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TITLE: First Baghdad Test for George W. Bush |
AUTHOR: Zvi Bar'el |
PUB: Ha'aretz |
DATE: February 16, 2001 |
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In the Middle East's volatile nexus of emotions and responses, when an American bomb falls in Baghdad, an Iraqi flag is proudly and defiantly raised in Ramallah. Protests staged by West Bank Palestinians against bombings in Iraq have over the past decade become a Pavlovian response. The chain reaction connecting Baghdad to anti-American demonstrations in Ramallah or Nablus exemplifies the tense muddle which could ensnare U.S. President George W. Bush when he tries to flex American muscle in the region. Friday's bombing, the first of its kind since 1998 (when Saddam Hussein booted UN inspectors out of the country), required the president's approval. Bush gave the go-ahead on Thursday, even though his new administration hasn't fully formulated its policies toward Iraq, and in spite of Secretary of State Colin Powell's upcoming visit to the region. While Bush declared that his administration plans to continue the same policies toward Saddam Hussein that were implemented by Bill Clinton, and by his father, Friday's sudden bomb attack obliterated two future scenarios that had been envisioned by some hopeful Arab leaders. For one thing, the bombing signaled that Bush doesn't plan to ease U.S. policy toward the Baghdad regime, despite Arab and international pressures on Washington to show increased flexibility. Also Bush is apparently disinclined to view Iraq as an issue inherently linked to the Arab world generally, and the Israel-Palestinian dispute in particular. Iraq, as Bush sees it, is an isolated and tightly-defined problem which should not be allowed to influence other issues in the Middle East. Yet Bush's apparent policy assumptions are not shared by the leaders of the Arab states, who were hoping for a new American attitude after the 2000 Presidential elections. These are the leaders of countries that joined the Arab coalition against Iraq in 1990, and accepted invitations to the Madrid conference. These are countries which have assisted in arriving at a "more balanced U.S. policy," meaning (among other things) a less indulgent and sympathetic attitude toward Israel. Under a tacit understanding which crystallized over the years, leaders of these states (with the exception of Jordan) would heed anti-Iraq economic sanction policies; in exchange, the Americans were to work as an "honest broker" in intensified efforts to resolve the Israel-Palestinian dispute, while not neglecting Arab points of view about that dispute. In the Arab perception, President Clinton abrogated this unwritten agreement, working as a partisan negotiator on Israel's behalf. Meantime waves of public outcry for aid to be given to the impoverished Iraqi population have engulfed various Arab regimes. Increasing numbers of residents in these Arab countries argue that it's wrong to make peace with Israel, while waging war on brothers in an Arab land, Iraq. Meantime, Iraqi money flowed to Palestinian Authority areas; and Saddam Hussein's declared willingness to launch a Jihad, or holy war, against Israel put Iraq at the forefront of states supporting the Palestinians. Thus, any strike against Baghdad constitutes a dagger thrust straight at the heart of the PA, and also a move which vexes the trend toward support for Iraq in Arab countries. This interlocking set of circumstances has fallen into place in recent months and years; and the new U.S. president faces a taut, potentially explosive, chain reaction scenario that was never a potential factor during his father's administration. © copyright 2000 Ha'aretz. END |