of the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT), said East Timorese are welcome to return "including those who collaborated with Indonesia... The CNRT will accept no reprisals against any of them. This is their country."
He urged an intensive short-term increase in personnel in West Timor "to help with accompaniment of civilians. International aid workers must be sent in to the camps, to shine the light of international attention on what our people are facing on a daily basis."
Jose Ramos-Horta shared the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize.
Following Is The Text Of the Statement by 1996 Nobel Peace Prize Co-Laureate José Ramos-Horta
The National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT) is deeply concerned about the dire situation still facing those East Timorese in militia and military-controlled camps in West Timor.
More than a month ago, West Timor officials stated that nearly 500 East Timorese, including 310 children, have died due to inadequate sanitation and medical care in the camps. Sanitation and access to medical treatment in the camps is practically nonexistent. Attacks and intimidation by militia and military are an ongoing reality. Access by international aid groups to the refugees is extremely limited, and there have been many militia attacks on aid workers. That this situation continues six months after these East Timorese were driven into forced exile is a criminal matter that must be remedied immediately.
The propaganda being spread through the camps by hard liners in the Indonesian military and their militia lackeys about violence in East Timor is making repatriation efforts much more difficult. We are committed to working together with the Indonesian government to explain to our East Timorese brothers and sisters that they can return safely, including those who collaborated with Indonesia.
Those thousands who voted for autonomy with Indonesia and those militia members who collaborated with the Indonesian Army can feel safe returning to their homeland. The CNRT will accept no reprisals against any of them. This is their country, they belong here and all of us -- the resistance, the pro-autonomy groups -- must meet halfway, bury the past, consolidate peace and rebuild this country.
However, there can be no tolerance for militia leadership that continues to oversee terror campaigns in West Timor, or cross-border and against Oecussi in East Timor. Those responsible for such premeditated savagery must be arrested immediately. Very recently, international peacekeepers near the border between East and West Timor came under fire from Indonesian military-backed militias four times in 24 hours. More recently, a cross-border raid into East Timor by either militias or military (in too many cases they are one and the same) killed one East Timorese civilian; a UN military spokesman said, "further harassment and killing of innocent locals could very well take place."
We are relieved that at long last a militia boss in West Timor, Moko Soares, was arrested, but we are concerned over the nature of and authority over his pending trial in West Timor. More of those in the militia leadership that are still ordering attacks must be brought to trial, and their bosses in the Indonesian military should be called to account as well. If the Indonesian authorities in West Timor can, in the arrogant double speak of the Suharto era, say our people in the camps need to decide whether or not they will come home by the end of March, certainly the rest of the world can tell those authorities that the military thugs calling the shots need to decide to cut loose the militias this week.
In East Timor we are beginning, with UNTAET, to establish our own judicial system, which will soon be ready to try those in East Timor arrested for militia or criminal violence. But, our brothers and sisters will have a harder time practicing forgiveness here in East Timor if they know justice is not being served at the highest levels of power, through trials of those in the Indonesian military who are responsible for the nightmare of destruction East Timor has witnessed since 1975. This is also the only way to send a signal once and for all that the international community will not tolerate ongoing military aggression against innocent East Timorese civilians. For this reason, while we support the process of investigation and trials underway in Indonesia we also encourage the international community to push forward with support for a tribunal. Such a tribunal would guarantee justice served against the masterminds of genocide in the Indonesian military high command if Indonesia cannot meet standard international norms of due process. The international community should clarify these standards now, and focus particular attention on the credibility of judicial personnel, witness protection, and military cooperation, and it should not allow selective immunity from prosecution.
We were extremely grateful that President Wahid took the bold step of coming to East Timor and reaching out his hand in reconciliation. This gesture of goodwill, in which he acknowledged with regret the destruction of our country by the Indonesian military, was not taken lightly by the East Timorese people. Nor will we forget that President Wahid supported our right to self-determination in the Suharto years. We are also grateful for his promise that Indonesian military support for the militia in West Timor will end, and look forward to seeing it fulfilled.
The international community must support the pro-democracy movement and the civilian government in Indonesia by taking strong measures at all levels to put the Indonesian military in check. By suspending all military ties with that brutal military, the great countries of the world not only help stop the terror in West Timor, they also strengthen the civilian government of our friend Abdurrahman Wahid, and bring closer the day when the people of Indonesia can finally live in peace, free from military repression and the draconian "dual-function" that maintains it. We are grateful for current restrictions and call for their continuation, until Indonesia is truly under civilian control, as well as fulfilling its commitments to legal accountability and the return of our people.
To help speed the return home of our fellow East Timorese still in West Timor, we ask for an intensive short-term increase in personnel to help with accompaniment of civilians. International aid workers must be sent into the camps, to shine the light of international attention once more on what our people are facing on a daily basis.
I thank you for your urgent attention to these vital matters.
José Ramos-Horta
1996 Nobel Peace Prize co-Laureate
Vice-President, National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT)
March 22,2000
END
Noose Is Tightening on Generals Invoved in Timor Violence
Tapol ~ March 17, 2000
JAKARTA - The team set up by the Attorney General Marzuki Darusman to examine the document prepared by the Special Investigation Commission (KPP HAM), has now completed its work and has decided that all the recommendations made by the KPP HAM are acceptable. This means that the investigations will now enter the next stage, namely interrogating possible witnesses or suspects. The Attorney General himself will coordinated the interrogation team.
On the basis of the findings of the team of 19 persons, the Attorney General has confirmed that the KPP HAM document has been accepted in its entirety, said Soehandoyo, head of public relations of the Attorney General's office. 'The recommendations made by the KPP HAM are regarded as being a sufficient basis for the interrogations to proceed.
The Attorney General will now appoint an interrogation team which will include prosecutors, and elements from the police and the military police and he has agreed to a suggestion that a team of experts should be set up to make proposals about how the interrogators should proceed.
"We hope that the interrogation team will be formed within two weeks,' said Soehandoyo, on behalf of the Attorney General's office.
He told the press he was not yet in a position to say who might be summoned as suspects. It will be for the team of interrogators to decide.
The Attorney General recently told the press that all the names recommended for consideration as suspects by the KPP HAM would be summoned and questioned. Among the armed forces senior officers mentioned by the KPP HAM is General Wiranto.
END
Wiranto Could Go On Trial in Three Months
Suara Pembaruan ~ March 17, 2000
JAKARTA - After attending a plenary session of the DPR Monday, the Minister for Law and Legislation, Yusril Izha Mahendra said that Wiranto could go on trial in three months, once the draft law on a Human Rights Court has been enacted by the parliament.
He said that although the KPP HAM, the investigation commission which had conducted investigations into abuses in East Timor, carried out its work on the strength of a presidential decree which has now been revoked by parliament, investigations into the crimes which will be carried out by the attorney-general's office could go ahead even though that decree was no longer in force.
He confirmed that the attorney general would have to wait until the new human rights court law has been enacted in order to go ahead with the trial of Wiranto. 'We want this to go ahead fast so that everything is ready in three months,' said Yusril, adding that the draft bill will be presented to parliament next week.
Such a trial would use an ad hoc provision (in the law) which can be triggered at the request of parliament, and which would have retroactive powers. He said it would be possible to deviate from the nullum delictum principle if there is a political decision and this is indeed the wish of the people. Yusril also said that alongside the draft bill on a human rights court, the government will also submit to parliament a draft bill on a truth and reconciliation commission.
The court established under the new law will be a permanent court, not an ad hoc court but the draft law provides for the human rights court to function also as an ad hoc court. This was the compromise that had been reached in the final draft of the law - the ninth draft - because there had been objections from some sides over introducing retroactivity which contradicts the principle of nullem delictum, namely that a law cannot be retroactive.
END
Elections Possible Next Year, Says UN
Sydney Morning Herald, by Mark Dodd ~ March 16, 2000
DILI - East Timor is likely to have a United Nations-supervised election next year to appoint its first democratically elected parliament, the UN's chief administrator for the territory says.
Expressing a note of exasperation at the slow pace of reconstruction, Mr Sergio Vieira de Mello, the head of UNTAET [United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor], said he wished he had a magic wand to translate donor pledges into instant public works projects.
While East Timor remained in a state of emergency, demands for political milestones that would lead the UN-administered territory to independence were not being ignored, he said.
Mr Vieira de Mello said that while it was preferable to focus on reconstruction and building a civil administration, "one cannot hold the political horses for too long".
"Perhaps after the CNRT [National Council for Timorese Resistance] congress in August, the time may be ripe for us to begin a very broad consultation with East Timorese civil society on what the Constitution of East Timor should look like," he said.
"We should let this grow out of an East Timorese process of reflection at all levels, going all the way down to traditional chiefs in the remotest villages of this country."
By early next year the transition would shift to a second phase, including the drafting of a constitution, regulations governing the formation of political parties, and an electoral law.
"I'm sure elections must take place in 2001," Mr Vieira de Mello said. "Would these be elections for a constituent assembly, as I presently believe should be the case?
"All of these questions are still premature, but that's how I see things unfolding from August or September this year, with elections possibly taking place in the middle of the year 2001."
He said that next week he would sign into effect a regulation establishing the long-delayed Civil Service Commission, responsible for the filling of up to 7,000 jobs.
He said 12,500 East Timorese had applied so far to enlist in a new police force, whose recruits will begin training on March 27 at a UN-run police academy.
The UNTAET chief said that while the security situation remained stable in the Oecussi enclave following last month's arrest of the militia leader Moko Soares, he remained very concerned about recent cross-border attacks by pro-Jakarta militia.
"President [Abdurrahman] Wahid was here only two weeks ago and I think on the security front developments have been very disappointing," he said, referring to pledges by the Indonesian President that he would crack down on the militias.
Mr Vieira de Mello confirmed that on Monday UNTAET and the CNRT had held their first talks on the future role of some 1,000 armed Falintil independence fighters.
He admitted conditions at their cantonment in Aileu were "ghastly" and promised immediate UN help to improve food supplies and sanitation. The meeting did not resolve the question of Falantil's future, but did cover several options, Mr Vieira de Mello said.
The independence leader Mr Jose Ramos Horta was a little more forthright. He said the CNRT had decided that, given the security situation and the legacy of the post-ballot violence, East Timor required a small, well-armed indigenous security force, whether it was police, army or a French-style gendarmerie, and the UNTAET mandate should, if necessary, be revised to include such a role for Falintil.
END
East Timor And Australia's Oily Politics
Mike Head, World Socialist Web Site ~ March 14, 2000
Among the most revealing aspects of recent events in East Timor has been the almost complete silence in Australian media and political circles about the two agreements signed by the Australian government last month to secure control over the multi-billion dollar oil and natural gas reserves beneath the Timor Sea.
One had to scour the newspapers for the barest references to the two treaties, tucked away in other stories. No headlines, photographs or commentary greeted either signing ceremony. In the first, on February 10, the Australian representative in Timor and UN Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET) chief Sergio Viera de Mello initialled a new Timor Gap Treaty to replace the one that the Hawke Labor government signed with the Suharto regime in 1989. Under the new treaty, the UN has simply supplanted Indonesia as Australia's partner in the Timor Sea Zone of Cooperation.
For the second ceremony on February 29, de Mello was joined by Australian Resources Minister Nick Minchin to sign the so-called Perth Agreement. It clears the way for a $1.4 billion project in the Bayu-Undan field, which is about 500 kilometres north-west of Darwin, capital of Australia's Northern Territory, and 250 km south of Suai in East Timor. Led by the US oil company, Phillips Petroleum, a US-Australian-Japanese-British consortium now has permission to exploit the huge field, which is expected to yield up to 400 million barrels of liquefied petroleum gas. The royalties and taxation revenues will be split between Australia and UNTAET.
The scant mention of the treaties was in stark contrast to 1989 when members of Hawke's cabinet signed the Timor Gap Treaty with their Indonesian counterparts in a champagne ceremony on board a VIP jet flying above the Timor Sea. That event was celebrated with film footage, editorials and front-page headlines.
Why the reticence about the Howard government's successful efforts to secure a dominant stake in the Timor Gap? Because the scramble for oil and gas undermines the government's claims to have sent thousands of troops to East Timor last September for purely humanitarian purposes. It suggests that, in relation to Timor, the old adage applies: the more things change, the more they stay the same. Much has altered since 1989, but one thing has not—the central pillar of Australian policy has remained the siphoning off of the lion's share of the resources under the sea between Timor and Australia.
Officially, Australian policy has shifted from being the West's most ardent defender of the Indonesian regime and its annexation of East Timor, to championing the right of the Timorese people to self-determination. Yet even the form of the Timor treaties highlights the colonial character of the new arrangements. The signatory for East Timor was the UN Administrator, who currently holds complete power over the former Portuguese colony. The treaties will legally bind any incoming East Timorese government. As for the Timorese masses, in whose name Australia has intervened, they have had no say in the arrangements whatsoever.
All in all, the Timor operation has provided an object lesson in the modus operandi of the new “ethical” foreign policy proclaimed by the Western powers as the basis for their interventions into Yugoslavia and Timor last year. Under the pretext of a sudden concern for the lives and well-being of refugees and the oppressed, a new colonialism has emerged, driven entirely by corporate and government appetites for oil and gas revenues, as well as other natural resources, cheap labour, new markets and strategic advantages.
While silence greeted the treaty signings, considerable fanfare was afforded to another event. On February 23, the Australian-led International Force in East Timor (Interfet) officially lowered its flag in Dili, the East Timorese capital, and formally transferred power to UN troops. Speaking at the farewell ceremony, the Australian commander, Major-General Peter Cosgrove, declared that after 157 days Interfet had accomplished its mission. “Peace and security” had largely been restored, he said. Moreover, Interfet had proven that “not all armies are oppressive instruments of an unwelcome administration”.
There was more than a coincidence of timing, however, between Interfet's departure and the signing of the two Timor Gap documents. When Cosgrove and 4,000 Australian military personnel were sent to East Timor last September their real mission was to protect Australian corporate and strategic interests. That was the mission that was largely completed with the Perth Agreement.
In fact, the operation was a continuation of three decades in which Australia's grip over the Timor Gap has been achieved over the bodies of hundreds of thousands of Timorese people. In the first place, in 1965-66 the Australian political, military and intelligence establishment gave full support to General Suharto's bloody coup in Indonesia and backed his dictatorship as a bulwark against the socialist and national liberation struggles in South-East Asia.
Then in 1974-75 the Labor government of Gough Whitlam gave Suharto unmistakable signals—and Whitlam's personal assurances at two summits—that his junta could invade East Timor with impunity. At least 200,000 Timorese people died as a result, through massacres and hunger. Timor's oil, first explored in the late 1960s, became a critical factor. Whitlam's ambassador to Indonesia, Richard Woolcott summed up Canberra's attitude in a diplomatic cable, advising the Labor government that a Timor Gap Treaty “could be more readily negotiated with Indonesia than with Portugal or independent Portuguese Timor”.
These aspirations came to fruition in the 1989 treaty. In return for Indonesia's signature, Australia became the only Western country to extend formal or de jure recognition to East Timor's incorporation as Indonesia's 27th province. Just two years later, while feeling obliged to express regret at the loss of life, the Hawke government endorsed the Suharto regime's blatant cover-up of the 1991 Dili massacre, in which more than 200 unarmed protestors were gunned down by Indonesian troops.
Brought to office in 1996, the Howard government maintained the alliance with the Indonesian regime as long as it possibly could. Throughout most of 1999 it steadfastly defended the Indonesian military's claims that it would ensure the safety of the Timorese people in the lead-up to the autonomy ballot of August 30. After the ballot produced an overwhelming vote for secession, Howard's government quickly reversed its position and campaigned for an Australian-led multinational force to occupy the territory. Cynically, Howard argued that the bloodbath in East Timor had reached such proportions that Australia had to immediately intervene.
Leaked intelligence documents have proven that Australian security forces had reliable reports from aid workers, telecommunications surveillance and other sources as early as November 1998 that the Indonesian generals were arming and backing the militias who were slaughtering whole villages. Howard and his ministers insisted publicly that any military involvement was the work of “rogue elements” outside the control of president Habibie and armed forces commander General Wiranto.
As a direct result of this complicity, the military-organised rampage continued, reaching a climax in the days after the ballot. Towns were devastated, 400,000 people—half the population—were forced to flee their homes, and thousands were killed. Most of the damage was done before the Australian troops arrived. They largely policed an already destroyed country.
This is the true record of official Australian policy in East Timor. At every turning point—from 1974-75 to 1989 and 1999-2000—the guiding principle has been oil and strategic interests. With the breakup of the Suharto regime in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis, an adjustment ultimately had to be made but the shift had no more to do with humanitarian concern than the previous policy.
General Cosgrove was not alone in claiming that his army had a uniquely humane role. His farewell speech echoed the sentiments of the entire political establishment—the Liberals, Nationals, Labor Party, Democrats and Greens—who all supported the intervention.
Even more significantly, it paralleled the claim of the “left” and radical milieu that demanded military intervention. As media commentators noted at the time, “troops out” activists of the Vietnam War era became champions of “troops in”. Their support for the dispatch of the Australian military helped to dampen disquiet and cut off avenues for the expression of any opposition. Along with the Howard government and the other parties, they bear equal responsibility for the outcome.
END
TAPOL Hails President Wahid For Supporting a Judicial Probe Into the 1965/66 Massacre
March 14, 2000
TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign, is profoundly moved by the announcement made today by President Abdurrahman Wahid, or Gus Dur as he is popularly known, supporting a judicial probe into the massacre of hundreds of thousands of alleged communists in 1965 and 1966.
TAPOL hails this as a major step towards enabling the people of Indonesia, in particular the younger generation, to face up to the horrific events that followed General Suharto's seizure of power in 1965 as hundreds of thousands of defenceless people were slaughtered in villages and towns across the country, especially in Central and East Java, Bali and North Sumatra.
The killings began in the latter part of October 1965 when Suharto ordered members of the elite corps, then known as RPKAD, now called Kopassus, to go out and persecute, arrest and eliminate anyone suspected of being communists or communist sympathisers. As President Wahid courageously acknowledges, many members of his own party, the Nahdatul Ulama, were recruited, trained and armed by the troops to join in the bloodletting.
Nor should it be forgotten that the western powers, including the US and British governments, did nothing to halt the bloodletting and indeed covertly helped the killers by supplying weapons and intelligence. They gleefully welcomed the destruction of the Indonesian communist party and the ousting of President Sukarno which paved the way for lucrative economic ties, trade and investment with resource-rich Indonesia and a new relationship with a country that was now under a dictatorship of unprecedented ruthelessness.
The 1965/66 massacre paved the way for Suharto to consolidate his power throughout the country and create a system of repression that held the country in its grip until the dictator was forced to resign in May 1998.
Carmel Budiardjo, director of TAPOL who spent three years in prison without charge or trial from 1968 - 1971, said: 'At a time when many groups in Indonesia are pressing for numerous human rights abuses and killings to be investigated, it is important to realise that all those targeted - imprisoned, torture, killed - during the 33 years of the Suharto New Order were victims of the same repressive machinery which Suharto created, built on the bones of the victims of the 1965/1966 massacre. It is important that President Wahid has added his voice to these demands by calling for a probe into this massacre, in the face of possible opposition from circles within the army and other groups in Indonesian society who still bear deep, irrational grudges against the Indonesian communist party and the leftwing movement which was decimated by Suharto's killer thugs.'
Budiardjo plans to visit Indonesia shortly, now that she is no longer blacklisted, and hopes to have an opportunity to convey her thanks personally to Gus Dur for this important decision.
END
U.N. Seizes Weapons Smuggled From Indonesia
Japan Economic Newswire ~ March 14, 2000
DILI - The United Nations peacekeeping force in East Timor has confiscated a number of weapons smuggled by ship from Indonesia's West Timor and detained at least five people, a U.N. spokesman said Friday.
Manoel de Almeida, spokesman of the U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), told a press conference the weapons were confiscated Thursday from a ship carrying refugees returning to East Timor.
"The ship carried 386 returnees from Kupang and upon arrival in Dili as the baggage was being unloaded and passengers started disembarking, customs officers conducted a routine search of one of the passengers and discovered two hand grenades," de Almeida said.
The grenades were concealed in a cassette player. The passenger was detained and handed over to U.N. civilian police, he said.
Following the discovery, the custom officers conducted a search of all the baggage on the ship, and found three weapons, several packages of air gun pellets, and a bundle of bayonets, de Almeida said.
"The confiscated weapons were handed over to U.N. peacekeeping personnel and four other individuals were detained for questioning by civpol (civilian police)," he said.
The discovery, he said, has prompted the U.N. border control service to conduct a search of the baggage on all ships bringing back returnees from West Timor. By Friday the number of such returning refugees had reached 150,194.
"Body searches may be carried out if it is deemed warranted," de Almeida said.
In a related development, Lt. Col. Brynjar Nymo, chief spokesman for the peacekeeping forces, said their presence in the Ermera District town of Atsabe in the central part of the territory "will remain high and patrols and checkpoints throughout the area will continue." Troops from Australia, New Zealand, Fiji and Portugal are taking part in the operation, he said.
The level of alertness along the East Timor border with West Timor has been increased from "medium" to "high", following a series of cross-border incursions and attacks on people in West Timor by pro-Indonesia militias.
The attacks have claimed at least one life, that of a villager.
"Yesterday (Thursday), members of the militia were spotted by the peacekeeping forces, but the distance, the difficult terrain and the bad weather prevented the peacekeeping forces from making physical contact or positively identifying the group," Nymo told reporters.
Based on observations in Atsabe, however, the group consisted of 15 males, wore dark clothes, and all of them were carrying weapons, he said.
According to Nymo, the pro-Jakarta militias are very active in isolated areas of the entire western part of East Timor and the Ermera district in the central part, driving unarmed civilians into hiding.
END
Wahid Orders Disarming of Militias
Lusa ~ March 14, 2000
Dili - Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid ordered his military Friday to disarm anti-independence East Timorese militias and take other "necessary actions" to keep them from attacking the territory, Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab announced in Jakarta.
"The president is very preoccupied and unhappy and immediately contacted the defense minister" on the issue, Shihab said, after meeting with a senior delegation from Dili’s UN administration and peacekeeping force.
"We can’t continue to tolerate such incidences [sic], and those responsible must get a strong warning and, if needed, face the corresponding legal sanctions", he added, saying he was citing the president.
The apparently stiffened stance against militias based in Indonesian West Timor came after "strong protests" and demands for action in Jakarta by the commander of East Timor’s peacekeeping force, Gen. Jaime de los Santos, and the UN administration’s director of political affairs, Peter Galbraith.
The two men, dispatched to Jakarta by UNTAET chief, Sergio Vieira de Mello, were also to meet Friday with Defense Minister Adm. Widodo Adisucipito, before travelling to West Timor for talks with Indonesia’s regional military commander.
UNTAET’s initiative came after militias launched more than 10 attacks against villages and UN peacekeeping positions from West Timor bases during the past two weeks.
In a related development, one militia leader returned Thursday to East Timor on an exploratory visit of reconciliation.
Considered a "moderate" among anti-independence forces, Juanico Belo, chief of the Saka militia group which was active in eastern Baucau, held talks in Dili Thursday with Vieira de Mello and local officials, including independence leader Xanana Gusmao, who had arranged the visit.
END
Court Told of Militia Leader's Gun-Dealing
by Karen Polglaze, AAP ~ March 14, 2000
JAKARTA, March 6 AAP - East Timor's most wanted militia leader listened impassively today as a West Timor court heard about his alleged gun-dealing.
Laurentino "Moko" Soares, commander of the Saukunar militia, appeared before the Kefamenanu District Court to answer charges that he had sold a rifle and ammunition to a cattle farmer.
Despite Soares's leadership of the militia believed to be involved in a massacre of more than 40 people in the enclave of Oecussi in the wake of the East Timor independence vote last August, and in shooting at Australian troops in January, no charges related to these incidents have been brought against him.
Soares was arrested near Kefamenanu on February 7 after he allegedly sold a gun and bullets to Lukas Anunu Asuuh in a deal unrelated to the violence in East Timor.
Kefamenanu chief prosecutor I Ketut Artana (I Ketut Artana) said Asuuh, the sole witness in today's hour-long court session, had told Judge Kamaruddin Simanjuntak and the two other members of the judicial panel that the transaction had occurred.
"The witness admitted he bought a gun and some ammunition from Moko, who considers himself as a middleman," Artana told AAP.
"The prosecutor in the court told me Moko Soares seemed impassive and just listened to the questioning of the witness."
Artana said Soares had been charged with a breach of the 1951 emergency laws. The offence carried a maximum penalty of death and a minimum of one day in jail.
The prosecution would decide what penalty to ask for after all witnesses had been heard, Artana said.
"Two or three more court sessions will be needed to decide what kind of penalty Moko should have," he said.
"The session adjourned until next Monday, when a witness from the Indonesian military and some others will be summoned."
Soares has reportedly been living in Kefamenanu, 15 kilometres south of West Timor's border with the East Timor enclave of Oecussi, since soldiers from the United Nations intervention force in East Timor (Interfet) gained control of Oecussi.
Securing the border there was one of the most difficult tasks faced by Interfet due to the many overnight incursions, allegedly by Saukunar militiamen.
The Interfet regional commander for Oecussi, Australian Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Singh, described Soares in January as a cynical bandit and a malicious murderer with a lust for blood.
Oecussi was believed to have been the site of the worst single incident of violence following the August 30 independence ballot in East Timor.
Last month, 45 bodies were recovered from a river bank there.
Investigators believed the people had been hacked to death or shot by pro-Indonesia militiamen.
On the day Soares's arrest was made public, the then- commander of Interfet, Major-General Peter Cosgrove, said he believed further charges would be laid against him by UN civilian police and Interfet.
"(The Indonesian military) have informed me that they are delighted to move forward with the charges that Interfet have made against Moko," Cosgrove said in February. "These include looting and, in the most extreme cases, murder."
Interfet has handed over responsibility for East Timor to the UN Transitional Administration. No further charges have been made against Soares.
END
Indonesia To Summon Generals, Steps Up Timor Probe
Reuters ~ March 14, 2000
JAKARTA - Indonesia's attorney-general's office expects to summon generals implicated in last year's mass violence in East Timor as it steps up its investigation of widespread murder and destruction in the territory.
"The report from the Timor commission has been submitted and we will step it up to investigation level,'' spokesman Suhandoyo told reporters.
A source in the attorney-general's office said that was a prelude to summoning senior generals whose names were mentioned in the report, drafted by Indonesia's official human rights inquiry into the East Timor violence.
"The probe is now at a stage where a summons for those generals is highly possible. The summons is on the agenda,'' said the official, who asked not to be named.
However, spokesman Suhandoyo said the office must set up its investigation team first, consisting of officials from the police, military and the attorney-general's office.
He added that the office had yet to declare any suspects in connection with the violence.
Attorney-General Marzuki Darusman said last month his office expected to name a military man as a suspect within two to three weeks.
The inquiry implicated several senior generals in the bloodshed, which broke out after the territory voted on August 30 to break away from Indonesia.
The mayhem, conducted by pro-Jakarta militias backed by sections of Indonesia's military, killed hundreds of people and left most of the territory in ruins.
END
Militia Elusive But UN Says Their Time Nearly Up
by Mark Dodd, Sydney Morning Herald ~ March 10, 2000
A group of 15 militia narrowly escaped capture in the rugged central highlands of East Timor after bad weather prevented a New Zealand-led force from completing its security sweep of the area, a senior United Nations military official said last night.
The sweep was not likely to yield results for another two days, said Major John Rogers, officer commanding support company First Royal NZ Infantry Regiment.
"With enough time we will capture them. We now have the forces to take this through to a conclusion," he said.
"Unfortunately the weather has closed in, and right at the crunch point - we were unable to get our cordon in.
"We have sighted two to three groups of militia heading away in different directions. Unfortunately I think we have lost them for now."
Helicopters were unable to land a platoon of Canadian infantry because of mist which reduced visibility to between five and 10 metres and which obscured the hiding place of the militia, Major Rogers said.
Soldiers from the elite New Zealand Special Air Service squadron, specialised infantry trackers, sniper teams, one Fijian infantry platoon, armoured vehicles and helicopter support are involved in the operation.
A militia man captured after Monday's shoot-out with Kenyan peacekeepers near here is helping with the search and has shown the New Zealand soldiers several safe houses used recently by his anti-independence colleagues.
A military observer based at Malabe said the target of recent militia attacks was most likely National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT) leadership at nearby Atsabe.
Major Rogers told of unconfirmed reports that four of the militia who escaped the shoot-out may have been wounded.
He said original reports indicated as many as 30 militia had crossed the border deep into the Atsabe region last year, a notorious militia stronghold. Those numbers have been revised to between 16 and 20.
The main search area on Wednesday covered the Batuani River valley and mountain spurs running north-west of Malabe village.
It is tough going for the foot patrols. The coffee-growing central highland comprises rugged limestone ridges covered in thick vegetation and deep river valleys often enveloped in mist.
Major Rogers said local residents had been co-operating enthusiastically in providing information about suspected militia movements, although their reports had not always been accurate.
"The population here is openly anti-militia so they [militia] have got two options to survive - steal or force people to give them supplies.
"That will ... let us know where they are. We can then manoeuvre forces in close and tighten the cordon to prevent their escape," he said.
Meanwhile, about six kilometres north-east at Atsabe, an old Portuguese colonial-era coffee-growing town, Lieutenant Colonel Jose Simoes has established a headquarters for co-ordinating security patrols involving 200 Portuguese paratroopers.
Colonel Simoes confirmed that a serving Indonesian Army corporal had been identified as being a member of the militia infiltrators.
Like his New Zealand counterpart, Colonel Simoes said he was confident the militia would soon be caught.
UN soldiers from New Zealand, Portugal, Kenya, Fiji and Australia are taking part in the combined operation focused in the central west of East Timor.
END
East Timor Operation Facing a Military Crisis in Australia
By Sonny Inbaraj
DARWIN, Australia, Mar. 10 (IPS) -- A defence crisis is looming in Australia despite praises being heaped on the Australian armed forces, the latest coming from President Bill Clinton, for their role in East Timor.
With funding tight, the Australian military is feeling the pinch with jobs of top defense staff under the gun and spending cuts in the pipeline.
Early this week Clinton congratulated Australian Prime Minister John Howard on the leadership his government has taken in helping stem the crisis in East Timor and thanked General Peter Cosgrove, commander of the Australian-led International Force for East Timor (Interfet), and the Australian forces for what the U.S. leader said was a tough job very well done.
Clinton added Australia had made an immense contribution to restoring security and stability in East Timor and had earned the well-deserved respect of the international community for the leadership it exercised.
But according to officials and analysts, the euphoria is all just media hype and comes in the midst of government concern over the Defence Department's administrative performance and the parlous condition of the defence budget amounting to 11 billion Australian dollars a year.
Last August, an official report condemned the five billion Australian dollar purchase of six Collins-class submarines as a "disaster," saying they were unfit for war.
"Unless we can plan for real increases in the defence budget over the next decade, Australia will be unable to afford a modern defence force," said Paul Dibb, a former senior official in the Defence Department who now heads the Strategic and Defence Studies Center at the Australian National University in Canberra.
Without such increases, he added, Australia will "no longer be a power with real military clout" in the Asia-Pacific region.
The East Timorese voted overwhelmingly for independence from Indonesia in a UN-sponsored ballot last Aug 30. But the announcement of the ballot results on Sept 4 was followed by a week of unbridled violence by Indonesian military-backed militias that left most of the cities in East Timor devastated and caused half its population to flee their homes.
On Sept 20 the Interfet was dispatched from the northern Australian city of Darwin to quell the militia violence in East Timor. The Australian-led force later grew to 11,000 troops under the command of General Cosgrove.
Interfet has been replaced by a 23-nation United Nations peacekeeping force led by Lieutenant General Jaime de los Santos of the Philippines, although 80 percent of the U.N. force of around 9,000 troops were transferred from Interfet.
The defence shake-up came as Allan Hawke took over as Australia's new Defence Department secretary.
"The plain fact is that defence has not been able to match the ends it is trying to achieve with the means it has been given to do so," said Hawke, a bureaucrat under both the Labor and Liberal governments.
Already he has begun to sharpen the axe. More than 200 of Australia's top defence bureaucrats will know at the end of next month how they have fared in a job shake-up by Hawke.
He revealed the shake-up -- which will affect deputy secretaries, division heads and assistant secretaries -- at a new conference in Canberra last week at which he unveiled details of what he has called "an agenda of continuous renewal for Defence."
Hawke said there were further savings to be had in the defence budget but no decisions had yet been made on major capital equipment projects under review.
About 88 billion Australian dollars is needed in new spending over the next 15 years to upgrade ageing defence equipment and the sum is 10 times bigger than any program ever considered by the government.
Amidst East Timor's turbulent path to independence, tensions in Aceh and West Papua, growing strains between China and the United States over Taiwan, and nuclear proliferation in South Asia -- which seriously challenge Australia's security environment -- this is indeed worrying.
"This money doesn't exist, while Australia urgently must decide on upgrading most of its surface combat capabilities," said Professor Des Ball, a defense analyst at Australian National University.
Explained Ball: "While most of the country's F-18s need to be replaced, the service life of the F1-11 fleet can be extended to 2020. But it doesn't make sense to replace F-18s without considering F1-11s as well. Meanwhile, the army is working with '60s and '70s artillery and armor such as the Leopard tank."
Michael O'Connor, executive director of the Australia Defence Association, was wary the Defence Department could be making the wrong decisions.
END
Saying It By Numbers: Mummy, Where Are You?
by Mark Dodd, Sydney Morning Herald ~ March 9, 2000
They are the forgotten victims of the anti-independence violence which swept East Timor last September. Now their faces stare forlornly from the hundreds of polaroid snapshots lining the display board outside the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) tracing office in Dili.
They are the 440 children still separated from their parents during the orchestrated deportation of tens of thousands of East Timorese by Indonesian troops and their pro-Jakarta militia collaborators.
Reuniting the children living in refugee camps in West Timor with their parents in East Timor is painstakingly slow work, said Ms Barbara Jaeggi, the ICRC's Protection Delegate in charge of tracing.
"We've been working on it since the start of the operation. We are doing our best and we hope we can bring back the majority," Ms Jaeggi said.
The children vary in age from two years to 16. The first photograph in the ICRC's line-up is an 11-year-old girl, Eduarda Dias, from Manufahi, a south coast region previously under the control of the Mahidi (Life or Death) pro-integration militia.
Wearing a blue dress, Eduarda holds a large white card with the number 115.
The photos often convey a snapshot of the militia-run camps the children are living in.
There is a cheerless photograph of Carlos Soares, Number 524, from Manatuto, posing against a background of rickety bamboo structures built on arid bushland.
Ms Jaeggi said that so far 81 children had been reunited with their parents. In West Timor most of the children are living with an extended family. The luckier ones are with relatives.
The UN refugee agency (UNHCR) estimates that as many as 100,000 East Timorese remain in camps in Indonesian West Timor, the majority of them unable to exercise their right to leave because of continuing threats and other intimidation by Indonesian officials and militia.
Mr Soren Jessen-Petersen, Assistant High Commissioner for UNHCR, said on Monday that 50,000 or more refugees would probably like to return home "if they had a free choice".
A well-organised campaign of disinformation and intimidation that appeared to have a local element of official support remained the biggest problem preventing the return of refugees, Mr Jessen-Petersen said.
"As long as people are being kept in a situation where they have no access, or not enough access, to objective information, where they are constantly being pumped and pumped with misinformation, and at the same time clear intimidation and harassment, it is obvious this is the major obstacle," he said.
The UN released an example of the type of disinformation referred to by the UNHCR chief - a propaganda sheet bearing the misleading title "UNTAS Bulletin" and a symbol similar to that of the recently departed Interfet force. This item, widely distributed in camps across the border, claimed the August 30 UN referendum result was false.
"Saddening and disgraceful conditions continue to exist in East Timor. News from families in East Timor via the telephone consistently indicates that the situation there is of concern, with a rise in criminal activity and high despotism," it said.
The "UNTAS Bulletin" blamed a shooting incident involving Indonesian troops at the border town of Motaain on February 19 during a family reunion meeting on an attempt by UNHCR to kidnap local people.
Mr Jessen-Petersen blamed Indonesian authorities for prolonging the misery of refugees wanting to return to East Timor.
"The basic problem is, these people [militia] are allowed to do what they are doing. They are allowed to harass. They are allowed to intimidate. That is the issue," he said.
END
Peace Keepers Capture Militia Member
UNTAET Briefing ~ March 9, 2000
UN Peacekeeping troops captured one militia member Wednesday afternoon, after an exchange of fire in Atsabe, Ermera district, some 60 kilometers away from the border with Indonesia.
Five militia fired around 15 rounds, and Peacekeeping troops fired approximately 40. The other four militiamen escaped.
The militia that was captured arrived in Dili today. He is being questioned by Civilian Police.
From the house where the militia members where hiding, Peacekeeping troops confiscated one automatic rifle, 350 rounds of ammunition, two black T-shirts, and two pairs of uniforms Indonesian-like.
UNTAET troops were sent to Atsabe region to investigate an incident which happened on March the 5th in which five militia attacked three farmers who were working in a rice field.
In this incident, one farmer was killed, one was wounded and a third escaped without any injury.
This incident happened in the same day as the Azufuru incident reported Wednesday.
Tomorrow, March the 8th, UNTAET's Peacekeeping Force Commander Jaime de los Santos and the director of the Office of Political Affairs, Peter Galbraith, are going to Jakarta to meet Indonesian Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab and other senior officers.
In the meeting - to be held on Thursday - UNTAET will seek action by Indonesia to stop the recent unlawful incursions into East Timor, and will stress that it is Indonesia's responsibility to stop the incursions.
Exhumations proceed in Baucau, Suai and Liquica
A body exhumed Wednesday in Baucau belonged to a man who was, according to UNTAET Human Rights Division, shot dead during the violence from September last year. The initial forensic examination found two gunshot wounds on the body. Exhumation in Baucau continued today (&ldots;.)
Exhumations by UNTAET CIVPOL and Human Rights investigators are also in progress in Liquica and Suai, where three bodies are to be recovered from a well.
UNTAET Human Rights Division has forensic experts from its team at the exhumation sites in Baucau and Suai, while one pathologist remained in Dili assisting the fieldwork by further examining the bodies that are exhumed and transported to the morgue facility in the Dili Human Rights Center.
END
Militias Pose Serious Threat to East Timor Refugees
Daniel Coney, Associated Press ~ March 9, 2000
KUPANG -- Exhausted, Remund Da Silva waited patiently on a ramshackle dock with his wife, seven children and hundreds of others for a U.N.-chartered ship back to East Timor.
The Da Silvas are among tens of thousands who fled or were forced from their homeland during bloody fighting last year. They sought shelter in squalid camps in Indonesian-controlled West Timor.
But unlike most refugees going back, Remund admits he took part in some of the violence.
He had been a member of Aitarak, one of several anti-independence militia gangs that went on a rampage of killings and destruction after East Timor's people voted overwhelmingly in a U.N.-supervised ballot to break away from Indonesian rule.
"I committed crimes," he said, refusing to elaborate. "But I just want to go home."
Six months after international peacekeepers forced the militia bands out of East Timor, some gang members want to go home and start anew.
But worried about revenge attacks or even prosecution, most remain in squalid and unhealthy refugee camps in West Timor.
Officials of the U.N. Commission for Refugees say 144,000 people from 200 camps have returned to the East. But almost as many are too afraid to return because of "continuous attacks and intimidation" by the militias.
"They want to hold on to the refugees as they feel they have more power that way," UNHCR spokesman William Splinder said.
U.S. ambassador to Indonesia, Robert Gelbard, said the remaining militia groups must be disarmed immediately.
"It's important that the Indonesian government take measures to remove militia leaders and help create a better environment within which people can make choices about whether to go back to East Timor or whether to become Indonesian citizens," he told reporters in Indonesia's capital, Jakarta.
Disease is also a major problem for the refugees. In Tuapukan camp, near West Timor's capital, Kupang, many children have scabies and all are malnourished. Camp doctors say malaria and respiratory illnesses are rife.
Gelbard said up to 900 camp inmates have died from disease.
"We warned the Indonesian authorities that leaving the people in the camps during the rainy season would -- not could -- would lead to an accelerated number of deaths," he said.
Last week, Indonesia's reformist president, Abdurrahman Wahid, went to West Timor after a historic first visit to East Timor. "The era has ended for those who want to resort to violence," he told militia supporters.
But his words have had little impact. A day later, suspected militia members opened fire at U.N. troops on the border between West and East Timor.
Security is also a continuous threat in some of the camps. UNHCR officials only visit them with armed escorts from the Indonesian military. A month ago, two foreign visitors were "beaten and nearly killed" by militiamen, the officials said.
An East Timorese anti-independence leader told The Associated Press the militias won't give up their struggle until the United Nations investigates claims that last year's independence vote was rigged.
"If this can be overcome, then I think we will be happy to start talking about going back," Francisco da Silva said.
But the U.N. has made clear that it has no intention of doing this, having already rejected all claims of bias and irregularities. Indonesia's government has accepted the results of the vote.
Despite the continuing troubles, some of the demoralized militia members now want to go home, said Red Cross officer Yayoi Hayashi, who coordinates a message service between the camps and family and friends in East Timor.
One of the messages Hayashi received recently from a militiaman read: "My friend, you may hate me, but I want to return. Everyone knows I'm a militia, my hands are dirty."
Before his family's name was called to board the ship home, Da Silva said he would do anything not to have to go back to the camps.
Despite reports from East Timor that returning militia members have been attacked and imprisoned, Da Silva said he trusted East Timorese independence leader Jose "Xanana" Gusmao when he said that past sins should be forgiven and East Timor must look to the future.
"East Timor is my home," Da Silva said. "It is time to go back."
END
Militia Disinformation Campaign Targets West Timor Refugees
Lusa, March 8, 2000
Dili - The UN Transition Administration of East Timor (UNTAET) has denounced the "disinformation campaign" waged by militia groups in Indonesian West Timor, whose aim is to make East Timorese refugees afraid to return to their homeland.
UNTAET spokesman Manoel Almeida e Silva told Lusa Monday that the campaign was promoted by the West Timor bulletin A Luta (The Struggle), published in Bahasa (the language of Indonesia) by the self- proclaimed United Timorese Heroes (UNTAS).
The issues of A Luta distributed among East Timorese refugees in West Timor urge them not to return to East Timor. A copy of the first edition, obtained by Lusa, outlines what it terms Portugal’s "neo-colonialist" designs on East Timor and describes the difficulties faced by residents of Dili, the East Timor capital, due to "rising crime and increased despotism".
The publication also claims that East Timor’s Aug. 30 vote for independence was "fraudulent and manipulated".
Almeida e Silva said UNTAS, which was first noted in January, had been set up to join under one banner East Timorese groups against independence and for integration into Indonesia.
"This situation worries the United Nations" he said, adding that the matter had been discussed by UNTAET administrator Sergio Vieira de Mello and the Indonesian president, during Abdurrahman Wahid’s recent visit to the territory.
The 24-year Indonesian occupation of East Timor ended last October, in the wake of the Aug. 30 plebiscite in which nearly 80 percent of East Timorese voted for independence. During the weeks of post-ballot violence, anti-independence militias and the Indonesian military evacuated or forcibly deported more than 200,000 East Timorese from their homeland. About 100,000 of them still remain in West Timor.
END
MARK DODD, Sydney Morning Herald, ~ March 7, 2000
DILI - Heavily armed intruders from across the Indonesian border are believed responsible for a weekend attack in which one person was killed, another injured and a third person taken hostage.
A United Nations spokesman has said pro-Indonesian militias were involved, but other UN officials privately suggest this and other recent attacks could have been made by Indonesian special forces, Kopassus, known to be based across the border.
Local villagers are insistent the raiders come from the Indonesian military, or TNI.
"There are no militia along the border. They are in Atambua. The TNI have the weapons," said Mr Augusto Soares, 34, a resident of Memo, a small village seven kilometres north-west of Maliana and right on the Indonesian border.
The latest attack was made on Sunday afternoon near a hamlet 15 kilometres north-east of the district capital Maliana, in an area guarded by Australian UN troops.
It came only two days after the UN ordered its border troops to go on high alert following four shooting incidents last week linked to militia - the worst violence seen along the border since October.
"Over the past week there have been several reports of militia movements in the Sector West Area [Maliana] and the [UN] Peacekeeping Force says the possibility of further harassment and killing of innocent locals could very well take place," said the UN military spokesman, Lieutenant-Colonel Brynjar Nymo.
The attackers in Maliana took a local person with them, according to reports. The captive later managed to escape and walk a long way to Maliana, where he alerted UN civilian police.
Colonel Nymo said the militia appeared to be well equipped with automatic weapons and grenades.
The spokesman put forward two possible motives for the attacks: either harassment and intimidation to test the UN response, or an attempt by the militias to increase their "political stature".
Another senior UN official, who asked not to be named, said he was concerned about recent reports of modern military weapons being given to pro-Jakarta militias, in breach of assurances from Indonesia's President Abdurrahman Wahid that the militias would be disarmed.
The frontier near Maliana is secured by troops from 5/7 Royal Australian Regiment, a mechanised infantry battalion (supported with armoured vehicles) who have been serving in East Timor since October.
It is understood troopers from the elite Special Air Service Regiment are also based along the border in a surveillance role.
The ability of the five alleged militia to breach the border in daylight and travel deep inside East Timor raises questions about the real identity of the attackers.
END
by Eric Wright ~ March 7, 2000
DILI - The former colonial power of East Timor, Portugal, is creeping back through an open door, more than 25 years after fleeing ignominiously from the mainland. The Timorese, in dire need of cash and assistance to build their new country, are willing to accept the Portuguese gifts. While the United Nations and World Bank crawl towards the point where they can begin major reconstruction, the Portuguese have offered hundreds of people and aid worth millions of dollars.
The recent visit of Portugal's president, Jorge Sampaio, served to highlight the hold which the Iberians continue to exercise over the furthest-flung part of their former empire.
The streets of Dili were lined with welcoming rows of palm leaves planted in banana stumps for Sampaio's arrival on Saturday 12 February; and the Timorese staff of the United Nations deserted their offices en masse to witness Sampaio's speech at the governor's palace, soon to be occupied by the UN's Transitional Administration in East Timor. Sampaio later attended an evening mass given by Bishop Belo, who shared the 1996 Nobel peace prize with Jose Ramos-Horta, East Timor's foreign minister in exile during the Indonesian occupation.
Sampaio's visit was preceded by a charm offensive which resulted in the announcement on Friday 10 February by Xanana Gusmao that Portuguese should be the official language of East Timor. This decision has not yet been endorsed by other Timorese leaders, or by the UN administration which officially runs the territory.
Many Timorese, especially the younger generation which has grown up learning Bahasa Indonesian at school and absorbing the Indonesian idea of history, do not fully accept the Portuguese or their president. "Teaching Portuguese is crazy," says Joao Ximenes, playing volley-ball on the beach on Sunday. "It's like we are walking backwards."
Although more than 130,000 people have returned from West Timor and other parts, there are still about 100,000 people in more than 100 camps scattered throughout the western part of the island, and an unknown number dispersed to other parts of Indonesia.
The issue of which language East Timor will use has become the most explosive national question since the decision in January that the US dollar would become the official currency. However, the currency decision was taken by the full National Consultative Council, the UN-Timorese body which is supposed to agree on all such matters of national policy, whereas Xanana's announcement on the eve of Sampaio's visit effectively short-circuited the territory's highest decision-making agency.
The NCC brings together different factions of the CNRT, or National Council for Timorese Resistance, a political umbrella which has covered the different East Timorese factions since 1997, and UNTAET, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor, established in October last year and expected to run the territory for at least two years.
Sergio de Mello, the head of the UN administration and the chair of the NCC, dodged the question of which language should be the official tongue of East Timor, claiming that as a Portuguese-speaker himself, he could not comment objectively on the issue.
Although many words of Tetum, the main language of East Timor, are descended from Portuguese, less than 10% of Timorese speak Portuguese with confidence. This compares with more than half who are fluent in Bahasa Indonesian. Young Timorese, especially, are more familiar with Bahasa. The UN estimates that more than 80% of Timorese under the age of 25 speak Bahasa.
The distribution of Portuguese text-books to primary schools in Dili has upset teachers, most of whom do not understand Portuguese to any useful degree.
"We have 11 teachers," commented Mario Soares, the head-master of Primary School 10 in Dili, who had been given the books. "Only four of them understand Portuguese, and not very well. How can we teach from these books when we can't read them?"
However, Bahasa is not politically acceptable to many of the Timorese who spent 24 years resisting the Indonesians, despite attempts to relabel the language Bahasa Malaiu, or Malay.
At the moment, teachers use whatever language they feel most comfortable with, and which they think their students understand. In schools which have received the Portuguese text-books, the system of primary education has been cut back from six years to four years. East Timor already has gaping holes in the upper levels of its education system, since most teachers at secondary and higher levels were Indonesian or loyal to the Indonesian administration, and a growing problem with youth gangs. Eliminating two years from primary school, the only level of education which is currently functioning across the country, is not likely to improve the situation.
"Four years of schooling is not enough," said Pawan Kucita, who is in charge of UNICEF's education programme in East Timor. "If you go to school for four years, you can forget everything you learned after a couple of years out of school. You lose your literacy."
The efforts of the Portuguese and the national CNRT, mostly expatriates who have recently returned to East Timor, to impose a language unwanted by the mass of the populace, has also undermined the efforts of UNTAET and other agencies trying to re-establish the education system in East Timor. UNTAET has ordered Indonesian textbooks to cover the rest of the school year.
"The Portuguese have not been cooperating with any of the other groups involved in education," one UN staff member complained. "They never show up at our weekly meetings. We didn't even know these text-books had been distributed until we went to a school and found the teachers wondering what to do with them."
The Portuguese aim to overcome the language handicap by bringing in several hundred people to conduct intensive language classes for teachers. They have even offered to send staff to conduct trauma counselling for children, ignoring the fact that almost none of the traumatised children in East Timor can communicate in Portuguese.
END
Troops on Alert as Shootings Delay Return to Normal Life
Sydney Morning Herald ~ March 7, 2000
MEMO - From a bunker guarded by an armoured personnel carrier in this village smack on the Indonesian border, Corporal Shane St Clair looks across the Maliabuka River to his Indonesian foes, similarly dug into sandbagged emplacements on a ridge.
"They (Indonesians) look at us and we look at them," said Corporal St Clair, of the Australian Army's 5/7 RAR battalion guarding this sector for the UN peacekeeping force.
About seven kilometres south of Memo, additional armoured vehicles have been moved to support a platoon on the high ground overlooking the hamlet and the Indonesian positions.
"The platoon in the south could be here in five minutes if we need them - the one in Maliana could be here in 10 minutes," Corporal St Clair says.
But their sophisticated night vision equipment did not detect a group of infiltrators last week who crossed the river into East Timor and approached to within 150 meters of the Australian position before firing between 15 and 20 rounds from automatic weapons.
The shootings have added an edge to life that was only just getting back to normal in Maliana.
Mid-evening in the once prosperous farming centre, teenagers gather round the decaying Indonesian monument in the town centre to strum guitars and chat. It is a convenient meeting place since the partial restoration of street lighting.
Along the darkened main street leading west to Balibo, fireflies light the night with bursts of flickering incandescence. Small oil lamps burn under house porches revealing more evening activity.
A group of men tinker with a motorbike brought into their house for safekeeping. Neighbours sit in the still evening under mango trees exchanging gossip.
The latest cross-border incursions threaten that precarious peace, and challenge the UN peacekeepers who have taken over from the Australian-led international force Interfet.
END
Jobless and Hungry But Full of Hope
By Kanis Dursin
DILI, Mar. 6 (IPS) -- The joy of winning independence seems to have been short-lived for Vasco Lopez as he ponders on how to feed his three young daughters amid limited resources and scarce job opportunities.
"I am worried about my children, about what they will eat since I have no job right now," said Lopez, whose house was burned down by pro-Jakarta militia during the post-ballot violence in East Timor.
"I have been going out every day to check with the UNTAET (United Nations) if there were vacancies. I am trying to apply for any job available."
Before the Aug. 30, 1999 referendum, Lopez, 28, worked for an Indonesian construction company, and earned between Rp450,000 and Rp1,000,000 ($65 to $130 U.S.) every month, barely enough for his family of five.
But the rampage following the announcement of landslide victory for independence destroyed almost all economic assets in the territory and drove businessmen, who were mostly Indonesians and pro-autonomy East Timorese, out of the former Portuguese colony, leaving those remaining in the area with little means of survival.
"The economic condition in East Timor is very difficult as there are very few job opportunities around. I never thought the situation would develop this way," Lopez lamented.
"I'm afraid my children will suffer from diseases or die of hunger if my husband could not find a job to support our family," said Lopez's wife, Maria Maia Odorozario de Sa, while trying to comfort her three daughters crying for food.
Latest data provided by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) shows that up to 80 percent of East Timor's population of over 700,000 are "currently without visible means of support."
Upon his arrival in Dili, Lopez cultivated a piece of land left by former East Timor governor Abillo Soares, who now resides in Kupang, the capital of Indonesia's East Nusa Tenggara province. "The harvest was not so good because the planting season had already passed when we returned," Lopez said.
Like most East Timorese, the Lopez family has been depending heavily on humanitarian assistance. Last November, the Lopez family received a total of 50 kilos of rice from the United Nations, but the rice has long been eaten.
A wide range of aid agencies led by the World Food Program distributed a total of 15,000 metric tons of food to the East Timorese from Sept. 20, 1999 to Jan. 31. Each person was given about 10 kilograms of rice.
Before the Aug. 30 ballot, East Timor had an estimated population of 829,000 people. Estimates by the United Nations Population Information Center show that 110,000 East Timorese are still in Indonesian West Timor.
Since January, only the most vulnerable groups benefited from the food distribution. UNTAET implemented the change to minimize food aid dependency and to prevent food market distortion in East Timor.
Maria said her family has not received any food assistance from the UNTAET since November, but they have managed to survive through aid from other donors like the Catholic foundation, Caritas.
"Pro-integration people are now laughing at us. They say 'look, you pro-independence people, now you become even poorer.' We ran away with our belongings and have returned also with our belongings," Maria said in tears.
At the height of the post-referendum violence, Lopez, who was known as a fanatic pro-independence supporter, sought protection from Falintil fighters in the jungle, while his wife and three daughters took refuge in Turiskai village in Indonesian West Timor.
When they returned to Dili a month after the arrival of international forces led by Australia in late September last year, Lopez and his wife found their house in Surikmas low-cost housing complex totally razed. All of their belongings and home appliances were either burned or taken away by the militia.
"We ran away before the militias burned down our house. Had we stayed here in this house, we would have been killed," Lopez said.
Asked about his feeling toward pro-Jakarta militias, Lopez said: "As an ordinary human being, I am always tempted to take revenge, but I can not. I will just let the existing laws deal with them."
Lopez, his wife and daughters are now staying in a house left by the brother of his wife, who supported autonomy during the referendum campaign and was believed to have provided information to pro-Jakarta militias. Maria's brother fled to the neighboring island of Flores shortly after the announcement in early September of the results of the referendum.
Lopez and other East Timorese living in the former Indonesian province now scramble for food, shelter and jobs. Due to widespread unemployment, signs of increasing criminality have emerged over the past few months.
"We are hungry, we need jobs now. Any job will do as long as I have one. I have families to feed," shouted Hugo, a young man who was queuing up to register for a job application with the UNTAET.
Humanitarian agencies are currently one of the largest employers in East Timor, accounting for over 3,000 jobs.
"I am a little bit disappointed because job opportunities are insufficient. We need food to eat," said Jose, who was applying to become a police officer.
"In terms of security, we already knew that the situation would get worse because even before the referendum there was widespread violence in East Timor. But in terms of the economic situation, we never thought it would become like this," he said.
"We have been very busy these past few days attending to the needs of applicants. Job opportunities are indeed very limited in East Timor," said a man attending to East Timorese wanting to become policemen.
Getting employed has proven to be doubly hard for most East Timorese not only because of limited job opportunities, but also because all vacancies require either Portuguese or English speaking East Timorese.
"I have been applying for any job with the UNTAET, but could not get one because UNTAET is looking for English-speaking East Timorese only. I feel that is unfair because as a nation, East Timor will have its own language," said Lopez, who finished senior high school only.
"We, pro-independence people never had the chance to learn English or Portuguese. Why they (UNTAET) ask us to speak in English or Portuguese?" said Barretto, another man applying to be a security guard with UNTAET.
As of February, UNTAET was employing some 670 local staff members, mostly as drivers and interpreters. Recruitment is underway to employ another 1,900 East Timorese for work within the mission.
UNTAET has launched quick impact projects in hard-hit districts to employ local people in rehabilitating their communities. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has started small-scale road rehabilitation projects, which are expected to provide employment to hundreds of East Timorese.
An independent Public Service Commission was established last Jan. 21 to oversee the selection and recruitment of East Timorese for the new civil service. The commission plans to recruit 7,000 people this year.
Foreigners, particularly Australians, own most large businesses currently operating in East Timor. Over 500 private businesses have applied for registration certificates with the UNTAET Finance, Development and Economic Affairs Department, and around 200 of them have received their certificates.
"I hope the countries which can help develop East Timor start creating job opportunities as soon as possible so that we can work," said Lopez, dispelling any bitterness or frustration over the present situation.
"I am not disappointed with the current situation. Whatever is happening now does not matter. What is important is that we are already independent," he said.
END
Timorese Search for Truth About 'Disappeared'
South China Morning Post, by JOANNA JOLLY ~ March 3, 2000
Manuel Mira Freitas wants to know the truth about his uncle, one of the thousands of people who disappeared under Indonesian rule.
Yesterday he led 300 protesters who demanded that Jakarta account for East Timorese who disappeared during its 24 years of rule.
They unfurled banners and held up photographs of those who had disappeared.
Mr Freitas' uncle was guerilla army commander David Alex, who was captured by the Indonesian military in 1997.
Although the army alleges that Alex died due to wounds received during his capture, his family believe he may still be alive as they have been offered no proof of his death.
"When he was captured, he was shot in the arm and leg," said Mr Freitas. "But then he just disappeared. The Indonesian army didn't call us in to see him. We think he could still be alive."
Mr Freitas' theory is supported by two sightings of Alex in custody in Dili. Witnesses say they saw Alex in the detention centre which will house the new Indonesian representative office in East Timor.
Mr Freitas called for the cases of all disappeared independence fighters to be investigated and for the Indonesian military commanders responsible to be brought to justice.
President Abdurrahman Wahid yesterday invited him to go to Jakarta and meet with a committee on the issue.
Mr Freitas said Mr Wahid was a democrat and that he trusted him, unlike Mr Wahid's predecessors.
END
East Timor Must Avoid Becoming Another Cambodia
TIME Asia online/Asia Buzz, by TERRY McCARTHY ~ March 3, 2000
East Timor is a large dose of déjà vu for anyone who was in Cambodia when the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia went in to clean up the mess there in 1992. The boys in the blue berets from the U.N. Transitional Authority in East Timor are now zipping around in their jeeps past a traumatized population who often don't know where the next meal is coming from, let alone where their future is taking them. The killers have disappeared, but the wounds are still fresh. And just like in Cambodia, the U.N. in East Timor seems to be bringing as many problems as it solves.
Dili is a modern-day Pompeii, a set of ruins where people are only beginning to creep back in and set up residence again. When the Indonesians pulled out, burning everything they could on their way, they scrawled graffiti on the walls that read, "A free East Timor will eat stones." That is about all they left behind.
So now nongovernment organizations are swarming in, hell-bent on their mission to save the East Timorese people from the comfort of their air-conditioned offices and four-wheel-drive vehicles. The U.N. are saying privately they think it will be two or three years before they can hand over to an East Timorese government, although local people have begun to complain that the U.N. is proceeding very slowly.
The danger of East Timor becoming too dependent on aid organizations and U.N. stewardship--just as happened in Cambodia--is beginning to show itself. Humanitarian organizations need disasters to justify their existence. But bad as things are in East Timor, in the long run it would probably be better if they did their work quickly and got out. This would force the East Timorese to face up to the difficult decisions they will have to take now that they are an independent country. The alternative--too well entrenched in Cambodia--is a long-term dependency on foreign experts and foreign aid money (still 50% of Cambodia's GDP) and a reliance on corruption rather than enterprise to make money.
History repeats itself in myriad ways. One of the big scandals surrounding the U.N. in Cambodia was the proliferation of brothels catering to the troops. In Dili, one of the local hotels was running a prostitution racket with Russian girls. Talk about the global village.
For a phone service, everyone now uses mobile phones with Australian numbers. Australian carpet-baggers are crawling over Dili, setting up businesses to make a quick buck as long as the U.N. and nongovernment organizations are here. East Timorese watch blankly as the aid community gathers for its morning cappuccino in a cafe outside ruined buildings behind the Turismo Hotel.
So here we are, a quarter of a century after Indonesia invaded, and East Timor has no legal system, no government, no phones, no infrastructure. Most of the houses in the major towns have been burned down. The schools have no desks, the hospitals have no beds. Cambodia, too, emerged from Year Zero and survived-but just getting rid of the bad guys was only a beginning. Now comes the hard part.
END
Reunion of Divided East Timor Families to Resume This Week
Agence France-Presse ~ March 3, 2000
JAKARTA - Reunions of families divided by last year's violence in East Timor will resume on the border with West Timor this week after being halted for security reasons, a UN official said Wednesday.
Indonesian Major General Kiki Syahnakri and UN Peace-Keeping Force (UNPKF) commander Major General Jaime de los Santos met on Tuesday at the border to discuss the resumption of the reunions, UNPKF spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Brynjar Nymo said.
Syahnakri oversees the Indonesian command that includes West Timor. "They mutually agreed to resume family reunions starting this Saturday," Nymo said.
He said a further meeting between the local Indonesian commander and representatives of the peacekeeping forces on Wednesday was seeking to iron out the details of the resumption.
The regular Saturday reunions -- held on a beach on the border between East Timor and Indonesian-controlled West Timor -- have attracted thousands of people and led many of them signing up to return to their homes in the East.
The reunions were halted after troubled flared at a meeting on February 19.
The Indonesian government has set a deadline of March 31 for the thousands of East Timorese refugees in East Timor, including the militias, to decide whether they want to return home or apply to stay in Indonesia.
Some 90,000 of the 250,000 East Timorese who fled or were forcibly driven into the West during the week-long militia rampage in September still remain in West Timor.
The militiamen, who also fled for West Timor when international troops arrived in September to halt their Indonesian army-backed terror campaign, have become camp bosses, trying to force inmates to join them, according to aid workers and returnees.
END
Interfet's Exit Has Militia On Warpath
The Australian, by MICHAEL WARE ~ February 29, 2000
THE capture of a militia reconnaissance team inside East Timor just one day after Major-General Peter Cosgrove's departure marks a heightened campaign of militia activity in the wake of the Interfet pullout.
From the time Interfet handed over its last area of operations to the new UN peacekeeping force on February 21, with the formal transition coming into effect two days later, militia activity has been on the rise. UN force commander Lieutenant-General Jaime de Los Santos yesterday told The Australian he could not discount the possibility there were certain "activities that could ignite the militia to test our resolve".
Concerns have been increasing within UN and some military circles over indications of limited militia remobilisation, with last week's attacks on refugees and aid agency staff, as well as the reconnaissance patrol's incursion, the most intense period of militia activity since mid-January.
It was believed the arrest of the last known active militia leader, Moko Soares, who had directed the repeated militia attacks in to the Oecussi enclave, had been the significant step in stemming militia activity.
Since the announcement of his arrest on February 9, there had been a lull in militia harassment and forays into East Timor, but that has now come to an end.
General de Los Santos confirmed two men from a militia unit sent across East Timor's western border were captured on February 24 near the village of Saborai.
During questioning, the men admitted they had been deployed on a mission to identify possible infiltration routes into East Timor so further militia forces could enter the UN-controlled territory. The men have been charged with espionage offences.
Militia also disrupted a UN High Commissioner for Refugees information campaign on Saturday in the village of Monumuti, in West Timor.
Australian army units in the UN peacekeeping force stationed along the western border have reported that militia "appear to be splitting into groups to attack" refugee convoys and aid agency workers.
That report follows the stabbing of an International Organisation for Migration doctor by a militia member in the West Timorese regional capital of Atambua on February 21, the day Interfet troops on the border transformed into blue helmet soldiers under the command of the UN.
Indonesian media has also reported a number of militia were detained at the border on Saturday by Indonesian soldiers when they became abusive because of the cancellation of a family reunion day.
General de Los Santos said there was a strong, however false, perception "among some East Timorese that our capabilities may not be the same as Interfet".
But virtually all of the UN troops on the critical western border are the same Australian and New Zealand soldiers who were stationed there as part of the Interfet force.
The renewed militia activity comes as Interfet's border agreement with the Indonesian army is being renegotiated by General de Los Santos.
END
Australian Financial Review, by Wilson da Silva ~ February 29, 2000
Dili - An impost on coffee exports in East Timor, among tax measures to be announced by the governing United Nations authority this week, was introduced at the insistence of the International Monetary Fund, despite resistance from the World Bank, UN staff and most Timorese leaders.
East Timor has been a tax-free haven for businesses since the Australian-led Interfet force arrived on September 20, and already more than 200 businesses are operating, most of them Australian or in partnership with Timorese.
The tax measures, passed by the National Consultative Council a 15-member, UN-appointed body dominated by Timorese representatives - will introduce taxes for the first time since the UN took the territory from Indonesia following an overwhelming vote for independence on August 30.
A duty of 5 per cent is to be introduced on all imports into the shattered territory, and additional sales taxes of up to 15 per cent on specific goods such as cars, mobile phones and items classed as luxuries, such as perfume.
Other items will carry a sales levy on top of the import duty: alcoholic beverages an additional $US1.50 ($2.40) a litre, cigarettes $US15 a kilo and fuel US5¢ a litre.
"The basic premise is to have tax measures that are very simple to administer because the capacity of East Timor (to administer them) is still very limited," said Mr Luis Mendonca, a senior economist with the IMF. "If you look at these numbers, these tax rates are low by international standards."
Exemptions include goods meant for humanitarian relief or non-profit organisations, goods meant for re-export and anything imported by the UN Administration in East Timor for its own use.
But among the measures is a "presumptive income tax" on coffee exports, the country's premium agricultural export. This last measure, the first and so far only impost on income, met widespread resistance when it was first proposed by the IMF and discussed at a National Consultative Council meeting on February 19. The IMF is the principal adviser to the UN administration on treasury and fiscal matters and drafted the tax regulations.
"It's lunacy and a step backwards," said one economist involved in the discussions. "I can't believe the IMF is proposing a tax on exports and was so adamant about it. The first country of the 21st century will emerge with an outdated and regressive tax that penalises the country's most successful export."
In the NCC debate, the export tax was opposed by Mr Xanana Gusmao, leader of the Timorese pro-independence coalition, the CNRT, and by the majority of NCC members.
But it was strongly defended by the IMF's Asia and Pacific Department chief, Mr Luis Valdivieso, and supported by Mr Joao Carrascalao, a Timorese businessman and NCC member with interests in coffee something that surprised observers.
They argued that since almost all of the territory's coffee exports were purchased by the National Co-operative Business Association, a non-profit federation of US co-operatives, and most of this sold to the Starbucks chain of coffee houses, the burden would fall on foreign companies and not on Timorese producers.
The tax regulations were eventually passed by another NCC meeting on Thursday, but will not come into effect until sometime after they are signed this week by the UN Administrator, Mr Sergio Vieira de Mello. The measures are expected to apply from March 1.
East Timor has 17,500 small family-run plantations and 15 primary co-operatives which produce 6,500 tonnes a year of mostly high-grade organic coffee. Producers receive an average of $US1.25 a kilo for unhusked beans.
Some CNRT members have railed against the export tax, and promised to raise it with the leadership, which the UN also relies on for consultation.
"This will have a very negative impact on small coffee producers," said Mr Estanislau da Silva, an agronomist who is member of the CNRT agriculture committee.
END
Former Militia Members Targeted Amid the Devastation
AAP, by John Martinkus ~ February 29, 2000
SALALE, East Timor, Feb 26 AAP - Indonesian military and New Zealand troops mix freely on the bridge that forms the border here.
It is hot, isolated and boring, surrounded by crocodile-infested mangroves.
The main problems for the New Zealand troops here are the mosquitoes carrying dengue fever and malaria.
This is Salele, the southernmost crossing point of the East Timorese border with Indonesian-controlled West Timor.
It is the entry point for returning East Timorese to the most isolated and devastated part of East Timor that is still struggling under UN administration to restore even the most basic services.
The nearby town of Suai, once the regional centre for an area that contained more than 60,000 people, still has no power, telephones or reliable water supply.
At night, the town of more than 27,000 people - living in burnt out buildings and under blue UN-supplied tarpaulins - resembles a medieval city, with people sitting in small groups around oil lamps and fires, passing the time.
The people here complain that the UN is not doing enough to improve the situation.
“Look at the NGOs - here they come with their cars and build offices but still we don't get any food," said Adrianno Nascimiento, a local resident and political activist.
The first stage of the emergency food distribution has finished.
The World Food Program now says it is targeting those most at risk, such as households with no male head and the refugees who continue to return from the camps across the border in West Timor, where they fled last September.
But some of those returning are former militia members, a situation which brings NGOs into direct conflict with CNRT, the pro-independence East Timorese political party that forms the only local administration.
Robin Taudevin, an organiser for independent aid organisation Timor Aid, said working under such conditions wasn't easy.
"To deal with the local communities we have to deal with CNRT," he said.
"That way they can mobilise people to assist.
"But CNRT is a political organisation and down here in the south-west, where there was so much killing and destruction by whole communities that were involved in the militia, we have CNRT sometimes trying to punish certain areas or individuals."
The percentage of refugees returning now who have been involved with the militia is higher here than anywhere else.
On Friday, ten of the 93 refugees who crossed at the Salele border post were isolated by UNHCR for their own protection.
They had admitted to UNHCR officials in the camps in West Timor that they had been involved with militia and they feared reprisals.
END
West Timor People Urging Govt to Review Timor Gap Treaty
Antara, March 1, 2000
KUPANG - People in West Timor (East Nusa Tenggara) are urging the Indonesian government to invite Australia to review the Timor Gap treaty in Jakarta in March, an informal leader said here Monday.
"The meeting will be more technical in nature because West Timor also has rights to the Timor Gap," said Ferdi Tanoni, chairman of a non-governemntal organisation called West Timor Foundation for Justice.
According to Ferdi, the independence of East Timor through the popular ballot on August 30, 1999 did not wipe out West Timor's claim over the Timor Gap.
"There is no law in the world that can deprive the people of West Timor of their right to lay claim to the Timor Gap. Our foundation is fighting for the people's traditional rights over the Timor Gap," he said.
Ferdi said the government and legislative assembly of West Timor (East Nusa Tenggara) would continue to demand a review on the ratification of the existing Timor Gap treaty which, he said, was mostly in Australia's favour.
"The matter will be discussed again with Australia in Jakarta next month," he said.
Ferdi pointed out that the Timor Gap issue could not be reviewed based on the International Law on the Sea only.
"It must also be seen from the aspects of legality of the Timor Gap borderline, which was unilaterally drawn by Australia," he argued.
According to Ferdi, Indonesia was then pressured by Australia to sign the Timor Gap treaty.
The Timor Gap treaty was signed by Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Alatas and his Australian counterpart, Garreth Evans, while flying over the Timor Sea in 1989.
Ferdi accused Australia of arrogance for refusing to accommodate the aspirations of the people in West Timor over the Timor Gap issue.
He said the Timor Gap treaty contained no clause stipulating that the rights of the people in West Timor or Indonesia to the Timor Gap would be rescinded if East Timor seprated from Indonesia.
Australia, Ferdi said, should be thankful for the assistance given by the West Timor people to Australian soldiers when they were attacked by the Japanese forces during World War II.
"So, it would only be fair for Australia to heed the interests of the people in West Timor," he said.
END
East Timorese refugees in Indonesia
Refugees International ~ 25/02/00
Nearly five months after an estimated 250,000 East Timorese fled, or were forcibly moved, to West Timor and other parts of Indonesia, Refugees International remains deeply concerned about their plight, especially the plight of those outside West Timor, and the continued disruption of repatriation operations by militia elements.
To date, UNHCR and IOM have made possible the repatriation of over 141,000 refugees to East Timor, despite having local and international staff repeatedly harassed, intimidated, and even physically assaulted.
In West Timor, conditions for the refugees in the camps have been dangerous and in many cases, life threatening. Local and international human rights organizations have documented cases of extortion, abduction, sexual violence, and unlawful killings at the hands of the militia. Yet the Government of Indonesia, despite international pressure, has shown itself either unwilling or unable to disarm and disband the militias.
In addition, the Indonesian government has failed to end or counteract a systematic campaign of disinformation organized by the militias. With the aim of discouraging refugee returns, the militias are falsely reporting widespread abuses of returnees at the hands of UN peacekeepers in East Timor.
Equally disturbing are the appalling living conditions within the refugee camps. An estimated 500 to 700 refugees have died due to various illnesses. Infant mortality rates especially have risen sharply due to increased incidence of malaria, chronic diarrhea and tuberculosis. A recent UNICEF nutritional survey demonstrated that "almost a quarter of children under the age of five are malnourished." With the advent of the monsoon season, conditions will deteriorate further.
The international community should exert intensified pressure on the Government of Indonesia and its military, committing them unambiguously to the welfare and protection of East Timorese refugees and the immediate repatriation of those who choose to return home. The application of such pressure is made even more urgent in light of recent pronouncements by representatives of the Government of Indonesia that, by March, refugees from East Timor will no longer receive assistance. They will have to choose between returning to East Timor or becoming citizens of Indonesia and face transmigration to other provinces.
A related and additional concern is the paucity of information available on East Timorese refugees who fled, or were moved, to regions outside of West Timor after the August 1999 referendum.
According to the information we have received, there may be 11,000 to 30,000 such refugees in ten regions in Indonesia. We have broadly identified two distinct groups. The first group includes East Timorese who willingly fled East Timor after the August 1999 referendum, and who do not wish to return, either because they actively supported integration and fear for their security in East Timor, or because they believe the general conditions there are not yet conducive for a return.
The second group includes those East Timorese who were either forced to leave or fled willingly after the referendum, but who may now be prevented from returning, or even expressing a desire to return to East Timor. It is this group that is of greatest concern. This concern is based largely on the treatment of East Timorese refugees in West Timor, where many are still being prevented from returning home, despite the considerable international attention they have received. Our fear is that if conditions such as those in West Timor can prevail, then they can easily be replicated in other parts of Indonesia especially since international monitoring of these refugees has not been extensive.
Refugees International, therefore, urges that the Government of Indonesia and its military:
Provide complete and unimpeded access to international relief organizations to all refugee camps in West Timor Disband and disarm all militias in and around the refugee camps, and on the borders with East Timor and the enclave of Oecussi
Ensure that UNHCR is able to register and interview refugees, under secure conditions where entire families can be interviewed together (to prevent kidnappings of some family members by the militia)
Offer the option of immediate departure for East Timor under protective convoy to those who choose repatriation should be.
With regard to East Timorese refugees in other parts of Indonesia, Refugees International recommends that the international community, especially the United States Investigate further their exact whereabouts and living conditions
Urge that all those wishing to return are free to do so, and have the necessary means of return available to them.
END
Liem Soei Liong, TOPAL ~ 25/02/00
One major unresolved problem relates to the return of refugees from West Timor and other parts of Indonesia. I soon realised that part of the problem lies within East Timor. I met many East Timorese who had recently returned home from refugee camps in the interior of East Timor or in West Timor.
The refugees in West Timor confront a complex situation with many being trapped in camps that remain under the control of militia gangs. [See TAPOL Bulletin No 156] But there are many who are reluctant to return home for the time being for a variety of reasons, including the fear of reprisals from the population. There have been instances when people who returned home were beaten up by the population. Feelings of anger still run deep among the East Timorese for the terrible destruction wrought on their villages and homes, for which they hold the army-backed militias responsible. Many of the people who return from West Timor are eyed with suspicion while the lack of any authority or accountability for these crimes only aggravates the problem. Several hundred returnees have sought protection from the Falintil forces in Aileu.
One incident during my stay involved a group of Indonesian refugees who had arrived back in Dili from West Timor. They had lived in East Timor for several decades and had come to regard East Timor as their home. Misunderstandings and feelings of resentment among East Timorese led to an outburst of anger in the neighbourhood where they were re-settled but fortunately Jose Ramos-Horta was on hand to talk to the East Timorese and persuade them to receive the new arrivals back as friends and the incident ended happily.
Another grave problem is health and the availability of medical services. For many years, tuberculosis and malaria have been major killers in East Timor. Living for months in close proximity in refugee camps caused the incidence of TB to intensify, while the many unfilled ditches and empty houses have become the breeding ground during the rainy season for mosquitoes, spreading malaria and dengue fever. Although a number of medical teams had arrived from various parts of the world, the state of health of the population is still very poor. I saw many very sick people wherever I went, East Timorese and foreigners alike. Almost everyone in the house where I was staying came down with something or other. Darwin has become a relief post for the very sick, mostly foreigners, and I was told that there were more than a thousand people from East Timor being treated there.
The CNRT
The CNRT is the only East Timorese political organisation which has a presence down to the villages. Despite its many problems, it is impressive to see that it has been able to mobilise the population to a considerable degree. But certain internal weaknesses had already begun to emerge in the early months of the emergency. By its very nature, the CNRT is a joint political platform consisting of groups and individuals with different political persuasions which has made it difficult structurally to adopt united positions on a number of burning issues.
UN officials have been known to complain that CNRT leaders take different positions on some issues. It is unlikely to expect this fragile unity to improve in the coming months, especially as general elections are due to be held in East Timor within two years. This means that the several political strands in the CNRT are bound to go their own way, emerging as distinct political parties. A new political map is already beginning to emerge, reflecting the transformation of East Timor into a pluralist society. While the old parties like Fretilin, UDT and Apodeti will take their rightful place, other parties are certain to appear, adding to the mosaic enriching East Timor’s post-colonial era. One party that has already emerged is the PST, the Socialist Party of Timor, which is represented on the transitional leadership of the CNRT administration. It is questionable whether the many activists will feel at home in any of the political groupings. I do believe many will remain active in their respective NGO constituencies.
The CNRT’s president and vice-president, Xanana Gusmao and Jose Ramos Horta, are enormously popular. Indeed, the East Timorese are lucky to have such experienced, impressive leaders. But at the same time, the CNRT leadership has failed as yet to recruit new blood from the hundreds of activists who did so much to keep the resistance alive under conditions of clandestinity during the final years of the Indonesian occupation, both in East Timor and Indonesia. Many of the second echelon CNRT leaders originate from the diaspora, mostly from Australia and Portugal, and an uneasy relationship now exists between former clandestine cadres and leaders from the diaspora. The decision to adopt Portuguese as the official language hasn’t helped to bridge the gap; this is not the language of the younger generation of East Timorese who speak Indonesian fluently but mostly struggle with Portuguese. The extensive use of Indonesian made it easy for me to communicate with almost everyone I met and to get a clearer picture of the present situation.
Civil society
In the difficult days of the Indonesian occupation, the Catholic Church played a critically important role in protecting and organising the people but now, things have changed. Of course, the role of the church is still important. I attended traditional masses at Christmas and New Year with thousands of people present. But these days, Bishop Ximenes Belo is much less prominent as a public figure than during the Indonesian occupation.
An incident during New Year’s Eve celebrations in front of the former governor’s office drew attention to a rather awkward clash of traditions. A big party had been organised by INTERFET and the CNRT to entertain the troops and the population, but this clashes with the tradition of going to midnight mass. Some angry church activists grabbed the mike and urged the crowd to go the church but most people stayed.
In public affairs, it is now the CNRT rather than the Church which organises the people politically while local NGOs are building a vibrant civil society. With time, the Church and its many followers will surely fit into this changed milieu.
During the media training I had been invited to assist, I was deeply moved by the boundless enthusiasm of the participants, eager to start up a range of media outlets. The moment the facilities are available, radio programmes, newspapers and magazines will begin to appear. At the end of the media course, the participants announced the establishment of a Timor Loro Sae Journalists’ Association, with mainstream and activist journalists joining forces in the new association.
NGO activists across the board have been quick off the mark. The impressive Yayasan Hak is continuing with its human rights work while others have come into existence, a Commission for Human Rights, women’s organisations as well as wide range of other NGOs.
The youth of East Timor are also finding their own place in civil society. A new group called Forum Demokrasi already exists with clear left-wing credentials. The more established youth and student organisations like Renetil, Ojetil and Solidaritas Mahasiswa have also begun to re-organise themselves.
During my stay, preparations for the Renetil congress were under way. Many Renetil activists played an important role during their years of study at Indonesian universities, promoting the issue of East Timor to the outside world. Over the years, TAPOL worked closely with these activists and it was thrilling to be there among old friends, sharing their enthusiasm. I was privileged to be able to attend several preparatory meetings along with hundreds of participants. One of the options considered was for Renetil to become a political party but it was decided at the congress in January to continue as a mass organisation, functioning also as a political watchdog. The existence of organisations like Renetil is a guarantee that East Timorese civil society will remain vibrant and alert, bridging the gap between the population and the UN/BINGOs.
Having been a campaigner for so many years, I realise how much East Timor has changed. The international solidarity movement for East Timor must come to terms with this new situation. Dozens of activists have already become involved in helping the reconstruction of the country. Others have drawn the conclusion that now that the main task, the right of self determination, has been achieved, their future role in solidarity with East Timor will need to be adjusted. I believe that the time has come to reconsider the strategy.
TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign
111 Northwood Road, Thornton Heath, Surrey CR7 8HW, UK
Phone: 0181 771-2904 Fax: 0181 653-0322
email: tapol@gn.apc.org ~ web-site: http://www.gn.apc.org/tapol
END
ETAN Opposes Continued Training in Violation of Ongoing Ban on Military Ties With Indonesia
East Timor Action Network ~ 25/02/00
The East Timor Action Network condemned continued training by the U.S. of Indonesian military officers as a violation of a Congressional ban on military ties with Indonesia.
The Washington Post recently reported that seven officers participating in the E-IMET (the "expanded" International Military Education and Training) program remained in the U.S. after President Clinton cut all U.S.training, weapons transfers and other military ties with Indonesia in the wake of brutal military and militia violence in East Timor following its pro-independence vote. The officers have recently resumed their classes.
"The training of the Indonesian officers must cease. It violates the law and demonstrates the Pentagon's continued disregard of congressional intent and human rights," said Lynn Fredriksson, Washington Representative of the East Timor Action Network.
In November, Congress set six specific conditions Indonesia must meet before receiving almost any U.S. military assistance. These include ensuring the safe return of over 100,000 East Timorese refugees trapped in militia-controlled camps in West Timor and prosecuting those responsible for atrocities committed against the people of East Timor. The conditions also require Indonesia to actively prevent militia incursions into East Timor. The restrictions are part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act which specifically bans E-IMET and IMET training.
"Rather than sending false signals to an Indonesian military still far from civilian control, the Pentagon should follow the law and end the training," said Fredriksson. "Decades of U.S. military training of the Indonesian military did nothing to temper their abusive behavior. There is no reason to believe that training now will lead to improvements. The best way to support Indonesian democracy is to follow a policy that makes clear to the Indonesian military that normal military relations are impossible until rights abuses end and the military fully withdraws from politics," she added.
Some U.S. officials have argued that the Indonesian military is being reformed and relations should be restored. (They point to the potential prosecution of General Wiranto, but Indonesia's President Wahid has said he will pardon him if convicted.) But the U.S. suspension remains in place, as it should, while human rights abuses by the Indonesian military continue in Aceh and West Papua as well as West Timor.
Shortly after President Clinton announced the cutting of military ties, Indonesia agreed to withdraw from East Timor and allow in an Australian-led multi-national peacekeeping force, measures it had previously resisted.
The East Timor Action Network/US was founded in November 1991, following the massacre of more than 271 peaceful demonstrators in Dili, East Timor. ETAN/US supports independence and human rights for the people of East Timor and democracy and human rights in Indonesia. ETAN has 28 local chapters.
Contact
John M. Miller; (718)596-7668; (516)317-6257 (mobile)
Lynn Fredriksson; (202)544-6911
END
East Timorese Trapped in West Timor
By TOPAL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign
February 2000
Four months after the East Timorese people threw off the yoke of Indonesian colonialism, there are still some 150,000 East Timorese trapped in refugee camps in West Timor. They account for almost a quarter of the total East Timorese people. They are being intimidated and live in atrocious conditions. Many hundreds have died, especially children. This is a grave humanitarian crisis.
The leader of the East Timorese people, Xanana Gusmoa, said recently, ‘East Timor’s greatest natural resource is its people.’ But, writes Richard Lloyd Parry in The Independent [9 January 2000], ‘when the country needs it most, even that one resource is seriously, and mysteriously, depleted.’
On 4 September 1999, the UN announced the official result of the 30 August ballot which showed that the East Timorese had voted overwhelmingly for independence from Indonesian rule. Six weeks later, in October, the Indonesian supreme assembly, the MPR, under immense international scrutiny, ratified the result, ending the 24-year struggle for East Timor’s independence.
After the intensive press coverage of the violence that erupted in the wake of the ballot announcement, the media glare on this part of the world has shifted. However, four months on, the Indonesian authorities are still dictating events to a large, displaced East Timorese population.
Systematic depopulation
The massive post-ballot depopulation of East Timor resulted in what may have been up to 250,000 East Timorese becoming unwilling refugees in West Timor. This was not a population fleeing in panic from their homes as has happened in so many countries, but a systematic and well- organised movement of people by the Indonesian armed forces and their militia proxies, acting in revenge for East Timor’s bold rejection of its Indonesian occupying force. This is highlighted by the fact that people were still moving across the border up to three weeks after the eruption of the violence, and after the arrival of the first Interfet troops in East Timor on 20 September.
Testimonies from refugees who have since returned to East Timor clearly show that many were forced to go to West Timor at gunpoint. Many are also quick to point out that this therefore made them hostages and not refugees. The similarity in stories from refugees from different districts across East Timor also points to the fact that the depopulation campaign was organised, comprehensive and evidently pre-planned.
Plans for this mass deportation go back at least to 5 May 1999, the day when the accords for the ballot were signed in New York between Indonesia, Portugal and the UN. On that day, the deputy chief of staff of the Indonesian army, Lt. General Jhoni Lumintang cabled Major-General Adam Damiri, who was the regional military commander of the region that included East Timor instructing him to prepare security contingency plans for either outcome of the ballot. If the result was a rejection of autonomy and a separation from Indonesia then Damiri should have plans ready for the ‘evacuation’ of East Timorese.
In July, by which time top Indonesian generals were being forced to accept that the vote would go against them, a senior officer working on the staff of General Feisal Tanjung, Minister-Coordinator for Political and Security Affairs in the Habibie government, wrote to his boss outlining contingency plans in readiness for the defeat of the autonomy option. The letter, signed by H.R. Garnadi, said the plan would include a huge influx of evacuees from East Timor into West Timor and the destruction of ‘vital facilities’ all along the evacuation route. [See TAPOL Bulletin, No 154/155, November 1999]
Having planned the evacuation, the TNI were also deeply involved in its completion. Army trucks and vehicles brought over from West Timor were used to transport East Timorese to Indonesian West Timor. In some cases, East Timorese families were transported out by sea. TNI soldiers accompanied the refugee trucks across the border. Reports were received at the time that many of the men were separated from the women and children. Some are thought to have been killed; many are thought to have been forcibly recruited into the militia gangs.
Many members of the two TNI battalions, 744 and 745, composed largely of East Timorese soldiers, later made their way across to West Timor to join forces; they still maintain a presence inside refugee camps in West Timor. One NGO source inside Kupang has told TAPOL that these soldiers are still receiving wages and food rations from the army.
Division in militia ranks
The TNI-sponsored militias who still exert a menacing influence over the refugees are said to number 50,000 men who, according to reliable sources, conduct training exercises daily in forty locations in West Timor. However, their intentions now appear to be ambiguous. Many militias, fearing that they are losing favour with their Indonesian military benefactors, have started voicing doubts regarding their sponsors and have expressed a wish to return to East Timor. The Washington Post recently reported that ‘there are signs the Indonesian armed forces... are moving slowly but deliberately to cut ties with their former protegés’.
Such signs may have prompted the action of militia leader Joao da Silva Tavares who, in mid December, announced that he had officially disbanded the self-styled East Timorese Fighter Force (PPTT) along with various other militia leaders. Tavares said that armed struggle was no longer appropriate for the East Timorese loyal to the Republic of Indonesia, and political struggle was more realistic. However not all of the militia leaders agreed with this position. Eurico Gutteres, head of the notorious Aitarak (Thorn) militia, publicly dissociated himself from Tavares’ proclamation. While the militia are not unified in their position; they are still active among the refugees.
In a detailed report published on 20 December, Amnesty International stated that the human rights crisis in West Timor was far from over. They found that refugees were ‘often intimidated, harassed, extorted and in some cases subjected to unlawful killings and sexual violence by militia groups’. Refugees interviewed by Amnesty International who had returned to Dili from camps in the Belu district in West Timor in November spoke of repeated incidents of rape by the militia and Indonesian soldiers. According to two refugees, a number of women were held in sexual slavery at the house of a TNI member. Refugees International were more forthright. In their report on 4 January they said: ‘Make no mistake, this continues to be a hostage situation and the international community cannot relax until it is assured this is no longer the case.’
As well as their campaign of violence, the militia are also waging an intelligence war. One reason why so many refugees are still in West Timor is the lack of accurate information about the present situation in East Timor coupled with a systematic campaign of disinformation and rumour being circulated inside the camps by the militias. Refugees are being led to believe that a war is still raging in East Timor, that Interfet are killing returning refugees and that Australian soldiers are raping women. UNHCR efforts to counter these lies with their own information dissemination campaigns and ‘go-and-see’ visits have so far proved to be inadequate. The International Organisation of Migration (IOM) recently stated: ‘Rumours, counter-information, intimidation and negative information campaigns continue to circulate. This is dissuading many East Timorese from returning.’ Until this issue can be comprehensively addressed the refugee crisis will persist.
Another pressing problem is that of health. Since the rainy season began in November, living conditions inside these makeshift refugee camps have become horrific. Malaria, chronic diarrhoea and tuberculosis are claiming lives daily with children and babies under the age of five being the most vulnerable; the infant mortality rate is high. In late December a UNICEF nutritional survey of 850 children in the Belu district showed that ‘almost a quarter of the children under the age of five are malnourished’ and said that ‘this alarming situation... warrants immediate remedial action’. The Jakarta daily, Media Indonesia, reported that at least 449 East Timorese had so far died of disease in West Timor refugee camps. This death toll can only escalate in the weeks and months ahead.
The hazards for international agencies
Official repatriation of refugees has been a long and arduous task for the UNHCR and IOM. They have operated in a hostile environment since first trying to enter the camps and staff have had to risk their personal safety. Militia intimidation has not been directed solely at refugees but also at the aid agencies, including the United Nations. Although the UNHCR formally has access to all the camps, local authorities have been lax in providing security. The result is that many areas, particularly the Belu region close to the border with East Timor, are too risky for the UNHCR to operate effectively. In mid-November, militia thugs stopped a convoy of three UNHCR trucks from picking up refugees at Halewen camp near Atambua airport. Despite police and army reinforcements, the militia stood their ground and forced the UNHCR to pull back as their vehicles were being stoned. At least 20 such incidents have now occurred in the Belu region alone. UNHCR staff have also been physically assaulted and the security situation deteriorated so much that in mid-December the UNHCR acknowledged that ‘West Timor is the only place in the world where UNHCR workers are heavily escorted by police and army troops when they go to the camps.’
Conventional repatriation methods are therefore not applicable. Initially the UNHCR were unable to compile comprehensive lists of those wishing to return home because compiling lists made people targets for the militia. As a result, the UNHCR opted for an extraction policy. This essentially involved driving unannounced into camps and loading up trucks with refugees as quickly as possible, then driving out fast. This was not the most expedient way to repatriate up to 300,000 people but it demonstrates how desperate the situation had become even for the UN. It is unbelievable that neither the Jakarta government nor the international community seriously addressed the issue that UN staff as well as East Timorese were suffering daily in- timidation and physical violence.
In recent weeks the security situation seems to have eased and UN staff are now able to enter camps where previously they had no access at all. The most worrisome issue now is the problem of disinformation. For those refugees who are able to leave West Timor, a boat or plane takes them to Dili. UNHCR in conjunction with IOM have been running flights and ships daily from several areas in West Timor but at times of very high intimidation these services have been cancelled because so few refugees had managed to register.
Some refugees near the border have managed to leave camps unescorted. These ‘spontaneous’ returnees often walk for hours in the burning sun to cross the border on foot. After reaching Suai and Maliana, they have told stories of militia intimidation right up to the border. Even though they are being allowed through TNI-controlled border posts, militia are still robbing them of their very last possessions before letting them re-enter East Timor.
The threat of re-settlement
The Indonesian government response to these problems entered a new phase at the beginning of the year. They now consider the ‘emergency’ phase to be over and have started on a period of resettlement and rehabilitation for those refugees remaining. Concerted efforts are being made in Kupang to resettle those refugees who remain, Jakarta logic dictating that those who are still in Indonesia are there by choice. Yet it is unclear how many refugees have chosen to be resettled, either locally or in other parts of Indonesia. What is clear however, is that there are as yet no criteria or appropriate screening process to ascertain the true wishes of the refugees. It is quite possible that refugees are agreeing to resettlement because the alternative of openly declaring that they wish to return to East Timor may still prove to be too dangerous. Refugees International has also argued that "militia retribution against those who opt to go home could be swift and brutal... Unless all members of families who are in West Timor are interviewed together, stray family members could be used by the militia as hostages... these might be held indefinitely in West Timor or transmigrated elsewhere in Indonesia."
Violence and health are not the only problems that these refugees face, there are also the associated problems of living in Indonesia. There is already widespread and open resentment of this displaced East Timorese population from the local population. Local communities envy the free aid that these East Timorese receive while they themselves receive nothing and are often no better off. This has already resulted in violent clashes between local and East Timorese youths outside of Kupang. There are also disturbing reports that the TNI and militia inside the camps have started trading their weapons to local Kupang communities and more ominously to buyers arriving from Ambon where intercommunal violence has already taken thousands of lives. It seems that the refugees have not solved the TNI’s East Timor problem but unleashed a new Indonesian one.
As the months wear on, it is becoming harder to tell who are the victims. TNI children are also dying of illness inside these camps, the militia appear to be running scared and are as keen as the refugees to go back to their homes in East Timor. They as well as their hostages are seeking security guarantees before they re-cross the border. Three months on and the struggle for East Timor may be over but the struggle of the East Timorese is still going on.
Tapol, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign
Bulletin Online 156 - Jan/Feb 2000 Campaigning to expose human rights violations in Indonesia, East Timor, West Papua and Aceh.
END
Military Training Resumes Quietly
Jakarta: The United States Defence Department has quietly resumed training Indonesian military officers in the US, restoring one element of its relationship with Indonesia that was suspended last year after Indonesian soldiers took part in the violence that engulfed East Timor.
The training program involves only seven Indonesian officers. US officials said it was restarted without fanfare to avoid criticism on Capitol Hill and among human rights groups.
US officials stressed they had not resumed full military relations, and warned that the training program would not continue if the Indonesian military did not deal with the refugee problem and other issues. Nevertheless, they said they were heartened by Indonesia's efforts to reform its armed forces since the country's first democratically elected president, Mr Abdurrahman Wahid, took office in October.
A US official said the training program was not resumed as a quid pro quo for specific Indonesian military reforms, but Washington had been pleased with many of the changes - particularly Mr Wahid's decision to suspend the former armed forces chief General Wiranto during investigations into human rights abuses.
The US hopes the resumption of training will serve as an incentive to Indonesia to follow through with other reforms.
The Washington Post
END
Legislators Hail Gus Dur's Move to Suspend Wiranto
15/02/00 ~ Jakarta Post
JAKARTA - Legislators and political observers on Monday expressed their overwhelming support for the decision to suspend Gen. Wiranto from his Cabinet post as coordinating minister for political affairs and security.
House of Representatives Speaker Akbar Tandjung said the suspension would help smoothen the investigation of the former Military chief after he was alleged to have been responsible for the violence that swept East Timor following the Aug. 30 independence ballot.
"It (the suspension) was what the House had earlier demanded. It's the right decision," Akbar, who is also chairman of the Golkar party, said.
While acknowledging the right of President Abdurrahman Wahid to install, dismiss or suspend his ministers, Akbar however questioned the installment ceremony of former minister of home affairs Soerjadi as the ad interim coordinating minister.
"It appears that Soerjadi was installed as a permanent coordinating minister for political affairs and security. In the past, there has never been a ceremony for an acting minister," remarked Akbar, who once served as state minister/state secretary and minister of sports and youth affairs.
House deputy chairman Muhaimin Iskandar also welcomed the President's decision and urged Wiranto to accept it without reservation.
"Wiranto should accept it. He is a gentleman and a statesman. We and the public would respect him," Muhaimin, who is also the secretary general of the Nation Awakening Party, said.
Foreign minister Alwi Shihab, who is known to be a close confidant of the President, expected the general public to see the decision as the best result for everyone concerned, including for Wiranto himself.
"The decision took into account the aspirations of many people, it did not disgrace Pak Wiranto and leaves open the possibility for him to resume his post if the investigation proves his innocence," Alwi told reporters on Monday.
Alwi remarked that having presidential prerogative powers, Abdurrahman could have dismissed Wiranto if he chose to.
"He (the President) only used the lowest level of power when making this decision," he added.
Alwi conceded that the drastic shift from Sunday's decision was, in some part, due to advice from certain parties.
"After receiving inputs from many parties, from inside and outside of the country, from whom I do not know, he eventually took the decision to suspend Wiranto," he said.
National Awakening Party chairman Matori Abdul Djalil praised the decision as the most appropriate the President could have taken.
"We all feel relieved with the stern attitude of the President to make sure that human rights violators are brought to justice," he said.
He said it was evidence of the government's commitment to upholding the law as the basis for democracy.
"Whether they are corporals or generals, for the sake of human rights, no one has impunity if they violate them," he added.
Meanwhile, in Yogyakarta political observer Riswandha Imawan from Gadjah Mada University warned that the suspension could lead to a further shakeup in the Cabinet as Wiranto was one of the guarantors in the selection of at least five Cabinet ministers.
"By suspending Wiranto, he leaves a time bomb in the Cabinet."
Riswandha warned that Abdurrahman may eventually have to replace all five ministers whose entrance into the Cabinet Wiranto had sponsored.
Political observer Mahfud MD from the Indonesian Islamic University (UII) also warned on Monday of an impending power struggle among the political elite as a result of the suspension.
"There might be a bitter fight between two different groups of elite politicians around Gus Dur.
"The first group may include, among others, Vice President Megawati, Wiranto and former Armed Forces commander L.B. Moerdani, while the other camp might comprise of the rights body and a number of NGOs."
He said the first group met Gus Dur in the morning, while the other group had probably intensely lobbied him into Sunday evening to get him to change his mind.
END
Indonesian Team Standing by to Explore Rights Abuses
15/02/00 ~ Agence France-Presse
Jakarta - The Indonesian team that will officially investigate human rights violations in East Timor, including the role of the former military chief General Wiranto, has already been formed, the Attorney General, Mr Marzuki Darusman, said yesterday.
"It's already been formed, but it has yet to be inaugurated," Mr Darusman told journalists. In addition to staff from the attorney-general's office, members of the police and the military police were included.
President Abdurrahman Wahid had earlier suspended General Wiranto from his Cabinet post to make way for an unimpeded inquiry into his alleged involvement in human rights abuses.
But Mr Darusman said the inquiry would not have been hampered even if Wiranto had retained his Cabinet post. "It wouldn't be a problem for me whether or not there's a decision on that [Wiranto's suspension]. The attorney-general's office sees no obstacles to investigating state officials," he said.
General Wiranto was held "morally responsible" by a domestic inquiry into the violence by virtue of his then position as chief of the Indonesian armed forces. Five other senior generals were among 33 people named in that investigation.
A separate United Nations Human Rights Commission investigation into the Timor violence recommended that an international tribunal should be set up to try those responsible for the Timor atrocities, which left hundreds killed and whole cities in rubble.
But the UN Secretary-General, Mr Kofi Annan, who is scheduled to arrive in Jakarta today, before visiting East Timor on Thursday, has said that if the Indonesian process is seen as fair and impartial there would be no need to convene the tribunal.
Mr Annan, in Singapore yesterday, welcomed the suspension of General Wiranto from the Indonesian Cabinet, saying those behind the mayhem in East Timor should be made accountable for their actions.
"I am pleased that the Indonesian Government seems determined to hold those responsible accountable and I think we should let the judicial process take its course," Mr Annan said after talks with Singapore leaders.
He said a UN report implicating General Wiranto in the violence in East Timor after the people there voted overwhelmingly for independence was "all part of the process" of seeking the truth.
In Bangkok, the East Timorese leader Mr Jose Ramos-Horta welcomed the decision to suspend General Wiranto. He said the credibility of Indonesia and Mr Wahid would be strengthened by the seriousness in handling allegations of crimes against humanity "perpetrated by senior Indonesian officers, including Wiranto".
"It shows to our East Timorese people, it shows to the rest of the world, we must trust the Indonesian domestic legal process to bring those responsible for war crimes in East Timor to justice," said Mr Ramos-Horta, co-winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996.
He said as long as Indonesia took steps to bring to trial those responsible, the country "should be spared the international embarrassment" of an international tribunal.
END
Retired General Criticizes Plan to Pardon Wiranto
15/02/00 ~ Indonesian Observer
JAKARTA — An outspoken retired general has blasted President Abdurrahman Wahid’s plan to pardon General Wiranto if he is found guilty of responsibility for last September’s carnage in East Timor.
The Commission of Inquiry into Human Rights Abuses (KPP HAM) has said Wiranto knew about the human rights abuses being conducted by military-backed militia gangs but did nothing to stop them.
Retired Lieutenant General Hasnan Habib yesterday said the offer of a pardon to Wiranto will not please the international community, which has expressed a desire for Indonesia to prove that it can take legal action against human rights violators.
Habib, who had a successful career in the military and then in the diplomatic corps, said the pardon contradicts the international community’s efforts to prevent generals from being above the law.
"Even though it is president’s privilege to issue [a pardon], it was improper for him to say it, because people will now say ‘Then why bother holding a trial’," he told the Observer on the sidelines of a seminar here entitled ‘Civilian-Military Relations: the Military and Democracy’. Habib warned that the international community will be angry if human rights abusers from the Indonesian military are allowed to walk free. "If they are pardoned before the trial process, people who committed such crimes can repeat their misdeeds because they assume they will pardoned again," he said.
"The prior goal of the international community to eliminate impunity will not be achieved. It will also nullify the upcoming investigation of the alleged suspects." Habib said he supported parliament’s plan to hold a meeting with the president after he returns to Jakarta following a tour of countries in the Middle East, Europe and Asia. He urged them to ask Wahid to explain the pardon for Wiranto.
END
Australia Hands East Timor Peace Mission to Portugal
15/02/00 ~ Australian Broadcasting Corporation
COMPERE: In East Timor Interfet's handover to UN peacekeeping soldiers is gathering pace. Today the Command of the Central Sector, which includes the capital Dili, was handed over to a Portuguese-led peacekeeping force.
GINNY STEIN: The handover was short and swift. One flag lowered and another raised, signalling the end of Australia's command, the task now delivered to a Portuguese-led peacekeeping force.
Outgoing Interfet Commander, Major General Peter Cosgrove, was generous with his praise to those who assisted in restoring peace to the city.
PETER COSGROVE: On behalf of all ranks of international policy to East Timor, we wish all those troops transferring to the peacekeeping force today the very best of luck and good soldiering so that your efforts may continue to help the people of this distressed land.
GINNY STEIN: Once all the handovers are complete, the UN Peacekeeping Command will come under the direction of Philippine's Commander, Lieutenant General Jammie De la Santos [phonetic].
JAMMIE DE LA SANTOS: Also I would like to express my gratitude to the leadership of Major General Peter Cosgrove for bringing about the foundation for the peace and security of East Timor which will make our roles and responsibilities easier. For that I would like to commend all the men under him, because what we see now here in Dili is a stable environment for the entry of the shipping port of [inaudible].
GINNY STEIN: With the lowering of the Interfet flag and the raising of the blue and white UN Banner, the command of Dili was handed over to Portuguese Commander Eduardo le Mapinto [phonetic].
EDUARDO LE MAPINTO: Certainly it's going to be difficult but at the moment we are trying to do exactly the same, man by man, and while the Dili command do so, we have to represent the spirit of United Nations. Keeping peace, the development of populations and so I think that the force of Interfet they had tremendous job to do in the military side.
We have another role. Our role is not only military side but also humanitarian side, as you know, and we must carry on that side as our mission.
GINNY STEIN: Today's switching of hats to the blue berets of the United Nations has never been more symbolic. With a sense of stability returning to East Timor, the emphasis and role of the peacekeeping soldiers may shift. But under the UN's mandate in East Timor, their capacity to respond to security problems remains the same. They're entitled to use whatever force is necessary to defend this emerging nation.
Ginny Stein, Dili.
END
Leader of Notorious Militia Gang Faces Execution
15/02/00 ~ South China Morning Post
EAST TIMOR - When Moko Soares stalked East Timor, it seemed nobody was safe. He and his militiamen murdered, raped and struck fear wherever they went.
With the notorious militia leader's arrest in the enclave of Oecussi last month came rejoicing.
Soares, 40, faces the death penalty in Indonesia on gun-running charges, police spokesman Captain Wayan Dana said yesterday in the West Timorese capital of Kupang.
Soares, whose real name is Laurentinho, is a former village head of the town of Cunha in Oecussi. Described as charismatic, he commanded 40 to 50 men, and was one of the leaders of the Sakunar militia, responsible for the destruction of Oecussi following last year's independence ballot.
Soares was arrested on charges of illegal possession of arms and arms sales at his home in Bobometo, on the Indonesian side of the border.
However, Interfet and UN civilian police have evidence that he was involved in murders and border incursions into East Timor and are working with Indonesian authorities to bring charges against him in West Timor.
If this succeeds, Soares will be the first militia leader to be tried in Indonesia for crimes committed in East Timor.
East Timorese human rights group Yayasan Hak spokesman Hilmar Farid said he has evidence Soares was still killing people after the arrival of Interfet forces in the enclave on October 20.
According to Mr Farid, Soares was involved in eight killings carried out on October 20, 22 and 23 in the villages of Bobocasse, Cunha and Lalisuc.
"They were basically killing those people before Interfet arrived because they would not leave to West Timor," he said.
A UN civilian police report has also accused Soares of 12 murders.
Last month, he is believed to have sent his militia across the border into the enclave to ambush unarmed UN personnel. That ambush was stopped by local East Timorese, who attacked the militia and handed two of them over to UN police.
The militia, being held in the Dili detention centre, told police Soares had offered them money to bring back the heads and ears of UN personnel.
UN civilian police said the removal of ears from the heads of his victims was Soares' trademark.
Soares clearly enjoyed a good relationship with the Indonesian military, which Australian military intelligence believe directed his attacks.
The former commander in the region, Lieutenant-Colonel Mannerong, was replaced after complaints from Interfet commander Major-General Peter Cosgrove that he was aiding the militia in their border incursions.
END
Workers Strike at Floating Hotels Housing UN Staff
14/02/00 ~ Agence France Presse
Negotiations continued Friday to resolve one of East Timor's first labor disputes, which saw a day-long walkout from the two floating hotels housing UN employees.
About 40 East Timorese workers at the Olympia and Amos W. hotels walked off the job on Thursday to protest wages, working hours and alleged discrimination.
They were back cleaning rooms, doing laundry and catering Friday as hotel management moved to address their complaints.
"Yes, they were right in their points," said Wouter Lap, acting manager of the two floating hotels.
The strikers work for Eurest, an international firm subcontracted by the hotels, Lap said.
"We insist to them they must increase our salary," said Domingos da Silva, one of the strike leaders. The employees earn five Australian dollars (about 3.5 US dollars) a day but were asking for 25 dollars, he said.
De Silva, a room boy, said they want their 72-hour work week reduced. They also object to searches of their bags conducted in front of East Timorese bystanders on the docksides outside the hotels, he said.
"They are suspicious that maybe we are steal something," da Silva said.
"We want justice," said another room boy, Milton Dias Ximenes. Lap said negotiations to resolve the dispute have been conducted with the help of two representatives from the National Council of Timorese Resistance.
He said wages can be raised to between 8.50 and 9.00 dollars a day, while the subcontractor is prepared to reduce the work week.
Spot checks of workers leaving the hotels will continue, but in a more sensitive manner, he said.
"In any hotel operation, you have to have spot checks," he said. Lap also said new managers are arriving to run the sub-contractor's operation.
"The two guys who are there now, they will leave within a week's time," Lap said. Workers were not happy with the two foreign supervisors, he said.
During the day-long strike, more than 30 East Timorese working in the bar, security and front office, employed directly by the hotel, continued to work. Those workers already earn a minimum of eight Australian dollars a day.
END
Timor’s Horta sees Internet Future for Timor
14/02/00 ~ Reuters by Chris Johnson
BANGKOK - East Timor's future is on the Internet, and it plans to surf it for trade and investment, Nobel Prize-winning independence leader Jose Ramos-Horta said.
The small territory will use the global computer network to keep in touch with the rest of the world when it becomes independent in two years' time, Ramos-Horta told Reuters.
"In this global economy, you don't have to have really an enormous space and population of your own,'' he said late on Saturday in an interview on the sidelines of a summit of the United Nations trade and development agency UNCTAD.
"You sit at the computer and you trade anywhere around the world. You can buy, you can sell, just at the touch of a keyboard. We are part of the global economy,'' he said.
"We look forward first domestically to produce enough food, enough for the population, and educate our people.
"But as a small nation we have to look at the world through the Internet, meaning surf the rest of the world for business opportunities to sell, to buy, to invest,'' he said.
East Timor has fought a bloody battle for independence from Indonesia, the world's fourth most populous state. Ramos-Horta said a large population was not necessarily an advantage.
"East Timor is as large or larger than about 40 independent states in the United Nations today and we have great resources and many of them. So why would we not be able to do equally well as Brunei or Fiji, the Caribbean nations and many others?''
SIZE ISN'T EVERYTHING
"We have too many examples, including right around us where the large size of population is not a guarantee of economic viablity and stability,'' he said.
Ramos-Horta said he was attending the UNCTAD summit to discuss visits this month of both Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid and U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan.
"The secretary-general is very keen, very determined to help us normalise relations with Indonesia and we are working closely in this regard,'' he said.
U.N. peacekeepers took over East Timor last year after a wave of violence followed a referendum vote for independence.
Ramos-Horta, who left East Timor for a long exile days before Indonesia invaded in 1975, said the territory had made progress towards reconciliation in recent months, creating the peace and stability needed for investment.
Over the next year, East Timor had to build up its infrastructure, establish courts and hold elections for villages, districts, and at a national level.
He expected independence in two years and East Timor's first leader to be fellow independence leader Xanana Gusmao.
"I have no doubt that it will be Xanana Gusmao, although he has said he is not going to seek public office. He has no choice because he believes he cannot turn his back on his people. So I am absolutely certain he will stand for election.''
On the economy of the strifetorn territory, Ramos-Horta said: "We have tremendous international goodwill that I hope can translate into concrete devivery of the monies pledged.
"At the same time we have abundant resources and we have tremendous potential for agriculture, fisheries and tourism and proven reserves of oil and natural gas to the tune of tens of millions of dollars in the next two and three years. So all the conditions are there,'' he said.
He said he expected East Timor to be admitted soon as a member of the Association of South East Asian Nations.
END
Journalists Harassed in West Timor
14/02/00
Committee to Protect Journalists, 330 Seventh Avenue -- 12th floor, New York, NY 10001
phone: 212-465-1004, fax: 212-465-9568, http://www.cpj.org
His Excellency Abdurrahman Wahid
President, Republic of Indonesia, Office of the President
Bina Graha, Jalan Veteran No. 17, Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia
VIA FAX: +62-21-778-182
Your Excellency:
The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) is deeply concerned about the recent harassment of three Portuguese television journalists, who were detained for three days by police in the Indonesian province of West Timor before being forced to leave the country.
On February 3, the SIC television crew--reporter João Ferreira, news editor Rita Nolasco, and cameraman Fernando Faria--was filming an interview with Moko Soares, commander of the local Sakunar militia, which has been accused of committing atrocities against East Timorese civilians who voted for independence from Indonesia. The journalists were interviewing Soares just across the border from the East Timor town of Passabe, where United Nations investigators recently discovered mass graves containing the remains of at least 50 people, massacred in the violence that followed East Timor's August referendum.
Officers from a nearby Indonesian army (TNI) checkpoint told the reporters they could not film without a special permit. The television crew had obtained journalists' visas from the Indonesian consulate in Darwin, Australia, and had registered with Indonesian police in the West Timor town of Motoain upon crossing the border from newly independent East Timor. Nevertheless, TNI soldiers summoned the police, and an officer arrived shortly before 12:00 p.m. He invited the journalists to accompany him to the police station, where he said they could obtain a letter of recommendation allowing them to resume their work.
Once the journalists arrived at the Kefamenanu police station, however, they began to be interrogated. They were questioned for more than seven hours, according to Ferreira, who told CPJ that he and his colleagues were also fingerprinted, photographed, and generally treated as criminals. Authorities repeatedly told the journalists that they were not under arrest, but denied them permission to leave. At around 8:00 p.m., the journalists were escorted by police back to their hotel, and six armed guards were posted outside. Police told the journalists that the guards were there to "protect" the crew from local militia members, though the journalists had emphasized that they did not want police protection.
The next morning, February 4, police arrived at the hotel to escort the journalists to the provincial capital of Kupang. Police told the journalists that they had entered West Timor improperly, and therefore had to report to police headquarters in Kupang, which is about a five-hour drive from Kefamenanu.
At the police headquarters in Kupang, the journalists were told that because their visas were not stamped upon their entry to West Timor, in Motoain, they could be fined, or jailed for up to three years. The officers, after confirming with police in Motoain that Ferreira, Nolasco, and Faria had indeed registered at the border, said that they would not arrest the journalists, but told them that they would have to return to the Motoain checkpoint. The immigration authority in Kupang confiscated the journalists' passports, and police escorted them to a hotel, where they stayed overnight.
On February 5, the journalists, accompanied by two immigration officials, made the ten-hour journey from Kupang to Motoain. An official at the immigration office had instructed the journalists that they must "cooperate," according to Ferreira, by paying for the fuel costs incurred on the trip, as well as for all meals and accommodation required by their official escorts. Upon arriving in Motoain, the immigration officials turned over the journalists' passports to the police, who stamped them "Entry Denied," effectively forcing them to return to East Timor.
As an organization of journalists dedicated to defending the rights of our colleagues around the world, CPJ is dismayed that the authorities in West Timor continue to harass journalists, preventing them from carrying out their professional duties. Members of the SIC television crew believe they were harassed because of their interviews with Moko Soares, and for their reporting on the links between the militia leader, the Indonesian military, and the police. Indonesian police arrested Soares on February 5 and have charged him with the illegal possession and sale of firearms. United Nations officials in East Timor have said they have massive evidence connecting Soares to at least twelve murders, as well as a series of raids in East Timor.
CPJ strongly urges Your Excellency to order an immediate investigation into the actions taken by officials in West Timor, and to discipline those officers responsible for the harassment endured by Ferreira, Nolasco, and Faria. We also ask that you instruct the Indonesian police and armed forces to respect the right of journalists to work freely.
We thank you for your attention to this matter, and look forward to your response.
Sincerely,
Ann K. Cooper
Executive Director
cc: Aliansi Jurnalis Independen
Southeast Asian Press Alliance
American Society of Newspaper Editors
Amnesty International
Article 19 (United Kingdom)
Artikel 19 (The Netherlands)
Canadian Journalists for Free Expression
Congressional Committee to Support Writers and Journalists
Freedom Forum
Freedom House
Human Rights Watch
Index on Censorship
International Association of Broadcasting
International Federation of Journalists
International Federation of Newspaper Publishers
International Journalism Institute
International PEN
International Press Institute
National Association of Black Journalists
National Press Club
Newspaper Association of AmericaThe Newspaper Guild
North American Broadcasters Association
Norwegian Forum for Freedom of Expression
Overseas Press Club
Reporters Sans Frontières
Society of Professional Journalists
World Association of Newspapers
World Press Freedom Committee
END
Statement on the International Human Rights Tribunal for East Timor
14/02/00
Free East Timor! Japan Coalition
Amnesty International Japan Section
East Timor People's Peace Relief Project
We, the undersigned, welcome the report issued by the UN's Commission of Inquiry on East Timor (CIET) and the report issued by the Indonesian Commission to Investigate Human Rights Violations in East Timor (KPP-HAM), both of which clearly describe the responsibility of the Indonesia army, as an important step towards clarifying the facts of and those responsible for the gross human right violations which were committed during Indonesia's illegal occupation of East Timor from 1975 to 1999.
We request that the UN immediately take the steps below, following the recommendations made in the CIET report:
(1) Toward the punishment of those who are responsible for the crimes against humanities, Establish an independent international investigation and prosecution body for conducting further investigations of human right violations in East Timor, identifying the persons responsible for those violations, ensuring reparations, and prosecuting those guilty of human right violations.
(2) Establish an international human rights tribunal consisting of judges appointed by the UN internationally, to judge crimes against humanity and war crimes (defined according to international human rights laws and international humanitarian laws) which occurred in East Timor.
(3) Further promote the return of East Timorese refugees who were forcibly taken to West Timor and other parts of Indonesia and are still exposed to grave human rights violations.
We appreciate the efforts made by KPP-HAM and Indonesia's move to establish its own human rights court, but this should not be regarded as a substitute for an international human rights tribunal. The international human rights tribunal should be established irrespective of Indonesia's stance. This is because:
(1) The human rights violations currently under examination constitute clear violations of the agreements reached by Indonesia with the United Nations. They were committed by the Indonesian army and police, the very bodies which had promised to maintain security and be neutral. Therefore, the UN and the international community should treat the crimes against humanity committed in East Timor as its own responsibility.
(2) The UN never approved Indonesia's unilateral integration of East Timor into Indonesia. According to the International Court of Justice, East Timor was regarded as a "non self-governing area", where the right of self-determination had yet to be applied. These clearly show that human rights violations in East Timor should be treated as an international issue.
In a letter attached to the report by CIET, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said he would wait and see what stance Indonesia would take. However, due to the above reasons, we ask the UN to take swift action following the recommendations by CIET.
We also request that the Japanese government assist the UN, both politically and economically, to this end. We deeply regret that the Japanese government behaved negatively towards the opening of the Special Session of the UN Human Rights Committee and the establishment of the Special Investigation Team.
For 24 years, the international community, including the Japanese government, turned a blind eye to the human rights violations committed by Indonesia in East Timor during its illegal occupation. In 1999, the international community opened the door to further killing and destruction by accepting the repeated assurances of the Indonesian authorities that they would maintain security, assurances which came to nothing, without sufficiently examining reports and appeals made by independent bodies stating that it was the Indonesian army and its militias which were killing and terrorizing the East Timorese. We should not gloss over these responsibilities by claiming that we have to "wait and see" what action the Indonesian government will take. The very least the international community can do for the East Timorese, who have suffered so long, is to take immediate action following the recommendations by CIET, and to fully cooperate with these actions.
Free East Timor! Japan Coalition
Amnesty International Japan Section
East Timor People's Peace Relief Project
END
Western Intelligence Hampering Portugal's Timor Effort, Minister Says
11/02/00 ~ RDP Antena 1 Radio
Lisbon - Portugal's peacekeeping mission in East Timor remains shrouded in controversy. Speaking at Lisbon airport yesterday on the departure of a contingent of Portuguese troops for the territory, Defence Minister Julio Castro Caldas attributed the repeated delays in sending the troops to the action of the intelligence services of some western governments, a revelation that surprised opposition social democratic party leader Durao Barroso, who asked the minister to explain himself.
Barroso: I think these are statements of considerable gravity which warrant an explanation to Portuguese public opinion and to parliament itself. So our western allies are raising obstacles to the sending of a Portuguese mission to Timor? How can this be explained? And how acceptable is it for a Portuguese defence minister to state publicly that some intelligence services - the inference being that they are from the countries in question - are against our presence there?
Presenter Minister Julio Castro Caldas has already advanced an explanation, or, rather, a rectification. Here he is, speaking to our reporter Eduardo Fidalgo:
Minister Caldas: I did not refer to western governments, I referred to intelligence services. I spoke of intelligence services, which is different.
Reporter: So no governments are involved.
Minister Caldas: The governments are not involved
END
Soares Sanctioned Murder: Militia Chief
11/02/00 ~ Sydney Morning Herald by LINDSAY MURDOCH
A pro-Jakarta militia commander has testified that East Timor's former governor, Mr Abilio Soares, told him early last year that all supporters of independence for the territory, including priests and nuns, should be "killed if necessary".
In confidential testimony before an independent Indonesian human rights inquiry, the commander testified that Mr Soares said "those who want independence are communists and should be killed".
According to the newspaper Media Indonesia, the commander, who was not named, also told of meetings between militia leaders and the former Bali-based Indonesian military regional commander in charge of East Timor, Major-General Adam Damiri, at which anti-independence leaders were promised funding and weapons to crush the independence movement.
"Militias were free; [if] they wanted to burn, capture or kill it was up to them," the commander was quoted as saying.
Asked if Indonesian soldiers were with the militia when they conducted operations, the commander replied: "A lot. Militias were on the front but those in back were ... elite force."
After hearing from the commander and other witnesses, National Human Rights Commission investigators recommended last week that the Attorney-General pursue Mr Soares, General Damiri and 31 others for atrocities in East Timor before and after last year's independence ballot.
One of the accused, General Wiranto, the former Indonesian military commander, has refused repeated requests from President Abdurrahman Wahid that he resign as Security Minister pending the Attorney-General's investigation, intensifying fears of an army rebellion against the Government.
A former military commander and vice-president, General Try Sutrisno, warned that unless the attacks on the military ended there would be a strong reaction. But he indicated he did not believe the military would mount a coup to oust Mr Wahid, 59, who has been trying to implement sweeping military reforms since taking office in October.
Five army generals named by the human rights team have received promotions since ending their involvement in East Timor and are still on active duty.
The commission investigators are coming under increasing pressure over their 2,000-page report on the East Timor atrocities that left hundreds dead and almost all the territory's homes and infrastructure destroyed, and forced several hundred thousand people into refugee camps in Indonesian-controlled West Timor.
The latest attack on the investigators' credibility came from representatives of Parliament's defence and information committee as MPs questioned them over their easy access to East Timor.
The official Antara news agency reported that the committee blamed the human rights team for a discriminatory inquiry that "targeted only the Indonesian military" and said it had "failed to investigate the human rights abuses, including torture and rape" committed by foreign personnel deployed in East Timor under the Australian-led Interfet.
Media Indonesia yesterday published sensational claims of human rights abuses by "Australia's Interfet" and East Timor pro-independence supporters.
It quoted a militia commander, Filomeno Antonio Brito, as alleging Interfet tortured eight of his men at Dili's port on September 22 last year. The claims included that Interfet soldiers witnessed torture by independence supporters in Bobonaro on September 26.
END
Exiled Timorese Militia Sells Arms to Ambon Fighters
10/02/00 ~ South China Morning Post by JOANNA JOLLY
Kupang, West Timor - Defeated East Timorese militia exiled in Indonesian West Timor are selling their weapons to Christian fighters in Ambon to make money.
Ambon is the centre of a vicious sectarian war in the eastern Maluku Islands which has seen thousands of Muslims and Christians killed and tens of thousands more made refugees.
According to an Ambonese Christian, who has been buying weapons from the pro-Jakarta militia since July last year, guns and hand grenades can be easily bought from militia now living in Kupang.
He also said the death toll since the violence in the Malukus began in January last year was 30,000, far higher than has been reported so far.
"We contact people in Dili who stay in houses in Kupang," said the trader, who wished to be identified only as Pauli M. "We know that the militia from Dili have more than 3,000 weapons. That's why we came here. We target them."
The claim came as the United Nations refugee agency yesterday urged Indonesia to halt a new surge in violence against refugees and aid workers in West Timor.
At least four incidents were reported last week at camps near Kupang, the capital of the Indonesian territory, said Ron Redmond, spokesman for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.
They included attacks against journalists and disruption to operations returning refugees to East Timor, Mr Redmond said.
The largest camp in West Timor, Tuapukan - which holds around 20,000 of the 110,000 refugees estimated to remain in the province - was causing the greatest concern.
Pauli M, who had contacts with the Indonesian military (TNI) in East Timor, first travelled to Dili in July before the August 30 United Nations-sponsored referendum, which produced an overwhelming vote for independence.
On that trip he bought three M-16 rifles for 15 million rupiah (HK$15,600) and three handguns for six million rupiah from a militia member, using money collected by the Christian community in Ambon.
He said prices had now increased, with each gun costing as much as 10 million rupiah. But he said it was easier to buy from the militias in Kupang than to deal with arms dealers in Jakarta.
"We needed weapons; some of us went to Dili and some went to Jakarta. Jakarta is the best, but the security is very high. Here is more expensive," he said.
According to Pauli M, the militia collected the guns from refugee camps on the border with East Timor in December when they were ordered to disarm. A small proportion were handed in to Indonesian police, but the rest were taken back to Kupang to sell.
The weapons Pauli M is buying from the militia are likely to have been given to the militia by the TNI. Human rights organisations operating in East Timor say they have ample documentary evidence to prove the TNI armed, trained and funded the pro-Jakarta militias before the referendum.
Despite an arms embargo, Pauli M said it was still possible to smuggle in weapons on small boats.
He accused the TNI of backing the Muslims in the province and named TNI commander Suadi Marasabesi as a supplier of weapons to the Muslim side. He also said Kopassus (special forces) Battalion 303 was actively supporting the Muslims.
END
Conclusive Proof TNI Planned Reign of Terror
07/02/00 ~ The Independent by Richard Lloyd Parry
On the day that the crucial find was made, early in October last year, it was already much too late for East Timor. Its towns and cities, including the capital, Dili, were in ruins. The local militias who had carried out most of the dirty work had fled the country.
But the organisation that armed and supported them, the Indonesian armed forces (TNI), was still present – a few hundred soldiers, preparing for their final withdrawal and burning their headquarters behind them.
It was in this sinister atmosphere that a small team of human-rights workers sneaked into a one-storey building off Dili's main port road. Until a few weeks before, it had been the offices of the adjutant general of the regional commander and inside was a chaotic scene – room after room stripped of furniture and fittings, and littered with hundreds of thousands of papers, the detritus of 24 years of Indonesian rule.
"There were kids playing on them, and shouting, 'The Indos have gone! The Indos have gone!'," said one of the workers, from the East Timorese Hak (Human Rights) Foundation. It was weeks before they realised the importance of what they had found – a treasury of information on the campaign of genocide and deportation which followed East Timor's vote for independence.
The documents, obtained by The Independent in Dili, and analysed in Jakarta by Indonesian investigators and Western diplomatic sources, provide evidence of what has long been suspected, but never proved – that, for months before the referendum on East Timor's independence in August, it was being systematically undermined by Indonesia's top generals.
They first tried to pervert it, by using military resources to buy off Timorese voters. And they gave guns to the opponents of independence – the local militias, and the pro-Indonesia appointees in the local government. But, from the start they were anticipating their defeat at the polls, and hatching an alternative plan – the forcible deportation of hundreds of thousands of East Timorese, with the use of what a senior Indonesian general referred to as "repressive/coercive" measures.
When the result of the referendum – a 78.5 per cent vote for independence – was announced in early September, the plan went into effect. Within two weeks, unknown numbers of Timorese had been killed, more than one-quarter of them had been herded into Indonesia, and virtually every town had been laid waste.
The documents implicate officers at every level, from the head of the Dili traffic police, who worked out the minute details of the deportation plan, to General Subagyo Hadi Siswoyo, the army chief of staff. "It's the missing link," said one Western diplomat, after The Independent showed him the documents. "It connects the military to the use of repression and coercion, and it shows a clear chain of command from close to the very top."
The most important document dates from the very day that the referendum was born. On 5 May 1999, the foreign ministers of Indonesia and Portugal, the territory's former colonial ruler, reached a formal agreement at the United Nations in New York.
The planned referendum asked the East Timorese to accept or reject so-called "special autonomy" proposed by Jakarta, which allowed for limited self-government under continued Indonesian rule. The UN's responsibilities would be strictly limited to the conduct of the poll –all security would be the responsibility of the Indonesian security forces.
Hours before the signing of the agreement in New York, the army in Jakarta was already plotting its undoing. The Independent has obtained a telegram, sent on 5 May by General Subagyo, and signed on his behalf by his deputy, Major-General Johny Lumintang. The letter is addressed to Colonel Tono Suratman, the military commander in Dili, and copied to senior military figures. Its contents are damning.
The crucial order reads: "Prepare a security plan to prevent civil war that includes preventive action (create conditions), policing measures, repressive/coercive measures and a plan to move to the rear/evacuate if the second option [independence] is chosen."
The striking part of the order is the preparation for "evacuation" – and the frank instruction to use repression. "That is very strong language," said one Western diplomat. "Even in their most honest, secret discussions, generals don't often own up to that kind of thinking."
The meaning of the phrase "preventive action (create conditions)" is suggested by another cable found in the adjutant general's office, dated 6 July. It is a request from a Bali-based brigadier-general, Mahidin Simbolon, for a naval vessel, the Jenis Frost, to be dispatched to East Timor and is addressed to the TNI chief, General Wiranto. The cargo was not to be munitions, but rice; its purpose political. "During the referendum process," General Simbolon said, "there are 35 NGOs [non-governmental organisations]... who give food assistance to the people. This can affect the result of the referendum which is why the local government has to provide food assistance to the people as soon as possible."
The New York agreement banned any use of government resources to influence the referendum. But rice was the most harmless of the TNI's contributions to the anti-independence campaign. In the military headquarters in the town of Vikeke, the researchers from the Hak Foundation found a log book detailing the weapons distributed to the local Wanra militia and pro-Jakarta leaders.
The first page alone lists scores of guns given to the militia. "What surprises me is the sheer quantity," said the Western diplomat. "We knew that the militia were getting military weapons, but we never knew it was this many.
The Indonesian attitude to the referendum, as a war to be won or lost, is illustrated in a document dated July 1999, and drafted by an officer of the Dili-based Wira Dharma command, Lieutenant-Colonel Soedjarwo. The 13 pages outline "Operational Plan Wira Dharma '99", nothing less than a battle plan. One section describes the "Enemy Forces" – not only the guerrillas of the resistance movement, Falintil, but civilians, including unarmed student groups and political organisations.
By mid-summer, it was clear that hopes of winning the referendum were waning, and the generals were doing everything in their power to buy and coerce the population.
In August, the Dili police department produced a volume called Operation Remember Lorosae II, after the local word for Timor. This includes a meticulous plan to evacuate hundreds of thousands of Timorese after the referendum. It contains charts breaking down the population into regions and into two groups – for and against Indonesian rule. In keeping with the TNI's deluded assumptions, it estimates that supporters of autonomy outnumber those for independence by 517,430 to 367,591. Starting with these numbers it presents two plans, based on the outcome of the vote.
In each, it proposes an evacuation of 50 per cent of those who supported the losing side. Within a month, the plan was put into precise action. The table estimates the number of vehicles needed to transport the "evacuees" from each region. In the case of a win for independence, the number earmarked for "evacuation" is 258,710 people – almost exactly the 250,000 estimated to have been forcibly displaced after the vote.
END
Wiranto Responsible for Timor Atrocities, say Gusmao, Ramos-Horta
07/02/00 ~ AFP
MANILA - Former Indonesian armed forces chief General Wiranto was directly responsible for last year's destruction and violence in East Timor and credible witnesses could testify against him, visiting East Timor independence leaders Xanana Gusmao and Jose Ramos-Horta said here Saturday.
"I say I do not have any doubt whatsoever that Wiranto as defense minister and the commander in chief of the armed forces was directly implicated in the preparation, in the training, in the funding and the execution of destruction and killing in East Timor," Ramos-Horta said at a press conference here.
"If there is going to be a war crimes tribunal, be it in Indonesia run by Indonesians, or international war crimes tribunal, we would be able to testify with witnesses that would prove beyond reasonable doubt that General Wiranto is responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in East Timor."
Wiranto, currently Indonesia's senior security minister, has been told to quit cabinet several times by President Abdurrahman Wahid since he was named in a domestic rights last week as being responsible for violence in East Timor following the August ballot in which its people voted for independence from Jakarta. Wiranto defended his record on Timor and has defied the resignation demands.
Gusmao, the president of the National Council for East Timorese Resistance and touted as the future president of the former Portuguese colony, said Wiranto had repeatedly ignored pleas to disarm pro-Jakarta militias who went on a rampage after an independence vote last year He told the press conference he had also met with Wiranto twice in June and July ahead of the polls to ask him to pull out Indonesian troops from East Timor villages to district centres to no avail.
"We met Wiranto before consultations in June in Jakarta," Gusmao said.
"In this meeting we asked him to disarm militias and he told us that 'I can disarm them in two days.' In July, I met him again with other representatives of national human rights commission, with (UN officials) and asked him to remove the forces from each village. He didn't want (to)."
Gusmao said he also sent messages through Wiranto's intelligence chief which went unanswered.
"I told him (the intelligence chief) to please say or tell Wiranto if he wants to save the image of Indonesia, stop the violence. It is a unique opportunity to him as general to do something. He didn't want (to)."
END
A Note on the Conduct of International NGOs and UN Institutions in Post-referendum Timor Lorosa’e
07/02/00 ~ HAK
"Here there is no luxurious house, bar to drink beer, discotheque, how can humanitarian workers want to stay here”, an indigenous leader said when he was asked for his comments about the lack of health services by international NGOs and UN institutions in sub-district Alas, Same.
"Do you have an identity card? Does your institution have any experience in distributing food materials in this area?” This was the question asked by WFP (World Food Program) staff when a local/national NGO which has operated for a long time in Timor Lorosa’e saw him in his office to arrange coordination for distributing food in Baucau, Timor Lorosa’e.
I. Introduction
The Scorched Earth operation in Timor Lorosa’e by the pro-integration militia and Indonesian military caused extraordinary damage. Lives and property were lost as a result of that operation. From the international political perspective, it can be said that the UN representative office in the area at that time was slow in taking action. As a result of the “ignorance politics” of the international community (UNAMET and UN in particular), the militia and the Indonesian military freely launched their operation after the announcement of the result of the ballot on September 4, 1999. After becoming the victim of this scorched-earth operation, now Timor Lorosa’e faces a new operation, i.e. “humanitarian operation”.
The destruction of Timor Lorosa’e after the referendum has created new problems. Even though it has to be admitted that Timor Lorosa’e was able to drive away Indonesian military, it appears that the destruction was meant to open a road for several groups to launch another “operation” in Timor Lorosa’e. Under the facade of humanitarian aid, various international NGOs as well as intergovernmental institutions are competing to carry out their programs in this burned-down country.
The flood of humanitarian aid through different NGOs and intergovernmental agencies in Timor Lorosa’e does not necessarily end the chain of misery of the East Timorese. On the contrary, it appears like it will become a new chain which will tie the East Timorese to external dependence in perpetuity.
The number of international NGO operating in Timor Lorosa’e has reached about thirty. There are also a number of intergovernmental agencies, such as UNHCR, UNICEF, UNESCO, FAO, and WFP. While the local NGOs are only about 20. These humanitarian organizations have come with all sorts of programs, like food distribution, health service, shelter, refugee service, distribution of seeds and many others.
It is interesting to examine how these international organizations have coped with the crisis in Timor Lorosa’e. Before we discuss the various problems faced by the NGOs and intergovernmental agencies in carrying out the humanitarian operation, we will first discuss the politics of humanitarian aid.
II. Politics of Humanitarian Aid
History notes that there has been enormous amount of humanitarian aid given to African countries. Whenever there is an upheaval, as a result of internal or external politics, various groups, international NGOs and UN agencies, each with its own method, entered the conflict under the name of humanitarian aid. Mozambique, Angola, Rwanda, Somalia, and many other countries in that continent have become a frequent recipients of a “humanitarian operation.” Despite the abundance of aid, the mortality rate in the region due to starvation and disease has not decreased; it has actually increased.
We can identify several specific problems that arise when humanitarian aid is distributed through international NGOs as well as through UN agencies.
The source of the problems are as follows :
First, the problem of transparency in financial matters. In executing their programs, most international NGOs make use of funds supposedly given to the government of the country suffering from the catastrophe. For instance, in 1989 Mozambique suffered from serious conflict which led to starvation. International NGOs and UN agencies began to enter the conflict area and address the problem. Apparently, the largest single source of funding for this operation was taken from the aid/grant given to the government of Mozambique.
Second, the problem of dependence. Bangladesh is an excellent case study of the effects of humanitarian operations organized by international NGOs and UN agencies on the country’s self-sufficiency. For some time, the society was flooded by humanitarian relief so that when the aid stopped, the society was shocked and was not ready for self-sufficiency. Besides, such an operation often times marginalizes people in the remote areas due to the ineffective mechanism of distribution. The aid, on the contrary, enriches certain groups of people in either urban or suburban areas, and make the poor become dependent on the nouveau riche.
Third, problem of lack of coordination. Many international NGOs and UN agencies conduct their operation in different places with a minimal coordination with local organizations. As a result, local/national NGOs or other potential groups within the society become “second class” people. Even worse, in order to carry out their programs, the local NGOs have to beg from the international NGOs or UN agencies to get their share of the aid granted to the local government for handling the catastrophe in their own country. At this point it seems like the governments which pledge their support or international donor agencies are more interested in contracting the humanitarian work to international NGOs, especially those which have special connection with the UN as well as various UN agencies themselves. Thus, the aid or grant promised to the local government in turn is mostly spent by institutions outside the country which suffers the catastrophe. It is often the case that the donor coun! try even looks to the international NGO itself to carry out the humanitarian operation and design the blueprint of the program. Therefore, international NGOs and UN agencies involved in humanitarian relief works are often defined as Private Voluntary Organization (PVO). As Joseph Hanlon observes in Mozambique, many international NGOs, such as World Vision or Care International, act more like big enterprises or transnational corporations that have branches in different countries. As such, the interest of these NGOs are disbursal of money, distribution of food, and emergency aid. For the overhead cost of the institutions, they can either receive interest from the aid/grant aside from their own fundraising effort. Without consulting local/national NGOs, these multinational institutions design and attempt to launch colossal projects, but these might not be the priority of the target groups they think they would help.
Fourth, the problem of “hidden message.” Many big international NGOs have a hidden agenda to send to the target groups in the countries facing problems. For instance, World Vision, when operating in Mozambique, was part of the US government effort to sabotage the FRELIMO government. It is an evangelical, anti-Communist organization that was opposed to the socialist government and in favor of the bandits and terrorists of Renamo. It openly stated that Renamo should seize power from the government. World Vision also has close relationship with repressive military regimes in Central America. Another example is the work of Care International, especially Care USA, which assisted the US government gather intelligence in Mozambique during the 80s. In some cases these international NGOs have more complete information about the society than the local groups, even the government of the country where they work. This information is first shared with the US government as the donor country,! instead of the local organizations or governments.
II. The Case of Timor Lorosa’e
How have international NGOs and UN agencies operated in Timor Lorosa’e after the Indonesian military left the area? As it was mentioned before, international NGOs and UN agencies swarmed into the area, operating from the capital city of Jakarta or Darwin, and attempted to reach the remotest areas in Timor Lorosa’e. They either worked to aid Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) or provide general humanitarian assistance.
In order to understand the conduct of these international organizations or institutions in Timor Lorosa’e several factors need to be considered :
1. Misleading Perspective
Misleading perspective is the fundamental problem of all humanitarian operation of the international NGOs in Timor Lorosa’e. These institutions perceive that the East Timorese at this moment “need food,” so all they have to do is just provide them with food. They have an assumption that the East Timorese are not able to organize themselves to overcome the emergency situation and they need “help” to get the food. With such a perspective all they care about is dumping food in an area. The East Timorese now are good at inquiring “when is the rice going to be distributed?” instead of “when are we going to be able to produce our own rice or corn?” Aside from the misleading assumptions on providing aid, there is also a degrading perspective about the East Timorese in general. In their eyes, the East Timorese are only capable of menial work. Therefore, in these organizations East Timorese are purely treated as wage workers and there is no attempt to transfer the knowledge or technolo! gy to the local people. The use of “local” in this humanitarian operation is limited to the hiring wage workers (about whom more will be said below). There is no partnership and no cooperation between the international agencies and the East Timorese; the latter are viewed only as passive recipients of the activity of the former.
2. Lack of Communication with East Timorese
It is bad enough for the international agencies to view East Timorese as passive recipients; it is even worse for them not to consider these passive recipients worthy of being told basic information of the aid they can expect to receive. Similar to experiences in other places, international NGOs and UN agencies involved in the humanitarian operation in Timor Lorosa’e tend to treat the local NGOs as second class people. A large part of the problem is that the international agencies simply do not communicate with the very people they are supposed to be helping.
One example occurred last year during the UNHCR/IOM repatriation program from Jakarta, Indonesia. On October 25, 1999 about three hundred East Timorese, some of whom had lived in Indonesia for years and some of whom were refugees who had fled the post-ballot violence, came to the Soekarno-Hatta Airport, Jakarta with all their cargo for repatriation to East Timor. After waiting for several hours, they heard from the UNHCR staff that the flight was canceled. No further information was provided as to why the flight was canceled and when the next flight would be. When the refugees asked the UNHCR staff about it, they said they did not know and suggested that the East Timorese get all their luggage and return to their original place. UNHCR did not appear to care that among the refugees there were people who had to hid and disguise themselves while they were in Jakarta to avoid being chased by pro-integration militia and the Indonesian military. The international staff simply did no! t bother to communicate with the refugees to figure out what to do. The flight was delayed for 24 hours and the refugees were left with nothing, not even food. UNHCR and IOM staff were not even present at the airport most of the time.
What happened in Jakarta was just a minor problem compared to the treatment of refugees within Timor Lorosa’e. After arriving in Dili, many of them were left without any information at the emergency shelter for a long periods of time. People were packed into the Don Bosco dormitory in Dili where the facilities, such as bathrooms and kitchens, were minimal. Some of the refugees were severely sick but they had to wait for days, sometimes weeks, to return to their original place. The only bit of information the refugees learned from the UNHCR was that the UNHCR would wait until the number of people from a particular zone reached 100 before transportation would be provided. “We can’t go home because our total is less than one hundred people, that’s UNHCR requirement,” a refugee from Same told us when we saw her at the Don Bosco shelter.
Once the refugees were in East Timor and at Don Bosco, it was not clear whose responsibility they were. Apparently, other international NGOs besides the UNHCR were supposed to be responsible for health care but they provided very little. We went to visit Don Bosco shelter and one refugee from Ermera who suffered from malaria shared her story, “Four days ago they gave me six tablets, but after two days the medicine was gone and I haven’t yet recovered”. This is only one of many, many complaints we heard from the refugees who slept on a tarpaulin mat for a long time at Don Bosco dormitory in Dili.
Refugees in other places had a different story. On December 28, 1999 about 400 refugees from Atambua arrived in Beikala village, Hatudu sub-district, Ainaro district. They said that from Atambua they had been transferred to Suai district and had stayed there before leaving for Ainaro. They had been in Timor Lorosa’e for weeks but it seemed like there was no coordination between UNHCR and other international NGOs working for humanitarian relief. The UNHCR had dropped off the refugees in the village without making any arrangements with other organizations for the delivery of aid. The refugees had received a certain amount of rice when they were in Suai. But once they were taken to Beikala they only had about one to two kilograms of rice left for each person. They did not know where to go because all their houses were burned down. They also did not know where to get food. In Beikala itself there is no public shelter, because the only elementary school in the village was burned do! wn. None of the international NGOs responsible for distributing food and providing shelter for the refugees were around Beikala. A CNRT local leader commented that probably the area was not a priority for the international institutions. Meanwhile the UNHCR made it sound like the repatriation was a great success even when the refugees were treated more like luggage. They dropped off the refugees and provided no explanation as to where they should stay if they do not have houses anymore and where to obtain food in the transition period. The refugees began to panic as the rainy season started.
A similar case happened to refugees from Lolotoe sub-district, Bobonaro district who returned from Atambua in November 1999. On November 26, 1999, because the road was damaged, UNHCR dropped off the some 300 refugees in the middle of the road in Tapo village, about 30 km before entering Lolotoe area. This was the second time they had been dropped off without explanation. Before that they had to wait in Maliana for several days. They were left with no food and none of the international NGOs accompanied these refugees. After waiting for several days and no action taken by UNHCR, finally the people from the village chartered a private car owned by the locals to carry the refugees to Lolotoe. It turned out that there was no problem with the road at all; their vehicle could pass through without any hassle. Each family of the refugees had to spent at least Rp. 500,000 to rent the cars.
Other case was the repatriation of the “Indonesian people” from West Timor to Kampung Alor area in Dili on January 1, 2000. Without consulting other parties, such as CNRT, churches, or UNTAET, UNHCR brought back the Indonesians who used to live in Timor Lorosa’e. They fled the area along with other refugees before the scorched earth operation. A youth in Kampung Alor said that repatriation of these Indonesian people took place at the wrong time. The East Timorese were anxiously waiting for their family members to come home, but what they saw was the return of unexpected “guests.” The East Timorese were understandably in an emotional state. For them, most of these “guests” were the beneficiary of the “integration cake” during the occupation of the Indonesian military. The UNHCR did not realize that people actually began to suspect that the UNHCR had intentionally arranged the repatriation of the Indonesians in order to prolong the conflict within the East Timorese society. Such! a careless action created new problems. Again, UNHCR behaved as if it was just transporting “units,” lifeless bits of unthinking flesh.
3. Inadequate knowledge of East Timor’s needs
Before the international agencies had stepped onto the island, they had already devised a six-month plan. They had not made any assessment about the real problems in the field. As a result, some of their programs have not been able to be implemented and some have been implemented in poor fashion.
There has been a lack of knowledge about the rice needs of the society. In some places refugees received rice several times. Meanwhile, in other places refugees or the local population did not receive rice at all. In Waitama village, Uatulari sub-district, Viqueque district, since December 1999, the local population has not received anything. According to them, they still have a small supply of rice, but it is insufficient and not all families have rice, only those who work in the ricefields. They complained that international NGOs do not seem to have comprehensive data about the local conditions. Just because some families have a supply of rice, the CNRT, international NGOs, and UN agencies assume that everybody has a sufficient supply of food. Besides, they also think that the people can fulfill other needs such as a medicine, toiletries, spices, and cooking oil. In reality, these are rare items in the villages.
In Atelari village, Baucau sub-district, Baguia sub-district where the population is mostly Moslem and Protestant, the people have not received any aid. This is because the distribution of rice was coordinated by WFP with Caritas International as the implementing partner. Caritas only gave aid to Catholic community groups in accordance with the data compiled by the Catholic church which understandably did not have data about the Moslems and Protestants. Besides the problem of unequal distribution of rice, the coordination with local leaders is also minimal; the CNRT leaders in various regions have complained about the unequal distribution of rice in their regions.
The distribution of corn seed for planting was done in a very careless manner. The seed was distributed when the planting season was largely over. So the people began to eat the seeds, not knowing that the seeds were covered with chemicals and were not meant as food. The sacks of seeds did have printing on the outside warning against ingestion of the seeds but the people were either illiterate or did not know the language of the warning. As a consequence, many people became sick.
Because the international agencies only had pre-packaged programs, they could not respond to what the people actually needed. For instance, in certain villages in Maliana and Baucau, the people cultivate rice, not corn. What they need is mechanical equipment to start working on the rice field. But none of the international NGOs and the UN agencies were geared to meet this need. The people of Maliana complained that there were neither tractors nor draft animals to work on the field, “Our oxen and water buffalo were either killed or taken away by the militia and Indonesian military,” a farmer from Ritabou village, Maliana told us when we saw him in his house. It is ironic that there are so many vehicles being transported to Timor Lorosa’e for use by the international agencies -- some are even left unused in the warehouse. But there are no tractors which are crucial to East Timor’s ability to overcome the food crisis.
Part of the reason the international agencies lack adequate knowledge of the society’s needs is due to their lack of cooperation and coordination with local organizations. The international agencies have divided up East Timor between themselves; certain agencies are responsible for certain zones. They then expect East Timorese NGOs, who have always worked throughout the country, to follow the bureaucratic divisions they have set up. East Timorese NGOs are also supposed to restrict their work to particular zones. When a national NGO came to the WFP office to coordinate the distribution of rice, he was asked by the WFP official “What is the identity of your NGO? Does your institution have any experience in distributing rice in Baucau?” As if there were any NGOs in East Timor that had specialized in rice distribution in the one district of Baucau!
The international agencies running the rice distribution, WFP and World Vision, have set up a rigid bureaucracy that East Timorese NGOs and small foreign NGOs have had difficulty working through. Their proposals to distribute rice are not handled quickly. Usually, it is not even clear when the proposal might be processed. These unnecessary delays have led to prolonged waits by many communities for rice deliveries.
NGOs have continued distributing food in regions where villagers are engaged in cultivating crops instead of helping the ongoing production process. In Aileu the population wants to harvest their rice but none of the international agencies have any program to assist them. In Turiscai the population has saved a considerable amount of coffee, but due to the collapse of the distribution network and the lack of transportation, the people do not know where to sell the coffee. A similar problem occurred in Bubususu village, Manufahi district. According to the community leader there, about 40 tons of coffee are stored there but the community does not know how to market it. They raised the issue to the international NGO operating in the area and they were told that there is no program for marketing coffee for the time being.
International agencies are now in East Timor following their pre-packaged project proposals. They are not adapting their work to the particular needs of East Timorese society.
4. Dependency on foreign aid
Humanitarian aid has begun to engender a problem of dependency. This phenomena is not due to the aid itself, but the manner in which it has been distributed. The lack of aid for cultivating rice or selling coffee noted above has meant that villagers have not been able to provide food and income for themselves. Without the needed aid to do their own work, they are left dependent on rice deliveries.
The method of rice delivery has actually encouraged people not to work in the fields in the villages. Because of the unpredictability of supplies in the districts, people have decided to stay in Dili to obtain rice. Many people do not want to return to their villages to work in their farm where they would be able to contribute to East Timor’s own food production.
In Liquiça, several fishermen groups tried to organize themselves into a cooperative. They submitted their proposal to a Japanese international NGO, Peace Winds, working in the area. These fishermen groups never got any response from Peace Winds. “Maybe fishermen affair is not part of their concern,” they complained when we asked for comments. If the fishermen were aided to get new boats (to replace the ones destroyed), they would be able to earn income and would not be wholly dependent on food aid from WFP and World Vision. But the international agencies don’t have any program for fishermen.
5. Lack of Transparency in Finances
Most people of Timor Lorosa’e do not know that the international NGOs and UN agencies are carrying out their operations by using the money pledged by the World Bank-led consortium. This is money meant for the interests of “the people of Timor Lorosa’e.” Through an agreement between the World Bank and donor countries in Tokyo on December 16-17, 1999 a grant of US$ 520 million for three years has been pledged for Timor Lorosa’e. But there is no information about how this money is being spent and how much of this grant is going to fund the operations of the international NGOs and UN agencies. Meanwhile, these international NGOs and UN agencies act like “saviors” who have come by virtue of their own fundraising.
People have no idea where they money is coming from for these international agencies nor any idea about their budgets. One international agency, World Vision, told a group of East Timorese that it had no money to transport rice to their village but that the villagers could transport the rice themselves from the warehouse to their village. This was the experience of the community from Leorema village, Bazartete sub-district, Liquiça. World Vision claimed it did not have a vehicle. On January 6, 2000 the villagers, on their own, chartered four trucks for eight million rupiah (about $1,150) to get their share of rice from World Vision warehouse located in Liquiça city. Why is it that ordinary villagers were able to find four vehicles to rent while World Vision could not? And why is it that World Vision, in possession of far greater resources than such villagers (who used their last savings for the charter), could not afford the transportation?
We, like all East Timorese, are disturbed to see the way in which the international agencies are spending money. The cost of maintaining the foreign staff is obviously very high with cars, houses, hotel rooms (reportedly near $200 per night), imported food and beer, transportation in and out of the country. If the foreign staff consisted of a small core of necessary officials such expenses would be unobjectionable but the size of the staff appears terribly bloated. If the international agencies relied on more East Timorese staff they could save money, put earnings in the hands of East Timorese, and gain far more diligent and hard-working employees.
6. Mistreatment of Workers
As noted above, the local component to the international agencies consists only in the drivers, servants, cooks, and menial laborers they hire. Even in this aspect of relating to local East Timorese society, the international agencies have showed themselves to be incompetent. Again, a large part of the problem is the refusal of the international agencies to communicate with the workers, to summon the human decency to consider these workers as people who deserve explanations about the terms of their work. All the workers that we have spoken to have complained that they have not received explanations about their wages, working time, or any other aspect of their work. We find no reason to justify the kind of labor practices that the international agencies have followed even if the country is in a crisis period.
a. Use of day labor: The international agencies treat nearly all their warehouse workers as casual, day laborers. Workers are only told to report at a certain time in the morning. If there is work they will be called, if there is none, they will not be called. This means that if workers invest money in the transportation to get to and from the warehouse, there is no guarantee they will be hired for the day.
b. Late payment or no payment of wages: Some workers have worked for many days without receiving a wage. For instance, nine East Timorese working for the rice warehouse owned by WFP in Viqueque worked from October to December 1999 without receiving a wage. Each one of them only received three kilograms of rice as compensation for a month of work. Three other workers working in the WFP and Timor Aid warehouse in Betano, Same experienced similar ill-treatment. One said: “We just keep working. Once we asked about our wage, but that white boss told us to wait, the wage will be given after we work.” These three workers only got three kilograms of rice whenever they unloaded rice from the ship and brought it to the warehouse. After two months, three of them received about one million rupiah. Workers in Liquiça have a similar experience. About 10 workers working in World Vision warehouse since the past two months have not received wage until the end of December 1999. According to our! source of information, World Vision only paid their wage on January 14, 2000. During the time they worked, they only received 10 kgs. of rice per month. There is no contract between the workers and management of World Vision. Workers at the WFP warehouse in Vila Verde, Dili went on a hunger strike in the beginning of January, 2000 to demand a wage increase. They had been receiving only Rp. 20,000/day but they had to spend about Rp. 6000 to Rp. 7000 for transportation per day and at least Rp. 10.000 for one meal. By the end of the day the workers only had Rp. 2000-Rp. 3000 to bring home. Cooks working at the kitchen of public hospital in Viqueque have worked for weeks and they have not received any payment from MSF which is responsible for managing the hospital.
c. Physical Abuse: Workers at the WFP warehouse in Vila Verde, Dili have actually been physically abused. Some of them were beaten up by the chief of the warehouse, a foreign staff member of WFP, because they were late in coming to work.
d. Safety conditions at job site: Workers who work in the rice warehouses do not get necessary protection such as masks, gloves, boots, etc.
We find it shameful that an organization such as World Vision which has enough money to pay its foreign staff hundreds or thousands of dollars per month has such chronic problems in paying its workers about $3 per day at so many of its warehouses.
7. Lack of Commitment in Providing Services
“Today is a holiday and there is no ambulance here,” an ICRC doctor on duty at Bidau hospital responded when several people came to ask for ICRC’s help to pick up one of their family members who was seriously sick at home. Eyewitnesses said that at that time several ambulances were parked in the ICRC garage. This is only one of many complaints we have heard from people about the problems of the health services in East Timor provided by international NGOs and UN agencies. They seem to behave as if they merely want to reach a certain quota in their working proposal. In some cases, it appears that they are using the East Timorese patients as guinea pigs for their projects. Other sources of information indicate that international NGOs and UN agencies do not want to deal with patients with TB.
There are several international NGOs dealing with health services, such as Medicins Sans Frontiers (MSF), Assistencia Medica International (AMI), International Medica Corps (IMC), Medicins du Monde France (MDM-F) and many others. The sad fact is that all of these health care professionals are concentrated in Dili. Outside Dili, there is a near total absence of health services. "Here there is no luxurious house, bar to drink beer, discotheque, how can humanitarian workers stay here”, an indigenous leader said when he was asked for his comments about the lack of health services by international NGOs and UN institutions in Alas sub-district, Same district.
Another story came from Atabae sub-district, Bobonaro district. MSF is supposed to take care of health services in that region. MSF staff come two times per week to the town of Atabae. They do not go to the villages because they say the village roads are bad. For example, they do not go to Aidabalete village because of the damaged road so if somebody gets sick in that village, they will not be able to receive care. Some local nurses offered to help by distributing medicine to the villages, but the MSF staff do not trust these local nurses. These local nurses complained, “Do we have to wait until sick persons die before MSF staff will come to our village?”
Again, in the field of health care, we find that the international agencies are unable to work with East Timorese people. Perhaps the nurses are not highly trained but they can deal with basic health problems if they have the right equipment and medicine. We are fully convinced that one “barefoot nurse” or “barefoot doctor” living year-round in districts is worth more to the health care of the people than a highly trained foreign doctor who makes flying visits. This is an old truism but one that seems to be ignored by all the aid agencies that have arrived here. It would be better for the international aid agencies to focus on the training and equipping of such a “barefoot” medical staff instead of focusing on their own (irregular) provision of health care.
There is a strong impression among the people of Timor Lorosa’e that many relief workers carry out their duty half-heartedly. They perceive that these foreign relief workers only come to Timor Lorosa’e for an adventuresome excursion amidst the suffering of the people.
III. Human Rights Context
In this section we will highlight various forms of human rights violations that have occurred during the humanitarian operation.
Civil and political rights:
Right to information. The people of Timor Lorosa’e do not receive any information regarding the basic principles and methods underlying the humanitarian operation, particularly with regard to the funding for carrying out the operation. Information about the programs and its planning have to be made public so that the target group is aware of the objectives of the programs.
Right to active participation. From our observation in the field, people of Timor Lorosa’e are being treated more as the object of this humanitarian operation instead of partners.
Right to be free from torture. Several workers in the warehouse were beaten up by a staff at an international NGO supervising the distribution of rice.
Economic, social and cultural rights :
Right to a fair wage. There is an obscenely large gap between the salary of foreign staff and the wage for local workers.
Right to information about the job. Workers in the international NGOs and UN agencies never receive any explanation about their rights as workers.
Right to food. Some of the population receive food aid, but others do not. This happens because the international NGOs and UN agencies do not have sufficient information about the situation on the ground and there is a poor coordination between international institutions and the local ones.
Social right to remain in one’s social environment. International institutions do not attempt to make use of the existing social institution to deal with the problems occurring in the field. They try to work on their own and ignore the existence of the local institutions.
IV. Recommendation
Given the foregoing description, we believe that there are steps that the international agencies can take in order to improve the humanitarian aid work. The general goal must be to empower people, not to treat them as thoughtless objects who only merit the privilege of being handed a sack of rice.
In order to make the operation effective, international NGOs and UN agencies need to coordinate with all potential groups within the society, the people in general, and national NGOs. The coordination meeting should not be devoted to rhetoric about “partnership” (which is what we have already received) but about concrete, practical activity.
To fulfill the East Timorese right to information, international NGOs and UN agencies, most importantly UNTAET, should inform the public about the allocation of the funding granted by the World Bank to Timor Lorosa’e.
Humanitarian workers should open their hearts to work together with the people of Timor Lorosa’e at the grassroots level so that it will not appear that they only come to this burned down country merely to have a picnic amidst the people’s suffering.
There should be a clarification and dissemination of information as to time international NGOs and UN agencies working in the field of humanitarian relief intend to stay in Timor Lorosa’e. This is necessary for the people to anticipate the departure of these foreign organizations and the possibility of not receiving relief anymore. There must be a clear schedule for the build up of East Timorese institutions prior to the withdrawal of the international agencies.
END
Will Wahid Tackle Indonesia’s Terror Machine?
04/02/00 ~ The Age by SCOTT BURCHILL E-mail: burchill@deakin.edu.au
THE Indonesian Government doesn't have an impressive record of investigating its own crimes in East Timor. And the Australian Government has been equally suspect in its reactions to Jakarta's inquiries.
The Djaelini inquiry, reluctantly established by the Suharto Government to investigate the 1991 Dili massacre, consciously underestimated the number of people killed at the Santa Cruz cemetery in November that year, and resulted in stiffer sentences being handed out to the victims of the shootings than to the military perpetrators.
In his enthusiasm to maintain good relations with Jakarta, Australia's then Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, described the Djaelini Commission as "credible and reasonable", although a more sober report by Amnesty International said the inquiry was "totally lacking in credibility and designed principally to appease international criticism".
It is therefore reasonable to be cautious about the findings of Indonesia's National Commission for Human Rights, released on Monday, which recommends that more than 20 military, police and militia commanders be prosecuted for atrocities committed in East Timor last year. The report, and reactions to it by President Wahid, raise a series of difficult issues and unanswered questions.
The commission found that General Wiranto, who was Defence Minister and head of the armed forces at the time, had "full knowledge" of the terror inflicted on East Timor last September. Because he failed to intervene to stop the killing, looting and forced displacement of the population, the commission recommends that he face charges relating to "omission". In other words, the inquiry found no evidence that Wiranto had planned or orchestrated the violence. He bears only moral responsibility for what happened.
This is incredible in the true sense of the word, and unlikely to satisfy either the East Timorese or those human rights organisations and United Nations officials pushing for the establishment of an international tribunal to investigate crimes against humanity in East Timor. By blaming senior military officers for creating "an atmosphere of impunity ... for the violations of human rights", the commission actually distances them from direct responsibility for the slaughter.
There seems little doubt that Canberra have signals intercepts that clearly implicate a "pro-active" Wiranto in the planning and execution of crimes in East Timor, though it is doubtful that this intelligence would be shared with prosecuting authorities in Jakarta. The Howard Government knows that this material would be needed to indict Wiranto for crimes against humanity, just as British and United States intelligence was crucial for similar charges to be brought against Serbian President Milosevic for his ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. The Howard Government may be happier to pass the information to New York, but it is far from certain that the UN Security Council has the appetite for an international tribunal for East Timor.
Wahid, who surprisingly appointed Wiranto to his first Cabinet, yesterday appeared to pre-empt the result of any prosecution by reportedly indicating that the former armed forces chief would be pardoned if found guilty of the charges brought against him. This follows Wahid's promise to pardon former President Suharto if he is ever found guilty of corruption.
If he has indeed made such a commitment to Wiranto, it is a sign that Wahid is shoring up his support within the military - but he does so at a cost to both the Indonesian legal process and to international goodwill, which wants Indonesia to have the first crack at bringing those responsible for state terror in East Timor to justice. Crimes on this scale are rarely tried in-house; more frequently they are held in third countries and often at the International Court of Justice in The Hague.
But does Indonesia have a judiciary, untainted by corruption and political patronage, that is up to the task? In order to satisfy the international community, the Indonesian President may have to swallow some of his pride and consider the option of inviting international judges to share the benches in the trials to follow. Otherwise the trials will simply lack credibility.
The commission's findings are also embarrassing for the Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, who on 7 March last year, when asked whether the Indonesian military was arming and organising the militias, told Channel 9's Sunday program that "if it's happening at all, it certainly isn't something that's been condoned by General Wiranto".
It's always dangerous to be so unequivocal in international diplomacy, particularly when your own intelligence is telling you a different story. Downer could not have foreseen that an Indonesian human rights inquiry would subsequently expose these remarks, but he has fewer excuses for claiming on 5September, at the height of the post-ballot slaughter, that he was confident Wiranto was still "trying to do the right thing".
Scott Burchill lectures in international relations at Deakin University.
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MAKING UP FOR THE TIMIDITY OF THE PAST
By Anil Netto MORE BY THIS AUTHOR
PENANG, Malaysia, Feb. 10 (IPS) -- East Timor's independence leaders Xanana Gusmao and Jose Ramos-Horta have wrapped up their Asian tour with fresh promises of help from South-east Asian governments, keen to make up for their decades-long coolness to backing the territory's cause.
In fact, in just about every stop in the region there has been discussion about East Timor being linked in some way to the Association of South-east Asian Nations.
Some want East Timor to observe this July's meeting of ASEAN ministers and eventually become a member of South-east Asia's main diplomatic grouping of 10 countries.
Gusmao and Ramos-Horta's 40-minute encounter with Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad in Kuala Lumpur on Feb. 8 was closely watched in particular, to see if the once frosty relations with ASEAN had thawed.
Mahathir had accused the West of inciting the East Timorese and had said the territory would have been better off if it had remained a part of Indonesia.
He also said Indonesia had done a lot to develop East Timor, which Indonesia had annexed as a province in 1976 and whose occupation bred a simmering rebellion until a UN-supervised vote in August 1999 led to an end to Jakarta's rule.
"We look at the matter as over with," said Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar of Kuala Lumpur's lack of sympathy for East Timor's cause, owing to a desire not to offend Indonesia.
"We want to forge ahead to regional and bilateral relations and we believe the East Timor government will be in place within two or three years," he added.
Gusmao, president of the National Council for Timorese Resistance, also requested Malaysia's support for it to be granted full observer status at ASEAN meetings.
"They are keen to get first-hand knowledge of ASEAN's workings, since it has been a successful regional grouping," said Syed Hamid.
But Syed Hamid said it did not mean that East Timor would automatically join ASEAN later. The issue, he added, would only be raised when the new nation's transitional period under United Nations administration was over. "Maybe, after two or three years under the U.N. Transitional Authority in East Timor, the idea can be raised formally," he said.
The East Timor independence leaders' visit to the region should be an occasion for ASEAN governments to work out a "coordinated program" to help rebuild East Timor, said veteran Malaysian opposition politician Lim Kit Siang.
"Malaysia should propose at the fourth ASEAN Finance Ministers' (AFMM) meeting in Brunei on March 25-26 the setting up of an ASEAN special commission to assist in the rebuilding of East Timor," Lim said. Each ASEAN government, added Lim, should be committed to a budgetary allocation for the commission.
"ASEAN nations should play a more active part to assist the East Timorese in their critical transition toward nationhood as well as development," said Lim, who also called for them to play a more prominent role in the United Nations peacekeeping force in East Timor.
The force comes under the U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which is responsible for preparing the territory for full independence and nationhood.
Lim said the first ASEAN-UN Summit in Bangkok on Feb 12 would be the ideal occasion for the announcement of an ASEAN peace-building initiative in East Timor to promote peace, development and justice.
Gusmao and Ramos-Horta's visit to Kuala Lumpur was the last leg of an 18-day six-nation Asian tour, which began on Jan 23.
During the tour aimed at promoting cooperation and improving diplomatic ties with ASEAN nations, the two leaders also set about to explore the possibility of East Timor becoming a member or at least an observer of ASEAN.
This newfound warmth is far removed from the bitter days when ASEAN governments vehemently refused to offend Indonesia by raising reports of human rights violations in East Timor or discussing independence in East Timor, and displayed little tolerance for regional pro-independence activists.
Four years ago, the Asia-Pacific Coalition for East Timor II (APCET II) conference in Kuala Lumpur was broken up by an unruly mob linked to Malaysia's ruling coalition. Authorities detained 59 participants and journalists covering the international conference for up to six days, while another 40 foreign delegates were deported.
But, on the fringes of this week's visit to Malaysia by Gusmao and Ramos-Horta, the process of soul-searching about attitudes toward East Timor has begun.
At a public forum Tuesday night attended by Gusmao and Ramos- Horta, a former leader of the youth wing of the dominant United Malays National Organization, Saifuddin Nasution, admitted he organized the mob at the APCET conference after allegedly being instructed by a government deputy minister with the blessing of the national leadership.
The angry mob had broken the doors to the conference hall at a local hotel, and then verbally and physically abused the delegates.
"With deep regret, I am here to offer my apology to all of you," Saifuddin, who is now an opposition politician, told the crowd of 500 present.
The Philippine government previously also clamped down on a similar meeting and had subsequently denied an entry visa to Ramos-Horta when he was invited to speak at a local university.
"The Asian tour has been a great success in terms of the reception from the governments and the people of the region," says Elizabeth Wong, a steering committee member of APCET, an umbrella group for East Timor solidarity groups in the region.
"There are other countries in ASEAN which support East Timor's entry into ASEAN judging from the very warm reception they received during their tour," observes Wong. "We felt that the trip also further strengthened people-to-people solidarity."
"From what we gather, it appears that ASEAN is very keen to have East Timor as part of the ASEAN family," says Wong. "East Timor leaders have had some reservations because of the past. But ASEAN itself is changing and they (the East Timor leadership) are keeping their options open."
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ALL THE HELP A NEW NATION CAN GET
By Prangtip Daorueng
BANGKOK, Feb. 6 (IPS) -- East Timor independence leader Xanana Gusmao's constant message during his South-east Asian tour has been that the world's youngest nation badly needs economic development that eases life for a people tired of conflict.
Indeed, after focusing on and achieving self-determination, East Timor is faced with the tough task of transforming a war-torn, poor island into a growing economy.
With 90 percent of its infrastructure destroyed and continuing attacks by pro-Indonesia militias six months after an Aug. 30 ballot that resulted in a vote to break away from Indonesia, East Timor almost has nothing left except its starving population.
Gusmao says there is actually very little to rebuild in this territory of 400,000 people. "East Timor is not going to be reconstructed, it needs to be built from ground zero," Gusmao said at a press conference here last week, in response to a Korean investor who asked about the prospect of Asian investment in East Timor.
Beyond being a political objective, independence and peace also have to be translated into improved standards of living for the East Timorese.
As Gusmao put it: "Independence also means to guarantee people of East Timor the better quality of life to compensate them from all sacrifice that they have made."
Xanana Gusmao and the Nobel Peace Prize winner Jose Ramos-Horta are now on a three-week Asian tour that includes China, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia. The trip, which ends later this week, aims to raise support from Asian countries -- not all of whom were forthcoming in political support during its decades-long effort to be rid of Indonesian control.
The two East Timorese leaders brought the same message to the Philippines, where they met President Joseph Estrada on Saturday. A Filipino general also leads.
Estrada said that while the Philippines could not extent large amounts of aid, he said the country would be happy to have East Timorese study in its schools. "They acknowledged that the Philippines has a very good educational system and they hope to be able to send East Timor students to study in Philippine schools," Press Secretary Rodolfo Reyes said.
The two leaders thanked Manila for its participation in international forces who went into the territory to restore peace. The Philippines sent some 600 soldiers to those forces and a Filipino general now leaders the United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET).
The country also shares special links with East Timor, which like the Philippines is mainly Roman Catholic. Several Filipino Church groups and missionaries have also been helping in humanitarian missions in the territory.
As in Thailand, Estrada said Filipino businessmen were looking at investment prospects in fisheries and agriculture.
In Bangkok last week, Ramos-Horta and Gusmao met not just Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai and Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan, but a group Of Thai businessmen led by one of Thailand's major construction firms CH Karnchang.
Members of the Thai business group expressed their interests in business investments in several areas in East Timor including infrastructure development, public utilities, fisheries and tourism.
The two leaders said the need of foreign investments in East Timor is one of the country's development priorities, but also stressed the types of investments that come with technology transfers and human resource development.
"As you are all aware that we don't have either technical capacity or large capital that can help ourselves," Gusmao said. "We in East Timor are open for foreign investments and we invite investors that want to transfer to East Timor either technology or capital to help us to be able to walk on our own feet in a very short time."
"We have the best coffee in the world, but we have to start from zero," added Ramos-Horta. He cited Singapore as a development model for East Timor, complimenting its efficiency and accountability of Singapore's private sector.
For now, East Timor is busy worrying about its basic needs. "Everything is a priority in East Timor," he said to the press. "We need qualified human resources, support in agriculture, and we need to start work on education and out a health system in place."
In their meeting, Chuan suggested that the East Timorese, where farmers make up majority of the population, should try to develop farming practice to increase farm products so that they can rely on themselves in the future.
The Thai government has offered agricultural assistance to East Timor by providing agriculture training under the framework of the King's sustainable economy theory. About 20 tonnes of rice worth 700,000 baht (around $18,716) were donated to East Timor as a part of Thai aid.
After meeting with Gusmao and Ramos-Horta, former Thai premier Anand Panyarachun said both confirmed that self-reliance is the type of economic development their country would work on.
If East Timor has been discussing economic assistance and investments with its Asian neighbors, the other outstanding issue is its membership in the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN), the region's key diplomatic club.
Ramos-Horta said East Timor wishes to actively participate in the ASEAN discussion and problem-solving process. He said that he did not want East Timor to be problematic to the region, but to be involved in regional development.
Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan said as a response to Ramos-Horta's statement that he would consult with other ASEAN members about the status of East Timor's participation in ASEAN's annual ministerial meeting in July. "If the Thai authorities invite us to attend in whatever capacity, we will be most happy to attend," said Ramos-Horta.
Thailand and the Philippines' warm reception of East Timor's leaders reflect those countries' more forthcoming support for the territory -- in contrast with other ASEAN members -- especially when armed militias were rampaging through it several months ago.
The subject of Indonesia's human rights violations in East Timor had for decades been a sensitive subject for ASEAN, and members' ties with Indonesia often meant they hardly paid attention to atrocities in East Timor since Jakarta's occupation in 1975.
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Indonesia's Wahid Close To Confronting Wiranto
By Nayan Chanda, John McBeth and Dan Murphy
28/01/00 Far Eastern Economic Review
JAKARTA -- Three months into his still-shaky presidency, Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid is close to confronting his nemesis, Coordinating Minister for Defense and Security Gen.Wiranto. It's a risky gamble that aides appear to be counting on to establish the president's authority, break open the logjam blocking necessary reforms, and allow him to concentrate on solving religious and ethnic strife across the country.
In an exclusive interview, Wahid told the REVIEW that if Gen. Wiranto is implicated by Indonesia's National Commission on Human Rights, which is investigating abuses against civilians in East Timor, the general will be asked to resign.
"I will call him and say I heard about this report and the conclusions that you are implicated," he said. "Because of this, it is better to save the institution, the Indonesian Armed Forces, so then you have to resign ... If he refuses, then he will go to the court."
Commission member H.S. Dillon says that when the report is released in the next few days, it will implicate Wiranto, among other generals, in the scorched-earth rampage that followed East Timor's vote for independence last Aug. 30.
"The documents we have demonstrate the army was aware of what was going to happen," he says. "We have created the momentum with our investigation and there is nothing we can backtrack from. For us, it's truth, justice and reconciliation. Someone has to be held accountable."
That's not just a political demand. Lack of accountability is the fundamental flaw in the economy and is at the heart of the new agreement Wahid signed with the International Monetary Fund in mid-January. Addressing it will be crucial in convincing decision-makers at foreign companies to invest in the country. Without investments from abroad, the Wahid administration can't hope to restructure corporate Indonesia's $70 billion foreign debt and sell assets controlled by the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency, or Ibra.
The impression that Wahid doesn't have a firm handle on his government is standing in the way of billions of dollars in potential foreign investment. The removal of Wiranto could help correct this, particularly if, as expected, it convinces some of his political opponents to back off. The key test is over Indonesia's largest car maker, Astra International (P.ASI). The sale of Ibra's 40% stake in Astra to investors such as Newbridge Capital and Gilbert Global Equity Partners of the United States has been blocked by company leaders with military connections. Pushing the sale through will be a key test for Ibra and Wahid.
It could also help improve Indonesia's investment climate, which was tarnished by Standard Chartered PLC's (U.STA) aborted effort to buy the scandal-ridden Bank Bali in December, viewed by potential investors as an example of how entrenched interests continue to undercut deals. In another instance, the Wahid administration showed its apparent impotence by failing to react when the local government of Sulawesi ignored an appeal by the minister of mining and threatened to close a $200 million gold mine operated by Newmont Mining Corp. (NEM) of the U.S.
Observers believe the investment climate could improve with the emergence of a take-charge president. But commitments made in the new IMF agreement, which paves the way for $5 billion in IMF aid over the next three years, are identical to the commitments made, but never fully carried out, by former Presidents Suharto and Habibie. Will Wahid demonstrate the political will his predecessors lacked?
"On economic policy, the new government didn't have any choices," says Sri Mulyani Indrawati, who heads Wahid's council of economic advisers. "The challenge is taking action - real, tangible action."
But Wahid's showdown with the military has been getting in the way. In the three months since he took office, Wahid has been engaged in what his aides call "psychological war" with the military, whittling away at the generals' grip on the levers of power. Mostly, the battle has been about separating the palace staff from the five other departments that make up the State Secretariat, the 3,000-strong body that handles the executive's administrative chores.
The most important accomplishment may have been the Dec.1 edict depriving the president's four adjutants of the right to monitor Wahid's visitors and outgoing correspondence. The number of senior military officers in the president's office has been pared down to 15 from 35, with three generals among the 20 officers who got their marching orders. Yet staffers say the pressure from the military, though more subtle, is still there.
Asked to assess the president's performance, a tribal independence leader from Irian Jaya, a leading ethnic-Chinese businessman and a Muslim member of Wahid's circle of economic advisers had the same answer: They can't get him to spare the time to hear their concerns. "Gus Dur (Wahid's nickname) is so concerned about his political survival that it's taking up all of his energy and drawing attention away from economic policy," the economic adviser complains.
Wahid's allies appeal for time after 30 years of corrupt and authoritarian rule. "It's like a dinner. You have to wash the dishes before you can cook the meal," Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab, a presidential confidant, told a delegation of U.S. congressional aides Jan. 18.
After Gen. Wiranto is dealt with, a bigger cleanup could be in the offing. Wahid looks set to dump a number of ministers, foisted on him as the price of the support that brought him the presidency, exchanging them for a more traditional cabinet of loyalists.
The reason is clear. Cabinet ministers have fought pitched battles over key appointments. One glaring example: the continuing struggle for control of the state banking system between Finance Minister Bambang Sudibyo, who is close to Muslim politicians, and State Enterprises Minister Laksamana Sukardi, an adviser to Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri. At the moment, there is much confusion over which minister Wahid favors.
Wahid's dismissal of Gen. Wiranto would at least symbolize the political end of Suharto's New Order regime - something that wasn't accomplished when the longtime leader was brought down in May 1998 after three decades in power. In a Jan. 14 warning that shocked the military and illustrated what is at stake, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke declared Washington's sympathy for Indonesia's reform efforts, "because what we are watching is a great drama, a struggle between the forces of democracy and reform and the forces of backward-looking corruption and militarism."
With Muslim interests tugging on one flank and the military on the other, Wahid has come to seem indispensable in international eyes. When the World Bank, the U.S., Japan and other major donors meet in early February to coordinate aid to Indonesia, diplomats say it's almost certain they will pledge the $4.5 billion Jakarta is counting on to fill its Year 2000 budget deficit. An IMF official says $2 billion more of existing debt is likely to be rescheduled this year. The president's new agreement with the IMF was seen as a victory, as was a positive market reaction to his austere and realistic budget.
Meanwhile, the country's economically vital, predominantly Christian ethnic-Chinese business community, historically a target of mob violence in Indonesia, is also rallying around the president. The Chinese are alarmed by the high-stakes romance between legislative assembly chairman Amien Rais and a politically active Muslim coalition aligned against Wahid, while they see Megawati as a lightning rod for Muslim concerns. Wahid is seen as the only hope of striking a peaceful balance.
"If Wahid doesn't hang on, I'll be on the first plane out of the country," says a prominent ethnic-Chinese businessman who has begun to move some of his family's assets back onshore following anti-Chinese riots two years ago.
Meanwhile, a belief has grown among officials and observers that much of the violence in the country - from North Maluku, Ambon and Lombok in the east to tiny Bintan Island and Aceh in the west - is either partly or wholly due to manipulation and incitement by elements of the Suharto-era military machine, loosely linked Islamic militants and vested business interests, all aimed at sowing doubts about Wahid's ability to rule. The military has strongly denied the allegations. Privately, palace officials say an end to the separatist bloodshed in Aceh and the Muslim-Christian violence in the eastern Moluccan islands -the two thorniest tasks facing the new government - is vital to Indonesia's economic recovery.
"You can't do much about the economy until the problem with the military is solved," says a senior Western diplomat. But the removal of Gen. Wiranto carries the risk of a backlash from an entrenched military worried about losing its place in the sun. That's why Wahid says he can only move gradually. But in doing so, he has suffered the embarrassment of seeing the military take weeks to follow his orders to sack spokesman Maj.-Gen. Sudradjat, a Wiranto ally who, among other things, openly challenged the president's right to intervene in military affairs.
President Wahid's strategy of chipping away at Gen. Wiranto's position has been backed by an impressive array of foreign friends, from United Nations Secretary-general Kofi Annan and President Bill Clinton to the European Union and international financial institutions. "He's lost momentum," says a retired economics minister. "But he does hold some aces - legitimacy and international support."
There is also acute awareness that too much foreign interference could be used to stoke ever-present nationalism. Ambassador Holbrooke told the REVIEW his warning to the military that its efforts to obstruct the domestic investigation into the army's role in the East Timor violence would take international pressure to a "higher point" was first cleared with Indonesian officials.
"Holbrooke is trying to help Gus Dur to cut the army down to size," says a senior Asean diplomat who watches Indonesia. Still, while there is little chance of a coup, he and other analysts warn that Wahid should be careful not to push the army. "The president still needs them," the Asean diplomat says. "The army is a major political force no matter how discredited it may now be in Indonesia."
That's a view shared even by Indonesia's Muslims. Says Nasir Tamara, spokesman of the United Development Party: "If the armed forces doesn't function, then we'll have a mafia running the country."
Western military analysts say that in removing Gen. Wiranto, Wahid may also need to weed out at least three of Wiranto's allies. But they believe a backlash can be avoided. "A vast majority of the officers are careerists, interested only in pay and promotion," says a Western officer with long experience in Indonesia. "Most would change their beliefs in order to achieve these sort of things."
That could prove decisive - if Wahid chooses to act. While Wahid's Islamic opponents are small in number and the president enjoys the support of the country's influential newspapers, his frail health and hands-off style of governance have led many people to see him as another transitional leader. For all its risks, decisive action now would help dispel that notion and make Wahid someone to be reckoned with.
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Coroner: Indonesian Military Shot Dutch Journalist In East Timor
28/01/00 Associated Press
DARWIN, Australia - A coroner concluded Thursday that a Dutch journalist who was killed in East Timor last year was probably shot by Indonesian soldiers. But an inquest into the death of Sander Thoenes, who was killed the day after the first soldiers of a foreign peacekeeping force arrived to restore order, was hampered by a lack of witnesses from the Indonesian military, coroner Greg Cavanagh said.
Sander Thoenes, who worked for the Christian Science Monitor and Financial Times newspapers, was killed on Sept. 21. His mutilated body was found the following day in a suburb of East Timor's capital, Dili.
Cavanagh, a magistrate sitting as coroner in Australia's Northern Territory, examined what evidence could be gathered on the killing and released his report Thursday. "I find that on all of the evidence available thus far, it is probable that a member or members of the 745 battalion of the TNI (Indonesian military) shot the deceased," Cavanagh said. "However, in the absence of full witness availability and without an examination and cross examination of those witnesses from that battalion, I am unable to completely discount the possibility that the assailant or assailants were not TNI members but a person or persons dressed in the uniform of the TNI," he said.
The U.N. civilian police force in East Timor said its investigation of Thoenes' killing had focussed on Battalion 745, but that Indonesian authorities hadn't cooperated fully. Thones was killed at a road block in the Dili suburb of Becora. An American and British journalist were also attacked in the same area the day.
Foreign peacekeepers entered East Timor to end a rampage by Indonesian military-backed militias which was triggered by an Aug. 30 referendum in which East Timorese voted overwhelmingly for independence from Indonesia, which had annexed the territory after a bloody 1975 invasion.
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Timor Rights Investigators Implicate Wiranto In Report
28/01/00 Associated Press
JAKARTA - Former military chief and now powerful Cabinet minister, Gen. Wiranto, has been implicated in a wave killings and destruction that gripped East Timor last year, a member of an Indonesian investigation said Thursday. Asmara Nababan, of the National Commission on Human Rights in East Timor, said the findings of its three-month inquiry would be presented to Indonesia's attorney-general on Monday.
"The report implicates Wiranto and other generals in the violence," said Nababan. "In all, about 200 people have been implicated. The government has told us it will prosecute everyone we implicate within three months of us handing over our report," he said. Nababan refused to outline Wiranto's alleged involvement.
In the past, the state-appointed panel said it had evidence that the generals knew of the violence and should be taken to court for failing to stop it. Wiranto, who is now political affairs and security minister, has always maintained his innocence and has engaged defense lawyers.
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New Information Reveals Moves Behind Timor Vote
28/01/00 ABC, PM News
COMPERE: It's a year today since Indonesia revealed it would consider granting Independence to East Timor, the territory it had invaded a quarter of a century before. It was a shock plan which led to the historic Referendum in East Timor but, as we now know, it was a plan that also unleashed a terrible wave of violence. The prospect of independence and what would follow was also to shape a new and delicate era in relations between Australia and Indonesia.
From Jakarta our correspondent Mark Bowling reports.
MARK BOWLING: It was Indonesia's then Foreign Minister Ali Alatas who emerged from a cabinet meeting inside the Presidential Palace with a surprising new proposal.
ALI ALATAS (TRANSLATED): "The prospect of granting Independence to East Timor is not the policy of the Indonesian Government, he said. But it is the last alternative if the people of the territory continue to reject Jakarta's offer of special autonomy."
MARK BOWLING: After years of saying that East Timor must remain part of Indonesia, the government in Jakarta was for the first time conceding independence could be granted, even though Cabinet Ministers believed the East Timorese would not accept such an alternative.
In the weeks that followed the Indonesian Government went on to offer the people of East Timora Referendum to decide for themselves if they wanted to accept a deal to remain part of Indonesia, but with greater autonomy, or to opt for full independence. Indonesia's then Information Minister Yunis Yosfir [phonetic] said East Timor's future would be decided democratically.
YUNIS YOSFIR (TRANSLATED): "If Indonesia's autonomy proposal is not accepted by the mass in East Timor" he says "we will suggest to the Indonesian Parliament, after fresh elections in June, that it release East Timor from Indonesia."
MARK BOWLING: It's now clear that Australia had played a key role in Indonesia's new East Timor policy. Weeks before the proposal was revealed, Prime Minister John Howard had sent a letter to President Habibie outlining Canberra's continuing recognition of Indonesia's sovereignty over East Timor. But also there was an Australian shift in position, that it now supported self determination for the people of East Timor.
In the mind of Indonesia's President, that was a significant shift. The loss of a long time supporter of Indonesia's East Timor policy, which left Indonesia with very little international support for an East Timor infamous for its tough military rule and human rights atrocities.
On the same day a year ago, the Indonesian Government said it would move East Timor's guerilla Leader, Xanana Gusmao, from gaol to house arrest. This was greeted as a victory by pro-independence forces, that Indonesia simply could not sustain its military grip on East Timor. Within weeks that transfer was made, and East Timor was on a rocky path towards an independence ballot.
But there's now overwhelming evidence that elements within the Indonesian military were already training, and possibly equipping, pro-Jakarta militias for a violent showdown if the East Timor vote went in favour of independence.
An Indonesian inquiry, ordered by a new President and with a new Military Command in place, is expected to report next week on the extent to which the armed forces were involved in the killings and violence which followed East Timor's Referendum, and significantly to what extent key military leaders like former Armed Forces Commander General Wiranto were actively involved and responsible for the rampage.
COMPERE: Mark Bowling.
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The Investigative Commission on Human Rights Violation Says 200 People, Including Scores of High-Ranking Military Officials, Involved in the East Timor Atrocities
28/01/00 Indonesian Observer
JAKARTA — The Investigative Commission on Human Rights Violation [KPP HAM] yesterday said about 200 people, including scores of high-ranking military officials, were involved in the East Timor atrocities. The Commission will soon issue its recommendation based on the results of the inquiry.
"The recommendation does not name just twenty violators, but about 200 from all sides&ldots;[pro-Indonesia] militias, police, pro-independence [forces]," KPP HAM Secretary, Asmara Nababan, told reporters. Prior to and after the August 30, UN-led ballot held to decide the future of East Timor, the now independent territory witnessed massive killing and burning spree allegedly conducted by military-backed militias.
When asked whether the recommendation also names Indonesian military officers, Nababan said: "Yes, those who have often been mentioned by newspapers." "I think those who have been summoned by KPP HAM are included in the recommendation. However, let’s wait until the plenary meeting," he added.
KPP HAM is scheduled to hold the meeting on January 27-29 to deliberate the recommendations. "The meeting will be held in an ‘unknown’ place so that the KPP HAM will not be disturbed by anybody," Nababan said.
The once all-powerful military has launched an intensive psy-war against the commission, which has implicated scores of generals over the atrocities. They are Gen. Wiranto, former military commander who is now coordinating minister for political and security affairs, Maj.-Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, Maj.-Gen. Adam Damiri, Maj.-Gen. Zacky Anwar Makarim, Brig.-Gen. Tono Suratman and Brig.-Gen. (police) Timbul Silaen.
On Monday Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab expressed his confidence that Indonesia will secure a veto on a proposed international war crimes tribunal for the Timor atrocities. The United States last week also gave Jakarta more time for its own human rights inquiry. President Abdurrahman Wahid told the Far Eastern Economic Review he will take even stronger measures should the KPP HAM investigation implicate the military officials.
If the investigation finds evidence of military complicity in the East Timor abuses, the individual officers named will have to be assigned an interim nonactive status, the president said in an interview to be published in the magazine’s latest issue to be released today.
"And when he or she is proven by the court to be guilty, then they should resign and become a civilian," he added.
END
Timor's Losers Gather to Decide Whether to Go Home or Not
28/01/00 AFP
KUPANG, West Timor - The real losers in East Timor's tumultuous transition to independence from Indonesia, the pro-Jakarta militias and their supporters, met at a rundown hotel here Wednesday to decide what to do now.
"The main decision they face," said Basilio Araujo at the launch of the three-day meeting in the Wisma Timau, "is whether to try to stay in Indonesia, try to win an agreement to go back as Indonesian citizens, or return home as East Timorese."
The some 200 delegates to the congress in Indonesian-controlled West Timor, are from four groups -- The Allianca (Aliense in Indonesian) which groups former top Indonesian party officials, the FPDK (Front for Justice and Democracy) an umbrella pro-Indonesia group, the BRTT (East Timorese People's Front) and its militia wing, the PPI (Pro-Integration Fighters). They hope to make a joint decision on which way to go during the three-day meeting to end on Saturday.
But Araujo, and some Allianca members speaking on condition of anonymity, told an AFP reporter that the decision would not be easy, or unanimous. The local West Timorese population is resentful of the some 110,000 East Timorese here, and weary of the gun-toting militia. Some former civil servants are getting their Indonesian pensions here, and others have got their kids into school.
But there are no jobs, even for West Timorese. On the East Timor side of the border, the militia -- whose wave of terror after the August 30 independence vote devastated the territory-- are afraid of a hostile reception at best and counter-terror at worst if they return.
The compromise option of negotiating a return with some kind of special status and Indonesian passports, is not expected to find sympathy with the UN transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), or the Indonesian government.
UNTAET chief Sergio de Mello has suggested that leaders of the groups make reconnaisance trips to East Timor -- so that they can separate fact from rumor -- and return to consult with their people in the camps. He has also suggested that UNTAET could try to negotiate the opening of an office in Kupang, to help those who want to go back, or communicate with those who are there.
Another topic at the Wisma Timau meeting will be whether the group should send a representative to take up the SPDK's vacant seat on the National Consulative Council -- a quasi-parliament in the East Timor capital of Dili with whom de Mello consults on all decisions by the UNTAET. They have not taken up the seat so far because on September 5, the day after the results of the UN-conducted vote in East Timor were announced, the SPDK announced that it rejected the almost 4-1 pro-independence vote.
Foreign sources here connected with international aid agencies said that over the four months since hundreds of thousands of East Timorese fled or were pushed across the border into camps mainly controlled by the militia, the Indonesian military appear to have been withdrawing their support for the East Timorese militia they once controlled and paid.
The West Timor Administration announced earlier in the month that Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid would attend the opening ceremony. But the highest Indonesian official present at the ceremony, chaired by Armindo Soares Mariano and marked with the tearful singing of East Timorese songs, was West Timor governor Piet Tallo.
END
UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION IN EAST TIMOR (UNTAET): Briefing 26 Jan 2000
SVM: Transitional Administrator in Jakarta
SRSG, Sergio Vieira de Mello met yesterday with Indonesia Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab, in Jakarta, where he arrived after visiting West Timor on Monday and Tuesday.
Today SRSG met other Foreign Ministry officials, the speaker of the Parliament, Mr. Akbar Tanjung, the Head of the Foreign Affairs Commission and other senior members of Parliament. Sergio Vieira de Mello made an open invitation to those officials to visit East Timor. He also called on them to support the process of normalization between East Timor and Indonesia. Tomorrow the Transitional Administrator is going to Geneva on his way to New York.
Oecussi
Two Australian forensic experts from the New South Wales Institute of Forensic Medicine went to the Passabe border area in Oecussi (the enclave in West Timor) yesterday afternoon (25 January). CIVPOL and INTERFET investigators, representatives of Human Rights NGO s also went to Passabe where an exhumation is expected to begin in one or two days.
Between 50 and 60 bodies are believed to be buried in Passabe. These people were killed in September 9. There are not details about how they died. But this case may be the most massive killing in the September's violence.
The work is particularly difficult because of the rainy season. Exhumations are not advised during this period. If it begins to rain during an excavation, the grave may be filled up with water and instead of gaining evidence; there is the risk of losing evidence.
Indonesian Human Rights Commission
Two members of the KPP Ham - The Indonesian Commission on inquiry into Human Rights violations in East Timor - left Dili this afternoon. The purpose of their visit was to check some of the information that they gathered in their two previous trips to East Timor.
This morning they met with Bishop Belo. During their two-day visit they also spoke with INTERFET Commander, General Cosgrove, and with witnesses of alleged cases of human rights violations.
The KPP Ham was established on September to gather information on abuses that occurred in East Timor from January to October 1999 and, if warranted, to use that information as the basis for filing indictments with a Human Rights Tribunal that would be set up in Indonesia. The KPP Ham has to give its report to Kommas HAM - the Indonesian National Human Rights Commission - by the end of this month.
In responding to a question, the Spokesman clarified that the Indonesian Human Rights Commission investigation is completely separate from the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in East Timor.
Border Control Unit
The New Timorese Border Control Service, which will include immigration and customs service, will be inaugurated on Friday in a ceremony to be held at Comoro airport in Dili. The first five international customs experts arrived yesterday from New Zealand to Dili to serve on the new service and to train future Timorese customs and immigration officers.
The Border Control Service will take over the customs and immigration checks of the airport from UNTAET CIVPOL on Saturday and the Dili Port a week later, on 5th of January. It is expected that by the end of the next month Border Control Service will establish two control points at the border between East and West Timor and one point at the border of Oecussi enclave.
There are currently 14 Timorese officers recruited by the Border Control Service and it is expected that more than a hundred of them will be employed by the end of next month. There are currently 115 applications lodged with UNTAET by Timorese who were formerly employed as immigration and customs officers during the Indonesian rule.
United States, Australia and Portugal also pledged to send experts for the Border Control Service Refugees The total number of voluntary returns to East Timor to date is 132.414
On Monday and Tuesday nights the first overland return convoys with refugees from Oecussi arrived in Dili. 240 East Timorese returned back to Dili by land in two convoys organized by UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees - and IOM - International Organization for Migration .
UNHCR also informed that the mass information campaign in the refugee camps in West Timor continues. Last week, as part as the campaign, foreign journalists and film crews visited various returnee areas. The footage of Manatuto, Baucau, Viqueque and Aileu will be shown to refugees in West Timor camps. UNHCR said that the campaign has had an impressive effect in West Timor. For instance, in some cases, friends and relatives rumoured to have been killed during the conflict have been found alive and well.
END
Indonesia’s Draft Law on Human Rights Court Will Protect Generals From Justice
Tapol, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign
24 January 2000
A draft law shortly to be submitted to Indonesia’s parliament on the creation of a human rights court has been deliberately framed so as to protect Indonesian generals from being brought to justice for the horrific crimes against humanity committed during the last few months of Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor.
The draft has abandoned the principle of retroactivity, and therefore rules out the prospect of any grave human rights violations committed prior to the creation of the court from being tried in a court of law. Instead, according to the draft law, such cases will be taken to a truth and reconciliation commission.
Carmel Budiardjo, director of TAPOL said: ‘This will render totally useless all the investigations carried out for the past four months by Indonesia’s Commission of Investigation into Human Rights Violations, KPP HAM, which has closely investigated the linkage between top-level officers in the Indonesian army and the militias who wrought such havoc on East Timor before and after the ballot on 30 August.’
The recent revelations about the contents of the draft law fully confirm the analysis contained in a Memorandum published today in which TAPOL analyses the problems confronting the investigation and trial of persons suspected of having committed crimes against humanity in East Timor during the period before and after the ballot in that country on 30 August which resulted in an overwhelming victory for East Timor’s independence.
The Memorandum summarises the investigations undertaken by Indonesia’s own commission of inquiry, the KPP HAM. While stating a preference for these trials to be held in Indonesia, it describes the difficulties that make it almost impossible for this to happen because there is no special human rights court and Indonesian law does not incorporate crimes against humanity and war crimes into its legal code, under which suspects would have to be tried.
The Memo also argues that the international community will be unable to accept trials held in Indonesia if suspects are tried by national courts under any of the following conditions:
The suspects are tried for ordinary crimes, not for crimes against humanity as defined under international humanitarian law.
The courts do not meet the criteria of independence and impartiality and are convened primarily to protect the suspects against being indicted before an international tribunal.
The courts pass sentences deemed inappropriate to the gravity of the crime.
Persons tried under such conditions would not enjoy the protection of the principle of double jeopardy and could therefore still be indicted by an international tribunal.
It also argues that the Indonesian Government proposal to try suspects from the armed forces in so- called koneksitas courts before a mixed panel of civilian and military judges is a sop to the army by using courts that fail the test of independence and impartiality. In the absence of appropriate courts and the inclusion of international humanitarian law into Indonesia’s legal code, it must allow the trials to be held before an international tribunal.
TAPOL states categorically: The new government must show the necessary commitment and political will to end the cycle of impunity. Only by so doing will it ensure the supremacy of civilian government over the militarism that has held Indonesia in its grip since Suharto seized power in 1965.
In conclusion, TAPOL puts forward the following demands:
The government of President Abdurrahman Wahid should reconsider the draft law on a human rights court and make it retroactive for at least fifteen years.
In the absence of any sign that the Indonesian government is willing to create a national human rights court with the necessary powers to try recent grave violations in East Timor and elsewhere, governments throughout the world, especially the member states of the UN Security Council, should support the establishment of an international tribunal to try all those suspected of being perpetrators of crimes against humanity in East Timor.
Governments should use their influence with the Indonesian Government to persuade it to accept the creation of an international tribunal.
The international community should press for this international tribunal to be set up, with or without the consent of the Indonesian government.
Human rights groups and East Timor solidarity groups in Indonesia and around the world should join in a campaign to persuade their governments to support the establishment of this international tribunal.
Everything should be done to remind the international community and the Indonesian people of the horrific practices visited on the people of East Timor throughout the illegal Indonesian occupation and in particular during the months before and after the ballot on 30 August 1999.
The international community should continue to impose sanctions against the TNI in the form of an embargo on arms sales and ties with the Indonesian military until it fully collaborates with actions to properly investigate and bring to trial all those, at whatever level, responsible for crimes against humanity in East Timor.
A copy of the eight-page memorandum entitled: ENDING THE CYCLE OF IMPUNITY: CAN THE EAST TIMOR INVESTIGATIONS PAVE THE WAY? is available online or in a paper copy on request.
Tapol, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign, 111 Northwood Road, Thornton Heath, Surrey CR7 8HW, UK. Tel:0181 771 2904 Fax:0181 653 0322. tapol@gn.apc.org - website www.gn.apc.org/tapol
END
UN Police Expect to Find 60 Bodies in Timor Grave
27/01/00 Reuters
DILI — Police in East Timor expect to find up to 60 bodies when they start investigating a grave site in an isolated enclave this week in what could be the biggest mass grave found in the territory so far.
United Nations and military police will travel to Oecussi, which is surrounded by Indonesian West Timor, by air and sea over the next two days for the operation which will take several weeks.
"This investigation is important for a number of reasons because it may have been the single largest massacre in the post-September and referendum violence...and it may be a case where you can demonstrate involvement of the police and army," said UN human rights chief in East Timor Sidney Jones.
More than 230 bodies have been recovered across the territory following a campaign of murder, arson and destruction by pro-Jakarta militias backed by the Indonesian military following East Timor’s August 30 vote to break from Indonesian rule.
The site, measuring 600 square metres, is located at Passabe in the far south of the enclave where anti-independence militia have launched five incursions in the past week. A senior police investigator with the Interfet multinational force in the territory said the security of the site was a major concern amid the increased militia activity and because it was visible from the Passabe border crossing point.
"Security has been stepped up because of the militia and we’ll have patrols going through the area the whole time," said investigator Shayne Towers-Hammond. He said the investigation would also be fraught with logistical difficulties as the site could not be accessed by vehicle. "It will take probably 24 to 48 hours to set the site up because there is absolutely nothing in the area. All the equipment will be brought across on a barge or swung on Black Hawk (helicopters) and lowered into place."
Jones said the victims were believed to be those of a militia attack on September 8 when people from two villages in Passabe were forced into West Timor, ordered back across the border into the enclave and massacred in the early hours of September 9.
"It seems to be fairly well substantiated by witness testimonies that there were between 50 and 60 bodies buried," Jones said. She said it was unclear whether the Sakunar militia — the group responsible for the recent border attacks — had been involved.
END
Pressure for International Tribunal Grows
27/01/00 IPS
By Sonny Inbaraj
DARWIN, Australia - While Indonesia wants the United Nations and the United States to give it a chance to complete its own inquiry into the atrocities in East Timor, a British human rights group warns that Jakarta could protect its own army generals from being brought to justice for crimes against humanity.
On Wednesday, the rights group launched a worldwide campaign for the creation of an international tribunal on East Timor, in accordance with the powers of the newly established International Criminal Court.
''A draft law shortly to be submitted to Indonesia's parliament on the creation of a human rights court has been deliberately framed so as to protect Indonesian generals from being brought to justice for the horrific crimes against humanity committed during the last few months of Indonesia's occupation of East Timor,'' Tapol said in a statement.
Indonesian military-supported militias terrorised East Timor after the Aug 30, UN-supported independence referendum, killing an untold number and sending hundreds of thousands of people to neighbouring West Timor. Militia members continue to intimidate the refugees, using scare tactics to prevent them from returning to East Timor, UN officials say.
In mid-September, then Indonesian President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie hastily proclaimed a presidential decree for the creation of a human rights court to pre-empt any move by the UN to set up an international tribunal.
The decree also mandated Indonesia's National Commission on Human Rights to set up the Commission to Investigate Human Rights Violations in East Timor (KPP-HAM). Two teams have visited East Timor and West Timor, collecting evidence to try six Indonesian army generals and other military and police personnel in connection with the systematic campaign of destruction and violence in East Timor.
But Tapol argues that the work of KPP-HAM, over the past four months, could be ''swept under the carpet'' if the new Wahid government enacts fresh legislation, expected to be soon, in parliament for the creation of a human rights court, thus rejecting Habibie's decree.
''The (Wahid) government's draft law for the creation of a human rights court is drafted in such a way as to make it impossible for all grave human rights violations committed in East Timor to be taken to such a court because it will not be retroactive,'' said Tapol's director Carmel Budiardjo.
In contention is Article 32 of the draft law which stipulates that ''cases of grave human rights violations that were created prior to the creation of the Human Rights Court shall be handled by a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).''
''Nothing is yet known about the terms of reference of the TRC, as intended by the government, but for those seeking accountability and justice, a truth commission cannot be accepted as an alternative to a properly constituted court of law,'' said Budiardjo.
''What will happen with cases where the TRC is dissatisfied with the explanations it hears from a human rights violator?'' asked Budiardjo.
The legal dilemma, explained the Tapol director, is that while the TRC has retroactive powers the human rights court, on the other hand, does not.
''The TRC will not be able to pass cases on to the human rights court because the latter will lack retroactive powers. This will mean the TRC will lack teeth; whatever people say there, they will be safe in the knowledge that they cannot be referred to a court for trial,'' explained Budiardjo.
''All the commitment and hard work of the KPP-HAM will be swept under the carpet if those suspected of crimes against humanity in East Timor are not brought before the appropriate court with adequate powers to pass verdicts,'' she added.
Because of this, Tapol launched an international campaign on Wednesday to press for an international tribunal on East Timor, in accordance with the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, to try suspected perpetrators.
''In the absence of any sign that the Indonesian government is willing to create a national human rights court with the necessary powers to try recent grave violations in East Timor and elsewhere, the international community should press for this international tribunal to be set up -- with or without the consent of the Indonesian government,'' she argued.
On Jan 19, Indonesian Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab met UN secretary-general Kofi Annan and explained Indonesia's opposition to an international tribunal on East Timor. He told Annan that the KPP-HAM must be given the authority with no interference from any institutions, ''including the UN'', to handle the question of accountability for the crimes committed in East Timor. At the United Nations, Shihab also met with several members of the Security Council and UN representatives of some 20 members, including China, Russia, Portugal, Middle East and Asian countries.
According to Indonesia's official news agency Antara, Shihab, however, admitted he could not be ''a hundred percent optimistic'' that Annan will back Indonesia up on the question of the international tribunal. ''Annan is likely not to have the authority to decide the issue by himself. However I believe Annan will consider my clarification as well as the opinion of some 20 UN's representative members,'' he said.
Later that day in a speech at Washington's School of Advanced International Studies -- after meeting US State Secretary Madeleine Albright -- Shihab said his government wanted the KPP-HAM to take the lead in dealing with abuses in East Timor.
Shihab said: ''An international tribunal could be counterproductive because then it would trigger xenophobia or an excessive spirit of nationalism that could only allow those who violated human rights to wrap their bodies in flags.''
But a US State Department official says the United States wants to see accountability. He added: ''We do not endorse a particular mechanism for accountability but continue to support a mechanism that is thorough, credible and transparent.''
In a report made public in New York in December, following their visit to East Timor, three UN special rapporteurs urged the Security Council to consider the setting up of an international criminal court for the territory. "This should preferably be done with the consent of the government (Indonesia), but such consent should not be a prerequisite. Such a tribunal should have jurisdiction over all crimes under international law committed by any party in the territory since the departure of the colonial power (Portugal in 1975, when the Indonesian armed forces invaded East Timor),'' said the report.
END
Soeharto Forces ‘Building Timor-style Militias’ in West Papua
21/01/2000 Sydney Morning Herald
By ANDREW KILVERT
Military authorities and political enforcers associated with the former Soeharto regime appear to be building up East Timor-style militias in the contested province of West Papua, human rights activists warned yesterday.
The claim follows clashes in the north coast town of Serui on Wednesday when pro-Jakarta elements clashed with pro-independence supporters. An Australian-based West Papuan academic, Mr John Ondowame, has accused former Soeharto-regime activist Mr Yurris Raweyai of engineering the formation of pro-Jakarta militias in West Papua - as Irian Jaya has been renamed since a visit by President Abdurrahman Wahid over the New Year.
Mr Yurris, an indigenous Papuan, is infamous in Indonesian politics for his prominent role in the ousting of Ms Megawati Sukarnoputri, now Indonesia’s vice-president, as the head of the Indonesian Democracy party in 1996.
Yurris is forming militias," Mr Ondawame said. "It is very dangerous, the Yurris rallies are protected by TNI [the Indonesian armed forces] but at the independence rallies the people are shot."
In the provincial capital Jayapura, Mr Yurris has organised the formation of the "West Papuan Army" in coalition with the moderate pro-independence leader Theys Eluay.
He is believed to have brought in many members of the Pemuda Pancasila movement - a youth group ostensibly formed to promote the state ideology Pancasila under the Soeharto government - which was often employed as to break up and intimidate opposition activity.
Pemuda Pancasila members were also prominent in the militias in East Timor, which slaughtered hundreds of people and deported nearly half the population after the territory’s pro-independence vote on August 30 last year.
Mr Eluay’s motives in associating himself with Mr Yurris are not clear, but some local activists suspect it is a tactical move to gain access to Mr Yurris’ funds, which come from the Indonesian military and TNI-associated business interests.
Mr John Rumbiak from the West Papua human rights organisation ELSHAM said: "He just wants the money from the military and their businesses. It is very complex but Theys is still supporting independence."
Since Mr Soeharto’s resignation in May 1998, West Papua has seen a growing popular movement for independence, expressed in ceremonial raising of the nationalist flag and other protests in many of its widely-scattered towns.
Mr Eluay himself is one of a number of independence activists charged with sedition for raising the rebel flag, and his trial is due to start on February 2. The trial of two others, Don Flassy and Samuel Yaru, began on Tuesday, with the charges carrying a maximum 15 years’ jail.
On Tuesday, about 100 people closed the airport at Sentani, just outside Jayapura, by sitting on the runway, in a protest demanding proper compensation for land seized for the airport 30 years ago, the Indonesian Observer newspaper reported.
Meanwhile the international community is starting to review the much criticised "act of free choice" in 1969, whereby 1,025 representatives selected by Indonesia voted for the former Dutch colony to become part of Indonesia.
The Netherlands Parliament is conducting an inquiry into the 1969 consultation. Some of the surviving representatives argued that they voted under duress and that the results did not reflect popular sentiment. The vote has never been ratified by the United Nations.
END
Lombok Violence Spurred on by Suharto’s Supporters: Wahid
21/01/2000 Australian Broadcasting Commission
The Indonesian Government has experessed fears that provocateurs with links to the country’s military and past regime of former President Suharto are behind sectarian violence in the country’s eastern islands. Christians continue to flee the tourist island of Lombok after days of religious rioting.
Hundreds of police and soldiers have re-established control of the streets in Lombok’s capital Mataram, but ethnic Chinese residents, many who are are Christians, continue to flee. Religious violence on Lombok and on the eastern Maluku Islands, including Ambon, is viewed by the new government of Abdurrahman Wahid as being manufactured.
They claims it is the work of provocateurs closely aligned to rogue elements in the military and the supporters of former President Suharto. But Indonesia’s leading military officials have met President Wahid to assure him they have no intention of staging a coup.
END
Brereton on Defence Intelligence Leaks and Australian Lies
Laurie Brereton MP, Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs ~ 25/11/99
"Foreign Minister Downer’s East Timor statements have been characterised by repeated lies, half-truths and evasions", the Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs, Laurie Brereton, said today.
"The Defence Intelligence reports published in the Bulletin magazine today confirm that Mr Downer consistently failed to speak the truth about events in East Timor over the course of this year."
"The documents show that while Mr Downer publicly accepted Indonesian Foreign Minister Alatas’s assurances about the arming of militias in East Timor, the Government was advised by the Defence Intelligence Organisation as early as 6 January that the Indonesian military were arming civilian militias in a deliberate strategy to subcontract out violence against pro-independence supporters."
When asked on the Sunday program of 7 March whether the Indonesian military were arming the militias, Foreign Minister Downer said:
‘If its happening at all and there is concern that it could be happening, if its happening at all, it certainly isn’t official Indonesian Government policy, it certainly isn’t something that’s been condoned by General Wiranto, the head of the armed forces. But there may be some rogue elements within the armed forces who are providing arms of one kind or another to pro-integrationists ... The Indonesian Government when we’ve raised it with them, including when I raised it with Ali Alatas the other day, have said that it certainly wasn’t happening, that they weren’t arming paramilitaries, there was some arming of the informal police support group who are civilians in East Timor but that applies in all of the provinces of Indonesia. There is nothing different or unusual about that, so I mean, I do accept the Indonesian Government’s word for it, that it’s not official Indonesian policy, but on the other hand it may be that some soldiers informally are doing this.’
Two months earlier, the Government had received the following assessment from DIO:
‘ABRI’s decision to arm local militias has drawn its first blood. As long as ABRI continues to contract-out some of its security responsibilities, more clashes are likely. ... ABRI has developed a defensive operational posture that aims to reduce the profile of regular units and turn some of the armed activity over to WANRA militia. ABRI has identified 440 villages where the population is sufficiently integrationist to permit WANRA units to be armed. ABRI recognises that using force against pro-referendum groups will continue to attract international criticism. So using force against the referendum movement looks likely to continue to be subcontracted to WANRA.’
"Mr Downer knew Foreign Minister Alatas’s assurances were in direct conflict with his own intelligence advice, yet he proceeded to publicly accept and endorse those assurances on 25 February, 7 March and 31 March."
"And this was only the beginning of a long series of statements notable for evasion, half-truths and wishful thinking. Even as late as 20 September, Mr Downer could only tell Parliament ‘some elements’ of the TNI were working with the militias. On 5 November he still maintained there was a clear difference between so-called legitimate security auxiliaries and the pro-integrationist militias."
"Foreign Minister Downer’s performance has been that of a man simply unable to tell the truth."
Attachment
EAST TIMOR CHRONOLOGY PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE REPORTS
5 December 1998:
Associated Press reports announcement by Indonesia’s military commander in Dili, Colonel Tono Suratman that the military intends to arm civilians to fight pro-independence rebels.
Colonel Suratman says that weapons would be issued to volunteers who would join the people’s defence force known as the WANRA. "I will equip those volunteers with guns in order to protect villages that are prone to rebel attacks."
7 December 1998: East Timor International Support Centre Press Release
ETISC highlights the Indonesian military’s plan to arm paramilitary groups in East Timor, warning "A ‘people’s defence force’ is just a cruel excuse to create another paramilitary group in East Timor. This defence force will be used by ABRI to do their dirty work, and being out of uniform they are unaccountable for the abuses they might commit.’
6 January 1999: Defence Intelligence Organisation Current Intelligence Brief reports the first killings by the pro-integrationist militias.
ABRI’s decision to arm local militias has drawn its first blood. As long as ABRI continues to contract-out some of its security responsibilities, more clashes are likely.
ABRI has developed a defensive operational posture that aims to reduce the profile of regular units and turn some of the armed activity over to WANRA militia. ABRI has identified 440 villages where the population is sufficiently integrationist to permit WANRA units to be armed. ABRI recognises that using force against pro-referendum groups will continue to attract international criticism. So using force against the referendum movement looks likely to continue to be subcontracted to WANRA.
More clashes ... are likely as tension rises between pro-referendum villages and those where WANRA units have been formed.
5 February 1999: Downer interview on ABC Radio Foreign Minister Downer says the Government cannot confirm reports that the Indonesian military are arming militias in East Timor.
Downer: "The Indonesian military are denying this ... It’s obviously very hard for us to verify one way or another."
25 February 1999: Downer Press Conference following meetings with the Indonesian Government Journalist: "Did you press the Indonesians on the question of disarmament and if so what was their response?"
Downer: "Yes, with Ali Alatas I did. I made it clear to him that we had heard reports that the Indonesians were providing arms, and that we were concerned about this. It wouldn’t improve the environment. Obviously it wouldn’t. And he explained to me that they weren’t giving arms out to pro-integrationists. But what they were doing was what they were doing in all the provinces, or just about all the provinces. I think he might have said all the provinces of Indonesia, and that is that they do have some civilian people who help in a policing function."
4 March 1999: Defence Intelligence Organisation Current Intelligence Brief
ABRI personnel in East Timor are condoning the activities of pro-Indonesian militants who have threatened Australian lives. Further violence is certain and Dili will be a focus. ABRI in East Timor are clearly protecting and in some instances operating with, militants who have threatened Australian lives. ... Wiranto’s views on ABRI’s involvement with militants are not known, but no vigorous action to reign in ABRI have been noted, implying that he is at least turning a blind eye. ... Unless Jakarta takes firm action, ABRI elements will continue to support intimidation and violence, or at least won’t prevent it.
7 March 1999: Downer Interview with Laurie Oakes on the Sunday Program. Asked about the arming of militias, Downer said:
"If its happening at all and there is concern that it could be happening, if its happening at all, it certainly isn’t official Indonesian Government policy, it certainly isn’t something that’s been condoned by General Wiranto, the head of the armed forces. But there may be some rogue elements within the armed forces who are providing arms of one kind or another to pro-integrationists who have been, you know, fighting for the cause of Indonesia. ... The Indonesian Government when we’ve raised it with them, including when I raised it with Ali Alatas the other day, have said that it certainly wasn’t happening, that they weren’t arming paramilitaries, there was some arming of the informal police support group who are civilians in East Timor but that applies in all of the provinces of Indonesia. There is nothing different or unusual about that, so I mean, I do accept the Indonesian Government’s word for it, that it’s not official Indonesian policy, but on the other hand it may be that some soldiers informally are doing this."
31 March 1999: Downer Questions and Answers at National Press Club
Downer: Well let me say something about this issue of the arming of paramilitaries, we obviously as I’ve pointed out have broached this on many occasions in many different ways with the Indonesian government and I can go back to last month when I raised this issue with the Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas and he told me that the Indonesian armed forces ABRI were not arming paramilitary’s. Nevertheless whilst we accept that is not the official policy of ABRI or the Indonesian government, there is a risk that some rogue elements within ABRI may be or may have been providing arms to the so-called paramilitaries in East Timor. ... I think it’s important to understand this, I don’t think that it is fair to claim that it is official Indonesian Government policy to arm paramilitary’s, I think it is however, possible that there has been some arming of those paramilitaries by rogue elements within ABRI, of course ABRI has a long history in East Timor.
8 April 1999: Defence Intelligence Organisation Current Intelligence Brief DIO’s preliminary assessment of the Liquica massacre notes that while ABRI’s exact role is unclear,
... it is known that ABRI had fired tear gas into the church and apparently did not intervene when the pro-independence activists were attacked. BRIMOB [Police Mobile Brigade] were allegedly standing behind the attacked at the church and firing into the air. ... ABRI is culpable whether it actively took part in the violence, or simply let it occur.
9 April 1999: Interview on ABC Radio with John McCarthy, Australian Ambassador to Indonesia.
McCarthy announces that Australian diplomats have been granted permission to travel to East Timor to investigate the Liquica massacre.
Journalist: What evidence are you hearing or do you have that ABRI may be involved?
McCarthy: Ah, the evidence that I’ve heard is more to the effect that ABRI weren’t active as they might have been, but there certainly has been , there’s been other evidence that they were involved, and I think we just need to wait until we get some clarification. There are a lot of conflicting accounts of what happened ... There have been a number of suggestions, which ABRI deny, that ABRI have encouraged some of the militias to take the actions that they have taken, or at least have stood back and let these things occur. Now ABRI deny that. But clearly we need to look at it thoroughly, and that’s what we’re trying to do."
11 April 1999: Downer interview with Glen Milne on Channel Seven Face to Face Program. Milne: Do you accept that the Indonesian army was involved in this incident?
Downer: Well, look, they were present, I understand, at the incident but there again, there’s a debate about what part they played. They clearly didn’t themselves kill people, but there is an argument, about whether they did try to stop the fighting or they didn’t do enough to try to stop the fighting, and the trouble is it’s very hard given we ourselves had no eye witnesses there, to be able to prove the case either way. The military give one story. Others give another story. Still others give a different story again. So our report is that you’re getting very conflicting accounts, wildly different accounts of what actually happened, but what you can be sure of is that some people did die, some people were injured and it was a very violent and unfortunate incident and we hope that such an incident doesn’t occur again.
16 April 1999: Further Downer comment on the Liquica massacre.
Downer refuses to release the report prepared by Australian diplomats following a visit to East Timor to investigate the Liquica massacre. "We aren’t in a position to be able to prove what happened there", Downer said. A spokesman for Downer said the report was unable to say what role ABRI played in the massacre.
27 April 1999: Downer interview with ABC Radio immediately after the conclusion of the Bali summit.
Downer: "There isn’t any doubt that the Indonesians through this process are committed to the laying down of arms, endeavouring to achieve disarmament using the Peace and Stability Commission which they established on 21 April to assist with that process but also to do so in consultation with the United Nations. I can say that much, and obviously we’re delighted to get that commitment from the Indonesians. ...We’ve been given firm commitments by the Indonesians - that is President Habibie, General Wiranto and the Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas. And their success in fulfilling those commitments, well all I can say is it remains to be seen, but we have no reason at all to doubt their goodwill."
"... What the Indonesians have said to us today is that the military’s role is increasingly going to be a role associated with broader national security and national defence and that the police will have a much more significant role in terms of internal security. I think people will feel more confident with the police playing a much more substantial role on the ground rather than the armed forces."
28 April 1999: Press Conference by Prime Minister Howard on the outcome of the Bali summit
Howard: "There has been a strong commitment made by the Indonesian government to the holding of an open and clean ballot. ... I have no reason to doubt the sincerity of the commitments that were made yesterday by both the President and also the other ministers who were present. So overall I think the outcome was very positive. ... There is no doubt that there has been a quantum shift so far as the assertion of control both in relation to the military by the Government and also the central control of the military in relation to its activities in East Timor. ... I am certainly satisfied from what’s happened publicly from the presence yesterday of General Wiranto, his participation in the discussions and the general attitude taken by Dr Habibie that there is a realisation that things had to change, that things have begun to change."
1 August 1999: Downer interview with Laurie Oakes on the Sunday Program following Downer’s visit to East Timor
Oakes: "So what undertakings did the [Indonesians] give you then about how they would keep the peace in phase two? Did they give you undertakings?"
Downer: "Oh yes, they’ve given undertakings they’ll keep the peace and ...the strategy that we’ve been promoting and they have let me say, have been quite positive in response to this, is that before we get to phase two there should be cantonment of the different parties, that is of the Falantil which is the military wing of the pro-independence group, of the militias which are the pro-integrationists and the Indonesian army should basically remain in their barracks. And the police would be responsible for the security of East Timor and the Indonesians are responding, well reasonably positively to that idea."
30 August 1999: Defence Intelligence Organisation Current Intelligence Brief issued on the day of the ballot.
TNI will continue to foster violence against its perceived enemies. But violence will remain orchestrated and its form and extent predictable at least for the next few weeks. ... Pro-Indonesia militant violence occurs within strict guidelines laid down by TNI. And the purposes and functions of violence in the territory are clear. We have good and timely indicators of any likely change in TNI policy on violence.
3 September 1999: Defence Intelligence Organisation Report prior to declaration of the ballot.
TNI is still hoping for a win or, at worse, narrow defeat for autonomy at the ballot, but privately many are more pessimistic. A key aspect of TNI’s efforts has been activity to disrupt UNAMET. ... GEN Wiranto has been fully aware of TNI activity, but until late August had not acted forcefully to control it. His chain of command is intact, with loyal officers in operational control. He was personally represented by MAJGEN Zacky Anwar ... and MAJGEN Adam Damiri, and he regularly directed the East Timor military commander. Wiranto did not, however, effectively rein in TNI support to the militias, and orders supposedly issued from Jakarta were not being fully heeded by officers in the province.
5 September 1999: Downer interview on Channel Ten’s Meet the Press Program.
Presenter: "Doesn’t the experience of the last few days tend to suggest the chain of command is by no means what we would like it to be, in terms of the influence that Wiranto and Alatas can have?"
Downer: "Well, I mean, it’s a fair question and it’s one that... on which there’s been a great deal of speculation for the last six months. But, look, I get the impression that President Habibie, Mr Alatas, General Wiranto are all trying to do the right th