TITLE: The Presidential Instruction; Laden With Uncertainty?

AUTHOR:

PUB: Tempo Magazine

DATE: April 17 - 23, 2001

Finally, the president has issued his much-awaited instruction to 'solve' the Aceh crisis. But the military has given it a cold response. They say it gives them too little protection from future legal action. ---------------------------------------------------------- Thanks to Presidential Instruction Number 4 of 2001, signed by President Abdurrahman Wahid last Wednesday, soldiers from the Rajawali Task Force are grateful for the chance "to show what they can do". Finally, they can leave for Aceh with aspirations to help crush the separatist rebellion there. Before the `order' was issued, soldiers complained that they were lounging around in uncertainty, unsure what they were training for. The task force was ready on March 14. That was when TNI spokesman Rear Marshal Graito Usodo announced that the force was considering a `limited military operation' which was intended to put an end to the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) rebellion. Two days earlier, an order officially declared GAM a separatist movement, enshrining on paper what has been a fact for years. Graito took the view that the level of violence in Aceh had exceeded the police's ability to cope. Once subordinate to the military, Indonesia's police force is now an independent entity and technically in charge of the government campaign against the Aceh guerrillas, although they routinely call on the military for help.The Rajawali soldiers may need to hold onto their exuberance for a bit longer. First their superiors have to win the war of words in Jakarta. According to Graito, "The police have not been given the capability to overcome this thing". Just 10 days after TNI announced the `limited military operation', chief security minister and retired general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono `clarified' the situation. There would be no `limited military operation'. Instead, there would be a `security operation', one of six strategic steps the government was taking to solve the Aceh problem. Hand in hand with it would be initiatives in the fields of economics, politics and social affairs. It was all a very big task, involving the vice-president, 14 ministers, the attorney general, the TNI commander, the national police chief, the Governor of Aceh, right down to the heads of local administration at regency level. But by the time the qualification was issued, the original order had been transmitted down to the ranks at battalion level. Commanders had already prepared their forces. The East Java-based Brawijaya military command had 1,040 soldiers ready to go. They come from Surabaya's Infantry Battalions 516 and 507 and from the `hunter' company Battalion 512 Malang. All have left Surabaya to join six company-level units being put together by the Kopassus special forces at the Kopassus Education Center in Batujajar, Bandung. What were they still waiting for? Their commanders were holding out for a legal `umbrella' of protection, whilst the soldiers continued training. In Batujajar, TEMPO met with soldiers whose faces betrayed their listlessness. The atmosphere was melancholy and overcast. They were eager for action, but found themselves wondering whether they might end up waiting forever for the Presidential Instruction.Now they have it, but the instruction reflects fears from outside the military. It got past legislators with a few provisos. One was that the words `limited military operation' be dropped. According to legislator Yasril Ananta Baharuddin, who heads Commission I of the House of Representatives (DPR) which deals with security issues, there were concerns the wording was too reminiscent of Aceh's past status as a `military operations area', known by the acronym DOM. The `DOM time' is now synonymous in Aceh with a period of military terror from 1990 to 1998 and widespread rights abuses. According to Yasril, such abuses are "clearly wrong, but there must be firm action rather than letting the problem carry on". Apparently the President himself was not convinced about the wisdom of a military operation. He preferred to continue negotiating with GAM leaders. That path was attempted last year (although many believe that it was an intention that was never seriously implemented), and failed to stem the upsurge in fighting. Will more violence solve things? "The President never believed that a military operation could make Aceh recover," the source said. TNI is not satisfied with the new instruction from their official commander in chief. "This Presidential Instruction is not going to bring any change at all," said a senior officer at TNI headquarters."What is the precise role of TNI?"the officer asked. According to this source, the new instruction still leaves the police in charge, but conditions in Aceh have now reached emergency levels and cannot be handled with "usual" methods. "Let us handle this problem," he said. His condition: "Give us trust without a lot of fuss." Army chief of staff General Endriartono Sutarto agrees. Long before this instruction was issued, Sutarto commented at a TNI event that the Aceh problem could be solved through a comprehensive Presidential Instruction. But this particular presidential instruction, he said, does not give TNI freedom to assume a larger role in improving security in Aceh. It is inadequate.TNI is rumored to prefer the format of a `government regulation to replace a law' in order to "solve" the Aceh problem, a move reminiscent of Indonesia's undemocratic past. Such an order has a higher legal status than a mere presidential instruction and is valid for longer. "We do not want to become victims again at a later date," said the source at TNI headquarters. In other words, TNI does not want to be targeted if government attitudes change, as has happened to TNI members over rights cases from former president Suharto's reign. When asked about the Government regulation, TNI chief spokesman Graito replied: "I am not at all involved in the problem."Both the Government and TNI are looking `two-faced' in this Aceh issue. Political analyst Salim Said points out that the government has said GAM is a separatist movement. Yet the police, not the military, control security issues in Aceh. This presidential instruction illustrates the government's ambiguous attitude. Given what is happening in Aceh right now, Salim says, the government should give the TNI freedom to handle the issue free of police control. How effective the Presidential Instruction will be on the ground is also questionable, he says. Its focus is not clear. Its scope is too wide. It is not fine-tuned to accommodate things that may yet happen in Aceh. According to Salim, the Presidential Instruction clearly shows Jakarta's muddled outlook. The most urgent demand from the Acehnese people may be to take the perpetrators of past human rights abusers to court. If so, that must be quickly done. According to Salim, it is not clear how the Presidential Instruction addresses this key issue.And the lack of clarity about authority in the field will trigger other problems, Salim said. The Presidential Instruction states that the police hold authority, not the military. On the ground, the reverse may be true. Salim questions whether the military can be effective if made to answer to the police. The police do not want to take responsibility if the military get out of control and do things they should not. "We have heard the national police chief himself say several times that conditions in Aceh are beyond their ability to cope," said Salim. He is not alone in his view. Sutradara Gintings, a legislator from the DPR's Indonesian Unity and Nationhood faction, sees the Presidential Instruction as weak, giving the soldiers little legal protection. A Presidential Instruction is customarily used within the bureaucracy itself, not outside. "I fear at some time TNI may be brought to task, even be accused of treachery because of this case," said Sutradara. East Timor, he said, shows how a brittle legal umbrella can make life difficult at a later date. A state of civil emergency might be a good alternative solution, he suggests, as in Maluku. But what sort of TNI legal protection is being advocated? Does Sutradara suggest that TNI should not be "brought to task" for unprofessional conduct? The President and legislators such as Yasril are anxious not to extend the apparent immunity from human rights abuses in Aceh that TNI has thus far received. Surely, the lack of accountability of TNI for civilian deaths in Aceh (which continue to far outnumber GAM deaths) is a cause rather than a solution of the escalation of violence in Aceh. A solution without guns, which stops bullets flying and grenades exploding, which prevents more victims dying, clearly is the type of solution that must be given top priority. Darmawan Sepriyossa and Purwani Diyah Prabandari/CM END top